On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal" <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote: On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote: On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote: > > On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: <snip> >> >> >> >> On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >> Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "we are to extract" >> over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in short, subject >> precedes object in the explanation. That's the reversal. >> >> >> Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little bit, >> or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object". >> > > Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too short. > But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt to avoid > ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :( > > >> I would say that subjects precedes physical objects >> , >> as physics becomes a first person plural notion. >> > > Exactly > > >> But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have to >> admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical sense) the >> subject, which arises from the infinitely many computations which supports >> its self-referential modes. >> > > Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or ontological > component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain objective sense, > but their 'observable' or epistemological component can only be realised > (i.e. made true) in terms of a point-of-view. > > > > OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of us) > aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a part of a > bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism, and our > sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less justify, but we > can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to > first the arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds) > the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set. > > That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms are > put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the existence of PA, > but "for RA" PA is already dreaming. > > It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not. Nelson > believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the induction axioms are > "viciously" circular, > Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in fact always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if only implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of 'data' on which to base the purported inductive generalisation was itself theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something more like "on the basis of a certain theory, let us select these features as data, which then might lead us to the following conclusion...etc.". I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of inductive inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the Peano sense. But Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as inductive inference. I agree that inductive inference is theory dependent, and it requires not just PA-like induction, but also the general assumption, usually at the metalevel that there is something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption). > making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I think we > can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of PA, despite most > mathematicians believe in the consistency of much more (in the sense of > proving abilities) powerful theory than PA, like ZF, Category, theory, > group theory, etc.). > > >> We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but that >> would be a bit ad hoc, >> > > Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of the > inner God-subject. > > > How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts the truth. The "Bp" is like a > finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The inner god > is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window. > Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed (wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual object. I guess that I meant "natural *number* object. > I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable is due > to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with the view of > the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does > not split along G/G*. But that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of > the first person subject. > Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least heuristically) with monopsychism. OK. God's solipism. To be sure, the "(outer) God" of mechanism, V, is not the biggest "God". Like in Plotinus, and perhaps arguably already in Plato's Parmenides, God is overwhelmed by the "Noùs". Quantified G*, qG*, is PI-complete in the V oracle. So, even if you have V at your disposition, you need to complete an infinite task, with infinitely "prayers" to V, to decide a general question (having quantifiers) on qG*. The god of mechanism is less rich and less complete than the "world of ideas" of mechanism. That is perhaps why Plato missed that God, and why Plotinus added it. A simple, if rough, analogy might be the relation between the mechanism of a DVD player and the spectrum of possible movies it is capable of instantiating (assuming also an infinite collection of discs and a suitable extrinsic interpretation). The DVD Library of Babel, if you like. It would be impossible in principle to predict the movies as experienced purely on the basis of the mechanism involved in the encoding /decoding process. Generalising to include the implicit observer, truth is then consequent on a reflexive or intrinsic notion of self-interpretation. So it is, in an epistemological sense, emergent from mechanism, though not in any objective sense mechanistically predictable. ISTM that these general principles lie at the core of the notions of origins and creativity necessarily implicit in the 'mechanistic TOE'. I think so, but that is why at some point we have to rely to the theory of self-reference of the universal numbers. It is not a coincidence why post used the term "creative". Yet this needs to assume some truth, as independent of all observers, machines, numbers (except God, but God is arithmetical truth, in this context, and neither "God", nor the term "truth" names it genuinely). Whatever it might be named it cannot coherently be doubted if mechanism is to make sense, as indeed you say below. If it had a name it might be the "indubitable" . David Now, even that truth is partially accessible only to the first person. That's why God invented it, to talk poetically, as such truth are supposed to be absolute for mechanism making sense. Bruno David > > So, I would say that they are in the mind of the outer God > In what sense is the outer-God conceptualised as possessing a 'mind'? Do you simply mean perception in some generic sense before symmetry is broken? The outer God is the Truth "predicate" (the one that the machine cannot define unless she invoke a bigger God). You can see it as a person by identifying the outer-God with a putative mind knowing, or believing, all (and only all) arithmetical truth. My habit is to keep "perception" for the physical realm. I prefer to say that I do not perceive a number, but that I only conceive it, or believe in it, even when I close my eyes. The reason is that I want to avoid the idea that number are physical objects. Eventually, there will be no physical object at all, but physical sensations, explained by (infinities) of number relations. OK > , and the inner God is the outer God becoming amnesic, and "lost" in the > belief that he is PA, or that number on the hard disk of the doctor. > Yes, as above. > On this, the math are difficult, and I assume fully the "galois > connection", with consciousness side with the semantic, that is the