On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> >> >> On 5/28/2017 3:40 AM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> >> >> On 28 May 2017 5:52 a.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >> >> >> On 5/27/2017 3:20 PM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> I think what is meant by the reversal is clear enough. The forward >>> hypothesis, mechanism, is that the realization of some information >>> processing in the brain, or other physical system, instantiates >>> consciousness. The reverse, platonism, is that all computations exist and >>> hence among them will be computations that instantiate all possible >>> conscious thoughts. >>> >>> And among all those thoughts there will be some that instantiate exactly >>> those thoughts we have, including those thoughts of perceiving and >>> inferring a physical world and other people. Thoughts are related by >>> threads of computation and consequently they can be classified into some >>> that can be proven and some that are true but can't be proven. One might >>> hypothesize that this division corresponds to what is thought and is >>> communicable versus what is thought but can't be communicated, i.e. the >>> internal thoughts of consciousness. >>> >> >> Yes, although I think you could be more explicit that "those thoughts >> of perceiving and inferring a physical world and other people" must >> encompass the entire spectrum of observable physical phenomena. The >> relevant computation must also precisely mirror the transformational >> schemas of physics. >> >> >> But that's the rub. If the physics is instantiated by the UD >> computation, is it really a "reversal" >> >> >> Yes. You keep missing the point that the reversal is already with the >> 'psychology' of machinery at a fundamental explanatory level, >> >> >> No, the fundamental explanatory level is the set of all possible >> computations - as might be executed in the abstract by a UD. From this >> plethora we are to extract in some sense experiences AND the physics of >> which they are experiences. >> > > Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "we are to extract" over > "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in short, subject precedes > object in the explanation. That's the reversal. > > > Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little bit, > or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object". >
Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too short. But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt to avoid ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :( > I would say that subjects precedes physical objects > , > as physics becomes a first person plural notion. > Exactly > But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have to > admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical sense) the > subject, which arises from the infinitely many computations which supports > its self-referential modes. > Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or ontological component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain objective sense, but their 'observable' or epistemological component can only be realised (i.e. made true) in terms of a point-of-view. > > We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but that > would be a bit ad hoc, > Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of the inner God-subject. That's one of the reasons I find that particular heuristic intuitively helpful. I guess it's my version of the Wittgenstein ladder. But don't worry, I can always let go of it. I hope. > even if for the numbers+addition+multiplication, we can only explains > them by "God made them", in the sense that we cannot recover them by > assuming less than anything Turing equivalent with them. > I can't think of anything less, offhand. > Sorry for splitting the airs, I guess, > Split away! It's hairs, by the way :) David > > Bruno > > > > >> such that in a sense one can think of the entirety of experience in terms >> of that of a single type of psychological agent. This is then the >> subjective filter that effectively constrains stable, pervasive and thereby >> (crucially) *consistently memorable* experiences from the rest of the >> computational Babel. And the consequence of that subjective filtration, in >> conjunction with the transformational computation that effects that its >> very stabilisation, then comprises the effective physics of the >> experiencer, with the caveats already mentioned. So subject precedes object >> in explaining the appearance of physics. That is the reversal. And it is >> necessitated by the not inconsiderable problem that the alternative >> explanatory order cannot help but *omit the explanation of the experiencer >> and its experiences*. >> >> or is it just a Church-Turing version of Tegmark, i.e. replacing the >> equations of quantum field theory with some computational sequences that >> have the same effect at the level of our experience. >> >> >> But why be so cavalier about "the level of our experience"? It's that >> very level that is omitted or merely taken for granted in the conventional >> explanatory order. Remember that the point of departure for all this is the >> computational theory of *mind*. Nonetheless, the price of the ticket turns >> out to be a computational theory of everything. Should this surprise us? >> >> >> But it's not clear to me that it has *mind* as fundamental. Mind is to >> be explained by relations of provability (which doesn't seem very plausible >> - but maybe). >> > > Well, mind here is explained in a sort of duality of provability and > truth, or externality and internality. The internal or 'qualitative' > aspect is captured both by its incommunicability (as seen from the > 'outside') and its indubitability (as seen from the 'inside). > > > >> The fundamental stuff is all possible computations, or arithmetic. >> >> >> If so, in this characterisation there would indeed be an explanatory >> reversal between physics and the psychology of the machine, as Bruno >> phrases it. >> >> >> Fine, if it actually explained something instead of saying "If this >> theory is correct there must be an explanation in terms of UD computational >> threads." >> >> >> I think you're being excessively demanding at this stage. The reversal is >> already a startling change in explanatory perspective. If it bears out, it >> can lead to a complete reformulation, not of the mind-body problem in >> isolation, but of the entire problem of origin and creativity. If one then >> takes this in conjunction with the failure of the conventional explanatory >> sequence to account in a non-question-begging manner for the very >> possibility of there being an observable reality in the first place, one >> can perhaps scrape together sufficient motivation to maintain a modicum of >> interest. >> >> >> The physical theory of cognition does explain some things - like the >> effect of tequila on mathematical ability, why we don't remember the >> future, why we love our children, etc. >> >> >> Again you keep missing the hugely crucial point that your >> characterisation above implicitly includes a privileged extrinsic >> interpretation. It's this latter that I've called a Wittgenstein ladder. It >> represents an artificial aid to comprehension that must ultimately be let >> go if the final explanation is not to beg the central question at issue. >> This crucial question is of course that of *intrinsic* interpretation. In >> the last analysis (which we cannot, finally, ignore) no theory of >> perception can coherently rely on interpretation from any perspective but >> that of the subject itself. The vital matter of *your* experience cannot >> ultimately be left to the mercy of *my* interpretation. Can it? >> >> >> "Vital" and "left to the mercy" are just rhetorical flourishes. >> > > I would have hoped nonetheless that my meaning was clearer to you. > > >> It may well be that third person accounts of you experience my be >> possible. >> > > But that's my whole point, don't you see? "Third person accounts" always > refers to an externalised interpretation in terms of which *this can be > said to be an account*. But the point is that the final account is always > an *internalised*, first-person one of which the third-person version is > merely a description. IOW *my* subjectivity can't intelligibly depend > solely on *your* externalised description of it. And of course vice versa. > > >> Consider my AI Mars Rover example. It behaves with human like >> intelligence - and it is generally agreed that a philosophical zombie is >> impossible, hence the Mars Rover is conscious. >> > > That argument is a mere artifact of the way the definition is formulated. > It's simply saying that if consciousness is considered to depend only on > physical action then both we and the Mars Rover must be considered > conscious because our physical actions are deemed to qualify in that > respect. > > And the engineers who designed its sensors and wrote its programs will >> be able to give you a very good account of what it is conscious of. What >> it's thoughts are on various subjects. What answers it will be give to >> various questions. Even how it would be affect by tequila. Of course you >> will say, "Yes, but they won't know it's inner experience." >> > > You're missing the point again. Which is that both the engineers' > accounts, and your own account of their accounts, ultimately depend solely > on internalised first-person interpretations (i.e. theirs and yours). Your > subsequent description is then an attempt to make this interpretation > explicit in the third-person mode. But the first-person interpretation is > the lens through which all this is being viewed (aka the Wittgenstein > ladder). Since it's that very lens we're trying to explain, you can't > simply assume it in the explanation. In effect, the account you give above > eliminates it from the explanans whilst implicitly retaining it in the > explanandum. > > > >> But Newton didn't know how gravity reached across empty space. >> Einstein didn't know why stress-energy appears on the RHS. >> > > True, but if such an account were to be known or knowable it would > presumably be fully accountable in the third-person mode without loss. > Indeed isn't that what Einstein achieved with respect to Newton's spooky > action at a distance? > > And Bruno doesn't know why some computations instantiate experience and >> others don't, and which do which. >> > > He won't