On 15 Sep 2016, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote:



On 9/15/2016 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Sep 2016, at 02:13, Brent Meeker wrote:



On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent. The "execution" of the program is timeless and exists in Platonia. So the steps of the UD have no duration, they are logically prior to time and duration. On the other hand, I think so called "observer moments" must have duration in the emergent sense and must overlap. But their relation to the UD threads is more aspirational than proven.

I think it should be possible to pause and restart at any point a process underpinning consciousness and leave the stream of consciousness unchanged; otherwise there would be a radical decoupling of the mental from the physical. At the limit, this means the process underpinning consciousness can be cut up into infinitesimals.

Infinitesimals, I think not, at least not in Bruno's model. Each thread of the UD's computation can be cut and restarted, but underlying an "observer moment" or a "thought" are infinitely many threads and there is no reference by which you can define cutting them all at "the same time". So they make the "time" of consciousness essentially real valued.

Good point.

But that is where the "infinitesimal" comes in, I would say, be them in terms of Cauchy sequences or in term of Non Standard analysis, that's not important at this stage. It depends on the mathematics of the arithmetical measure on 1p experiences (we get them trough the math of self-reference, but are still a long way from an arithmetical Gleason theorem).

Bruno

PS wrote this mail yesterday, seems to not have gone through. Sorry if sent in double exemplars.

But the 'time' is only a real number if you can order the events in the different threads relative to one another. In the materialist theory of mind that is provided by physical time, the evolution parameter of the wave function.

OK, but it does not work, as we lost all connection between physicalness and consciousness (by UDA).


I think that means that in your theory you have to derive time in order to locate 'thoughts' or 'observer moments'; they are no givens that you can assume.

Indeed. But we already got it through the logics of the first person (S4Grz1, X1*).

Note that the physical time is also not well explained in "materialist physics". In the DeWitt-Wheeler equation, it disappears, and reappears as a local indexical/modal notion. Strictly speaking, physicists have not yet an account of reality coherent with both QM and GR, so that is an problem in physics too. Anyway, we can't invoke a primitive physicalness to explain the conscious appearance of physicalness in the digital mechanist frame.

Bruno



Brent

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