On 07 Jan 2017, at 20:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 1/7/2017 2:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Jan 2017, at 02:42, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Jan 5, 2017 at 3:18 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> It is insufficient to explain what a computation is,
what is needed is an explanation of how to perform a calculation.
In textbooks on arithmetic it will say something like "take this
number and place it in that set" but how do I "take" a number and
how do I "place" it in a set without matter that obeys the laws of
physics?
By using the representation of finite sequence of number by a
number, for example by using Gödel's numbering
What!? that's just passing the buck! How can anything be "used"
by anything if matter that obeys the laws of physics is not
involved somewhere along the line ?
because with the standard definition of computation, they exist and
are realized in all models of Robinson Arithmetic. The definition
of computation does not involve matter, and indeed we can
eventually understand that matter is an appearance from the points
of view of immaterial machine implemented in an non material reality.
You do the same mistake than the people who say that a (physical)
simulation of a typhoon cannot make us wet. The usual answer to
this is that a simulation of "you + the typhoon" will make a "you"
feeling being wet in a relative way. It is the same in arithmetic,
where a simulation (actually infinitely many) of "you", below your
substitution level, will make you feel the appearance of matter
relatively to you.
No universal Turing machine can distinguish the following situations:
A physical device simulating Robinson arithmetic simulating a Lisp
universal program simulating that universal Turing machine,
and
Robinson arithmetic simulating a physical device simulating
Robinson arithmetic simulating a Lisp universal program simulating
that universal Turing machine.
Is this OK for everybody?
No. What would it mean for a UTM, a logical abstraction, to
"distinguish situations"? Sounds like a category error.
It means that the proposition "the löbian UTM u proves that the UTM u
see the difference between itself in this situation and/or that
situation" is an arithmetical truth (provable in RA, or PA, or ZF).
Exemple. keep in mind that we assume mechanism. So when you can or
cannot distinguish X from Y, there is a theorem in elementary
arithmetic which proves that from the states "brent meeker" (you at a
correct substitution level) relatively to some universal number ...
relatively to arithmetic (chosen as the base) there is a possibility,
or no possibility, to tell correctly the difference.
the notion of UTM is a logical abstraction, like the notion of dog,
but when we talk about a special dog or a special utm, we give its
precise specification, like the number sent on mars in a teleportation.
And what does it mean to simulate a physical device? All the
simulations of physical devices that I'm familiar with are really
just simulations of some high-level model of the device.
Yes. necessarily so with computationalism given that any piece of
matter is a first person plural notion summing up an infinity of
computations.
You forget that I have proven here and there no physical device at all
can be emulated by a digital machine, so the simulation concerns
*only* "higher level model of the device".
Here, of course, I was talking abpout the Turing Universal higher
level aspect of some subset of physical law.
Given the ubiquity of quantum entanglement, I doubt that it is
possible to simulate a physical device in an absolute sense.
We agree on this since long!
That is a theorem of classical computer science, in the physics
extracted from machine's self-reference.
If someone believes that some primary matter is needed to get
consciousness of that matter appearance, it is up to them to
explain how that primary matter can have a role in the computation.
But if you succeed, then some primary matter has a rôle in
consciousness which is no more Turing emulable, and
computationalism is false.
>> And I still don't see how you can be blithely talking
about the set that contains all true mathematical statements and
no false ones when you must know there is no way to construct such
a set even in theory.
> That set cannot be defined in arithmetic, but admit a
simple definition in set theory or in analysis.
A definition is NOT a construction!
Yes, that is exactly the point. We can define the set of
arithmetical true statements, and so we can *talk* about it,
without being able to construct it, or to generate it mechanically.
The collection of definable set of numbers is larger than the
collection of semi-computable, or recursively enumerable sets. The
set of computable or recursive sets of numbers is not computable.
The set of solutions of a universal diophantine polynomial equation
is semi-computable, but the set of numbers which are not solutions
of a that universal diophantine equation, although easily
definable, so that we can talk about, is not semi-computable (it is
pi_1 instead of sigma_1).
It's extraordinarily easy to define a Faster Than Light
Spaceship, it's right there in the very name of the thing, it's a
spaceship that can move faster than light, but that doesn't mean
anybody can construct such a thing . The very laws
of mathematics you keep talking about tell us
there is NO WAY even in theory to construct a set that has all
true mathematical statements and no false ones ; forget
practicalities you can't do it even in theory, not even if
you had a infinite amount of time to work
on it. So using such a set to tell us something about reality is
not permissible under the rules of logic.