ever know *why* because that's subsumed in the assumption of > CTM. But his aim, at least in a preliminary way, on the basis of that > assumption, is to suggest *how*, and in so doing also make plausible what > the logical limits of such an account might consequently be. > > The further point is that, if an everythingist approach is to work, both > the how and the why must in the end 'self-select' from the dual plenitude > of the ontological and epistemological assumptions. I know you have a > distaste for this mode of explanation and indeed in the end it might never > be made to work. But as a conception it has a certain compelling quality; > at least it does for me. That's because, at least potentially, it addresses > core questions of origins and creativity without assuming either. > Everything that is, and everything that can be performed or known, emerge > in this view as the dumb extensional consequences of an intensionally > minimal widget, itself a consequence of mere arithmetic. It's a conception > of an entirely ignorant but supremely productive creative process. To that > extent it might be said to out-Darwin Darwin. > > >> >> I have suggested several times to Bruno questions related to >> fundamental physics which it seems his theory might address, e.g. why is QM >> based on complex Hilbert space instead of quarteronic or octonic? Is the >> wave function ontic or epistemic? But then he says his theory is just >> showing there's a problem - not solving them. >> >> >> Well give the poor guy a break why don't you? Open problems are open to >> all. Why not give it a try yourself? That said, in response to your >> question about the wavefunction, this bears on the distinction I've >> recently been trying to draw between the ontological and epistemological >> components of a general theory. Inasmuch as the wavefunction is itself an >> inference from the arithmetical ontology, in terms of my explanatory scheme >> it is therefore an aspect of epistemology. IOW the implication is that the >> physical organisation imposed on the computational Babel by subjective >> filtration 'necessarily' (with the usual caveats here) takes the >> mathematical form of the wavefunction. >> >> >> That's the implication of a hope. >> > > Indeed. But doesn't all speculation begin that way? > > >> >> >> With an incidental historical appropriateness, this is probably the view >> that Schrodinger himself might well have taken, given his well known >> philosophical position. >> >> Computationalism makes this characteristic of the physical a little less >> surprising since the superposition of outcomes is a direct consequence of >> the multiplicity of continuations proceeding from any relative state. >> >> >> No. The multiplicity is use to explain the probabilistic nature of >> outcomes - or beliefs. But it doesn't explain interference patterns that >> arise from superpositions. >> > > You're right; my imprecision. What I meant of course is that it would at > least make the counterfactuality implied by MWI plausible to that extent. > > >> >> >> The question of relative measure of course remains open for solution. >> >> >> Of course there is an assumption here that the modes of perception we are >> attempting to explain depend in some critical way on just that physics >> whose phenomena we observe and whose mathematical transformations we >> hypothesise. And further that the measure of such a physics would typically >> predominate over any other physics that might produce either different >> modes of perception or a different spectrum of 'probabilities'. These are, >> to say the least. open problems although as you are aware they have begun >> to figure even in 'conventional' physical speculation. >> >> >> Yes, very open. It's a version of everything happens, and that explains >> everything. >> >> >> But this is the Everything List, so if not here where and if not now >> when? Everythingism, in whatever form, seems in favour at the moment as a >> general opening up of the possibilities of explanation with a corresponding >> minimisation of the basic entities and relations to be 'taken for granted'. >> As such, it will either collapse into the theoretical graveyard as is the >> fate of most such hypotheses or else emerge into the light as a genuinely >> novel and fertile direction. >> >> I know you're fond of the slogan that a theory that explains everything >> actually succeeds in explaining nothing. But in fact I think this is a >> misunderstanding of the original aphorism. Its applicability is appropriate >> to a theory of epicycles - psychoanalysis for example - in terms of which >> there can be no counter-examples because new epicycles can always be added >> to shore up the structure, no matter how rickety it becomes. Bruno's >> approach isn't like that. It's open to falsification by counter-example or >> contradiction at any point. So aren't you still curious? Just a little? >> >> >> Sure. That's why I've been on this list a long time. And I've even >> offered to recommend Bruno for a Templeton - his theological approach would >> really appeal to them. >> > > Good idea. > > David > > >> >> >> Brent >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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