On 02 May 2017, at 23:17, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, May 2, 2017 at 3:39 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
> We know (modulo Mechanism) that the experience will feel to
be unique and asymmetrical when we are still in Helsinki.
Modulo my ass, when I am in Helsinki I know I am in Helsinki and
nowhere else and I don't need to assume Mechanism or anything else
to know it.
You just evade the question. I said, in Helsinki, I know (assuming
mechanism of course) I will push on a button, and find myself alive in
ONE city, living an asymmetrical condition.
> >Even after the experiment is over nobody can answer even
approximately the question " what one and only one city will I
see after I am duplicated?".
> if you are using "will", the question has to be asked before.
The question must be asked before the experiment but the ANSWER
must be available AFTER the experiment otherwise there is no way to
know if the prediction made before the experiment turned out to be
true.
Right. But don't forget that the question is on the future personal
experience, not about the localisation of all experiences involved
after the duplication.
You say the correct answer could have been either city
No. It is "W or M"? Then that remains correct and verified by the two
copies. each specific prediction W, or M, is refuted by one copy, and
that is enough to refute the prediction.
but there is no way to say which city from "the 1-p" (whatever that
means) would be correct before the experiment. So all I want to know
is AFTER the experiment is over what city turned out to be correct
from "the 1-p of the 1-p of the 1-p of the 1-p ....". No I don't
know what that string of peas means but you claim to know so which
city was seen? I say he will see both because after duplication the
Helsinki man is now two so seeing 2 cities at th same time is no
problem;
So you say that the two guys have the personal experience of seeing
the two cities? That needs a peculiar telepathic ability. It is simply
non-sense, and it contradicts the fact that you have agreed in
previous post that both copies see only one city. But I think you are
just eliminating that first person experience, as seen from that first
person perspective, so that you can say he see both cities, which is
the correct third person view, but obviously non sensical as a first
person view, on which the question was all about.
but you say that's wrong, so what one and only one city did it turn
out to be, Moscow or Washington? If you can't answer that simple
question with one word then it's not a experiment.
We cannot answer to youyr question, but it is still an experiment once
we agree to listen to what each copy will say. deciding that this is
not an experiement is equivalent with denying the first person
experience of the subject. That is the usual materialist elimination
of the first person, consciousness, etc.
The fact that this can not be answered is not due to some deeply
hidden fact about the nature of reality, it can't be answered
because it's not a question, it's not even a stupid question, in a
world that contains "I" duplicating machines it's just gibberish
with a question mark at the end.
> That is just denying simple verifiable facts,
The trouble is the one and only one city that correctly answers
the question can NOT be verified EVER,
A kid can do the verification. "W v M" is verified by both copies. "W"
is refuted by one copy. "M" is refuted by one copy. "W & M" is refuted
by both copies.
not because I don't know the answer but because I don't know the
question.
Where will the guy in Helsinki find itself after pushing the button.
Computationalism makes this isomorphic to coin throwing. We could even
argue that here, the P = 1/2 is exact, given the numerical identify of
the copies (in the case of throwing a coin, some could insist the
proba is due to contingent ignorance, where in the duplication
scenario, the ignorance is intrinsic and imposed by logic).
You string some ASCII characters together and put a question mark
at the end and claim my inability to respond to it points to
something of cosmic importance, well I can't respond to
xhsduye77f? either but I don't think that indicates anything profound.
> Some non specific answer is available, and "W or M" works
perfectly.
Yes it works, as long as it's not a exclusive or.
But it has to be an exclusive OR. The guy in Moscow has no mean to see
what the guy in Washington is seeing. And vice-versa. Unless telepathy
or some synchronisation technology added in both places (and thus in a
different protocol), the two first person experience are incompatible.
> To say that this makes no sense is equivalent with
eliminating the first person experience of both copies.
No it is not, it's equivalent to saying "Asking what one and only
one future first person experience you will have after you walk into
that you duplicating machine is just plain stupid".
Yet we know in Helsinki that there are no other options, (than two
predict one unknown city) and both copies will agree with this.
>> So according to you the Helsinki man
will see NEITHER Moscow NOR Washington,Washington is wrong, given
that it fails for the Moscow man, and Moscow is wrong as it fails
for the Washington man.
> That simply does not follow.
I say the Helsinki Man will see Washington AND Moscow but you say
that's incorrect,
I keep saying that this is correct in the 3-1 picture. The guy in
Moscow can say "I am in both city". But he cannot say "I feel from the
first person experience that I am in both city" (unless telepathy).
you say and I quote "Washington is wrong, given that it fails
for the Moscow man" and you also say "Moscow is wrong as it
fails for the Washington man". So it simply DOES follow that
according to you the poor Helsinki man will see NEITHER Moscow NOR
Washington.
... with certainty. Yes. because each copy can listen to the other.
But that does not mean that "~W & ~M" is correct, only that "W & M" is
incorrect.
And yes I know what you will retort, for the peepee but not for the
peepee's peepee or some such thing.
>> Then from “the 1-p experience
itself" what one and only one city will the Helsinki man see
after the duplication experiment is over?
> The point is that it is impossible to know that in advance.
Forget "in advance", after the experiment was compete what one
and only one city did it turn out to be?
After the experience, we have two answers, compatibel in the 3p
picture, and incompatible in the 1p picture, like god or truth might
know that Bruno Marchal and John Clark are the same person, but,
without telepathy, they can only feel different, and the duplication
experience is about predicting what we feel. The obvious answer is
that we don't feel like being duplicated, we don't feel anthing
different from a simple teleportation, except that we (both) get a
doppelganger at a distant place.
What have you learned after the experiment that you didn't know
before?
The name of the city behind the reconstitution box door. And that, I
could predict in advance? But not which specific city.
If you can answer those questions then it's not a experiment, it's
not even a thought experiment.
> When I throw a coin, I can't say the result in advance. If I
could answer to your question, then there would be no first person
indeterminacy indeed.
You can't predict a coin flip, it could come out heads or tails, but
AFTER the flip is over it's easy to tell which one turned out
to be correct. But even AFTER your "experiment" is over nobody can
tell which answer turned out to be correct.
Nobody? What about each reconstituted person? Again, you eliminate the
experience lived by both copies, which both learned which city they
are confronted with. There is no 3p indeterminacy, we have agreed on
that, but each copies can and will acknowledge seeing only one city,
and thus getting the result confirming or not the prediction made in
Helsinki, which was about that first person experience, seen from the
first person perspective.
Bruno
The basic difference is that the question "how will this coin flip
turn out?" is crystal clear even if I don't know the answer, but the
question "what one and only one city will I see after I walk into
that I duplicating machine?" is nothing but gibberish. I don't
know the answer because I don't know the question.
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
