Hi Bruno! >> Evolution is a theory on the origins of biological complexity. We know >> nothing about consciousness. > > > > Do you agree that consciousness is a form of knowledge? That is: > consciousness requires some knowledge, and (genuine) knowledge requires some > conscious person)?
I agree, but I feel it begs the question: knowledge is an awareness of something, it implies consciousness by definition. What is the situation with an artificial neural network? Does it know something, or is it akin to a stone being kicked down a hill? Or is the stone being kicked down a hill akin to our brains and requiring consciousness already? > Then do you agree with the S4 theory of rational knowledge, which is that > > (knowable x) implies x > (knowable (x implies y)) implies ((knowable x) implies (knowable y)) > (knowable x) implies (knowable (knowable x)) > > With the inference rules: > > If I prove x I can deduce (knowable x) > + modus ponens I'm ok with this. > If you are OK with this, it is not difficult to explain why evolution, or > anything actually, cannot NOT bring consciousness, and a first person > knower, in the picture. Here I don't follow. Aren't you making the hidden assumption: (knowable x) => (known x) ? Notice that I do tend to think what you say, that "anything actually, cannot NOT bring consciousness" -- but I see this as part of my "personal religion". I'm just not convinced that the above proves it. > That is a consequence of incompleteness which make the machine aware of the > difference between []p and []p & p. The machine can know that []p obeys to > the modal logic G and that ([]p & p), the definition of "knowable" by > Theaetetus, obeys to the modal logic S4 + Grz (with Grz the Gregorczyk > formula). > > Now, consciousness is not exactly knowledge, but a knowledge of some > "reality". But "who" knows? Again, isn't this begging the question? > It is based on an implicit automated belief in our consistency > (which is equivalent with the existence of a "model" in the logician sense, > which means some "reality" satisfying our belief. This makes consciousness > close to inconsistency. Interesting idea. > Then it can be shown that consciousness, which is unavoidable, has still > some important role in evolution, as it makes the machine self-speed-up-able > and more and more autonomous relatively to the probable universal > machine/number which supports them. For me evolution has a very fractal-like quality to it, in the sense that it generates machines that become very similar to the machine where they come from. I am still not convinced that consciousness is necessary to explain biological complexification. Can you expand? > Similarly, we get the feeling and the qualia with the logic of []p a p, and > []p & <>t & p, with p sigma_1. This add the symmetrical (p implies []p) in > the picture, and leads to quantum sort of logics. Here I don't follow. You alluded to this quantum-like logic a few times but you never expanded (I think). I would be interested in a more detailed explanation. > It makes also consciousness into a bridge between the 3p arithmetical > picture and the (many) 1p internal views, including the first person plural > physics, making this theory testable (and confirmed up to now, both > introspectively and quantitatively). cf NUMBER ==> CONSCIOUSNESS/DREAM ==> > PHYSICAL-REALITY. Do you believe you can make a prediction that could be experimentally tested, ideally something that has not been observed yet? > This explains notably why consciousness is what we know the best from the 1p > view, and yet is completely NOT definable in any 3p sense (like the notion > of Arithmetical Truth). You mean because it does not exist in 3p? > Intutively: consciousness brings the semantics, or the meaning of our > beliefs, and that speed-up the possible actions of the machine, making the > development of consciousness an advantage in the evolution, even if it > brings some amount of self-delusion, like the many confusion between the > reality that we infer with a reification of the reality that we observe ... > until Pythagoras and Plato get back to the scientific doubt and skepticism. I always have a hard time seeing consciousness as causal. What about does experiments with MRI that show decision being made before the person in aware of deciding? T. >> >>>> I don't quite understand why an omnipotent being >>>> >>>> would "want" anything, He should already have it. Nevertheless the >>>> >>>> religious say God does want certain things and they know exactly >>>> precisely >>>> >>>> what they are and they insist on telling us about it; and they also >>>> insist >>>> >>>> God can't get what He wants on His own, we have to help the poor fellow >>>> >>>> achieve His aims. >>>> >>>>> >>>> You are describing Abrahamic religions. I don't believe in them either. >>> >>> >>> >>> I don't think the >>> Hindu religion >>> is significantly less stupid. There are some forms of Buddhism and Taoism >>> that aren't stupid but they aren't religions, they don't say anything >>> about >>> God, don't say faith is a virtue, and don't even claim they are revealing >>> something new about the world, instead they are doing something much more >>> modest, they are giving personal advice; they are saying this is a way to >>> be >>> happy. Not the only way, maybe not the best way, just a way. >> >> >> Ok, so you only recognise something as a religion if you think it's >> stupid. Not hard to win an argument with that move... >> >>>>> >>>> I think you are not interested in what Bruno has to say. There's >>>> nothing wrong with that, but it's just a personal preference of yours. >>> >>> >>> >>> Well yes, but how could not being interested in something not be a >>> personal >>> preference. >> >> >> It could not be "just a personal preference", which is what I wrote. > > > > Indeed, all what I say is deducible from the computationalist assumption, > intuitively and formally. The only way a God, or a Matter, can change the > consequences is by attaching consciousness to something which is not Turing > emulable nor recoverable from the First Person Indeterminacy in the set of > all (relative) computational consistent continuations, with or without > oracle. This makes the physical reality stable for some Random Oracle, as > the observation confirmed with the quantum indeterminacy. It leads also to > apparent non-locality. > > Bruno > > > > > >> >> Telmo. >> >>> John K Clark >>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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