On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 6:02 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > You just evade the question. I said, in Helsinki, I know (assuming > mechanism of course) > What does mechanism have to do with it? > > > I will push on a button, and find myself alive in ONE city, living an > asymmetrical condition. > Doesn't the fact that even *AFTER* "I" push the button "I" *STILL* don't know what *ONE* city "I" ended up in make you suspect that maybe just maybe the way personal pronouns are used needs to be changed in a world that contains "I" duplicating machines? > > > don't forget that the question is on the future personal experience, > That exactly is the problem, in a world with "I" duplicating machines there is no such thing as *THE * future personal experience , there is only* A* future personal experience . > > So you say that the two guys have the personal experience of seeing the > two cities? > > That needs a peculiar telepathic ability. > Two guys personally experiencing two cities need to be telepathic? Well you and I are two guys and we're personally experiencing two different cities right now, so I guess we're telepathic. > >> >> what one and only one city did it turn out to be, Moscow or Washington? >> If you can't answer that simple question with one word then it's not a >> experiment. > > > > > We cannot answer to youyr question, but it is still an experiment once we > agree to listen to what each copy will say. deciding that this is not an > experiement is equivalent with denying the first person experience of the > subject. > Quite true, I do indeed deny that someone who is about to be duplicated will have a thing called "*THE* first person experience " in the future. There is nothing profound here, i t's a trivial and obvious fact that "you" can not name the one and only one city that "you" will see in the future after "you" walk into a "you" duplicating machine because a city that fits that description *DOES NOT EXIST*. >> >> >> The trouble is the one and only one city that correctly answers the >> question can NOT be verified EVER, > > > > A kid can do the verification. > Then it's important that we find that kid so he can tell us if the one and only one city turned out to be Moscow or Washington. > > The guy in Moscow has no mean to see what the guy in Washington is seeing. > And vice-versa. > True, and that is why the Moscow man is not the Washington man, but that is irrelevant because both are the Helsinki man; so yesterday my statement "the Helsinki man will see both cities" turned out to be true. > > > the two first person experience are incompatible. > Yes, and that is why today they are not each other even though yesterday they were both the Helsinki man. > > > The guy in Moscow can say "I am in both city". But he cannot say "I feel > from the first person experience that I am in both city" > So what? You've only talked with one Helsinki man, but there is another. >> >> What have you learned after the experiment that you didn't know before? > > > The name of the city behind the reconstitution box door. > Well don't keep us in suspense, now that you've opened the door what was the name of the city that "you" saw, was it Moscow or Washington? >> >> You can't predict a coin flip, it could come out heads or tails, but >> *AFTER* the flip is over it's easy to tell which >> one >> turned out to be correct. But even *AFTER* your "experiment" is over >> nobody can tell which answer turned out to be correct. > > > > > Nobody? > Nobody. > > > What about each reconstituted person? > What about them? > > > Again, you eliminate the experience lived by both copies, > I did noting of the sort. Both say they are the Helsinki man and I believe both because both remember being the Helsinki man, and one says he is experiencing Moscow and the other says he is experiencing Washington and I believe both of them about that too. So if the man in Helsinki ended up seeing both cities then if that man asked yesterday "what cities will I experience tomorrow" the correct answer is obvious. And by the way, I still don't understand why we keep talking about predictions when predictions, neither correct ones nor incorrect ones, have anything to do with the subjective feeling of self. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