> The whole chapter of mathematical logic known as recursion
theory studies and classifies the degree of unsolvability of such
set.
A classification is NOT a construction anymore than a definition
is!
Of course. Again that is what I was saying. Nobody said that all
sets of numbers are constructible, indeed the set of definable sets
is larger than the set of recursively enumerable set, itself larger
than the set of totally computable, recursive, sets. You make my
point.
The Faster Than Light Spaceship is in the "vehicle"
class and in the "spaceship" class but unfortunately it is also in
the "fictional" class because nobody can construct one.
By mocking the possibility of doing theology in the scientific
way, the gnostic-atheists (believers in a Primary Physical Reality
Does " Primary Physical Reality " mean a belief that
matter is all there is?
No. It means that a Physical Reality which has to be assumed. It
means a Physical reality which would not been able to be explained
without assuming that matter.
As I said often I used "primary" in the sense: "has to be assumed",
or "the appearance of which cannot be derived from something else".
Which illustrates the flaw in your argument. Like the simulated
typhoon that can wet the simulated you, the arithmetical you can
only exist relative to an arithmetical physics.
Or an arithmetical dream, that is a computation (an arithmetical
object).
What do you mean by arithmetical physics? Do you mean a physics
emerging from the numbers internal FPI, or a digital physics (a
program simulating a universe (I guess no from above).
When you see a flaw, you need to be much more precise. "the
arithmetical you" lives in arithmetic, and we explain why he believes,
eve,n correctly from its first person view, in a physical reality,
which actually cannot be arithmetical at all, but it is not among what
exist at the base level, where only 0, s(0), etc. exist.
So the physics is not dispensable.
In the sense that it is no more assumed, and thus no more fundamental:
it is derived from arithmetic (we can even discharge the assumption of
mechanism, in fact, as long as the arithmetical physics is not refuted).
But given that it is not dispensable, it is essential to arithmetic
and consciousness and so what is primary is meaningless.
?
Here are the difference in the theory:
Copenhagen assumes arithmetic + a wave + a collapse + a non
intelligible dualist theory of mind.
Everett assumes arithmetic + a wave + mechanism
I show that Everett theory can oly work if the following theory works:
arithmetic + mechanism.
That is, I reduce the problem of qualia and quanta to the problem of
justifying both the qualia and the quanta from the numbers and a
statistics on numbers' thought.
Brent
Most people agree that biological facts do not need to be assumed.
They can be derived from the laws of chemistry. That is the reason
why few scientist would assumed a primary vital principle (vitalism).
Similarly, with computationalism, the physical facts do not needed
to be assumed (and worst cannot be assumed in fact). They have to
be derived from the statistics on all computations which exist
provably when we assume Robinson Arithmetic, (or the laws of
combinators, ...). If we can explain the mind from the sigma_1
arithmetical relations, then we have to expain the appearance of
matter by the statistics on all computations. The Universal
Dovetailer Argument explains why we have to do that, and the
interview of (any) Löbian machine shows that it works: indeed the
set of computable states corresponding to machine's yes-no type of
observation inherit a precise quantum logic derived from the logic
of self-reference. It is the logic of []p & <>t , with p sigma_1
(that is equivalent with an arithmetic formula having the shape
ExP(x, y) with P recursive.
If so then I don't believe in it. Yes nouns exist but so do
adjectives, aka information.
> and believer in the zero personal gods theory)
maintain the field in the hands of the clericals
How long do you suppose the Catholic Church would last if
the Pope said "There is no personal God. God exists but He's an
invisible fuzzy amoral mindless blob . "
? I would estimate about .9 seconds.
That is optimist.
But who care about the opinion of someone still using argument per-
authority in the field?
A personal God who might grant us immortality if we
flatter Him enough is the only type of God that 99.9% of the
1.2 Billion Catholics are interested in. That's why they go to
Mass on Sunday, to butter Him up. If He's not personal then God
is about as useful to them as a screen door on a
submarine .
Who care? We know that they are wrong (methodologically wrong at
the least) since they forbid the greek way to reason on such matter
(thus: since 523, when they banished Platonism and all "pagan non
confessional religions").
You illustrate again that you want to keep the pope and the pseudo-
religious believers happy.
You illustrate again that Gnostic Atheism is a form of catholicism.
Bruno
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-
l...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.