G, <>t, > by the completeness theorem. Eventually, and to be short, consciousness > sides with p, making Bp, the brain/machine/theory/formula restricting > consciousness. > The problem with this is that it makes a butterfly more conscious than a > human. Little mind have more possibilities, and a far bigger set of > consistent extensions, and consciousness reflects that spectrum ignorance. > I don't know, I find that weird. > Well, in a monopsychic sense the 'roots' of consciousness, in the generic, virgin machine, are perhaps very deep. So if the brain/body somehow 'filters' perception then perhaps, the less constriction, the less consequent impedance, at least to some limit. The doors of perception perhaps open a bit wider. I don't know either, but it might make some sort of sense. Less restriction? I guess so. Plotinus want the ONE to be simple. I can think of it as being a person, or a thing. It might defines more restricted notion of God, which could make more sense for people having had a religious education. There is room for debate, but in the mind-body problem, those consideration are irrelevant, as we use only the points of view available by the machine, and this requires always the "[]p (& #)". I should perhaps insist that I identify a person with its set of beliefs. Then you can associate a person to any subset of V, including V. But a machine is characterized by the fact that its subset of belief (or better: believable propositions) is (locally) RE. > That's one of the reasons I find that particular heuristic intuitively > helpful. I guess it's my version of the Wittgenstein ladder. But don't > worry, I can always let go of it. I hope. > > >> even if for the numbers+addition+multiplication, we can only explains >> them by "God made them", in the sense that we cannot recover them by >> assuming less than anything Turing equivalent with them. >> > > I can't think of anything less, offhand. > > >> Sorry for splitting the airs, I guess, >> > > Split away! It's hairs, by the way :) > > > Now, *you* are splitting the hairs. > > Let me really split one hair. What could that give? I tell you that it > gives h and airs. h is the indivisible horse! > Oy veh :( I was just using Occam :) > Don't cut yourself! Oops ... Bruno David > > Bruno > > > > David > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> such that in a sense one can think of the entirety of experience in >>> terms of that of a single type of psychological agent. This is then the >>> subjective filter that effectively constrains stable, pervasive and thereby >>> (crucially) *consistently memorable* experiences from the rest of the >>> computational Babel. And the consequence of that subjective filtration, in >>> conjunction with the transformational computation that effects that its >>> very stabilisation, then comprises the effective physics of the >>> experiencer, with the caveats already mentioned. So subject precedes object >>> in explaining the appearance of physics. That is the reversal. And it is >>> necessitated by the not inconsiderable problem that the alternative >>> explanatory order cannot help but *omit the explanation of the experiencer >>> and its experiences*. >>> >>> or is it just a Church-Turing version of Tegmark, i.e. replacing the >>> equations of quantum field theory with some computational sequences that >>> have the same effect at the level of our experience. >>> >>> >>> But why be so cavalier about "the level of our experience"? It's that >>> very level that is omitted or merely taken for granted in the conventional >>> explanatory order. Remember that the point of departure for all this is the >>> computational theory of *mind*. Nonetheless, the price of the ticket turns >>> out to be a computational theory of everything. Should this surprise us? >>> >>> >>> But it's not clear to me that it has *mind* as fundamental. Mind is to >>> be explained by relations of provability (which doesn't seem very plausible >>> - but maybe). >>> >> >> Well, mind here is explained in a sort of duality of provability and >> truth, or externality and internality. The internal or 'qualitative' >> aspect is captured both by its incommunicability (as seen from the >> 'outside') and its indubitability (as seen from the 'inside). >> >> >> >>> The fundamental stuff is all possible computations, or arithmetic. >>> >>> >>> If so, in this characterisation there would indeed be an explanatory >>> reversal between physics and the psychology of the machine, as Bruno >>> phrases it. >>> >>> >>> Fine, if it actually explained something instead of saying "If this >>> theory is correct there must be an explanation in terms of UD computational >>> threads." >>> >>> >>> I think you're being excessively demanding at this stage. The reversal >>> is already a startling change in explanatory perspective. If it bears out, >>> it can lead to a complete reformulation, not of the mind-body problem in >>> isolation, but of the entire problem of origin and creativity. If one then >>> takes this in conjunction with the failure of the conventional explanatory >>> sequence to account in a non-question-begging manner for the very >>> possibility of there being an observable reality in the first place, one >>> can perhaps scrape together sufficient motivation to maintain a modicum of >>> interest. >>> >>> >>> The physical theory of cognition does explain some things - like the >>> effect of tequila on mathematical ability, why we don't remember the >>> future, why we love our children, etc. >>> >>> >>> Again you keep missing the hugely crucial point that your >>> characterisation above implicitly includes a privileged extrinsic >>> interpretation. It's this latter that I've called a Wittgenstein ladder. It >>> represents an artificial aid to comprehension that must ultimately be let >>> go if the final explanation is not to beg the central question at issue. >>> This crucial question is of course that of *intrinsic* interpretation. In >>> the last analysis (which we cannot, finally, ignore) no theory of >>> perception can coherently rely on interpretation from any perspective but >>> that of the subject itself. The vital matter of *your* experience cannot >>> ultimately be left to the mercy of *my* interpretation. Can it? >>> >>> >>> "Vital" and "left to the mercy" are just rhetorical flourishes. >>> >> >> I would have hoped nonetheless that my meaning was clearer to you. >> >> >>> It may well be that third person accounts of you experience my be >>> possible. >>> >> >> But that's my whole point, don't you see? "Third person accounts" always >> refers to an externalised interpretation in terms of which *this can be >> said to be an account*. But the point is that the final account is always >> an *internalised*, first-person one of which the third-person version is >> merely a description. IOW *my* subjectivity can't intelligibly depend >> solely on *your* externalised description of it. And of course vice versa. >> >> >>> Consider my AI Mars Rover example. It behaves with human like >>> intelligence - and it is generally agreed that a philosophical zombie is >>> impossible, hence the Mars Rover is conscious. >>> >> >> That argument is a mere artifact of the way the definition is >> formulated. It's simply saying that if consciousness is considered to >> depend only on physical action then both we and the Mars Rover must be >> considered conscious because our physical actions are deemed to qualify in >> that respect. >> >> And the engineers who designed its sensors and wrote its programs will >>> be able to give you a very good account of what it is conscious of. What >>> it's thoughts are on various subjects. What answers it will be give to >>> various questions. Even how it would be affect by tequila. Of course you >>> will say, "Yes, but they won't know it's inner experience." >>> >> >> You're missing the point again. Which is that both the engineers' >> accounts, and your own account of their accounts, ultimately depend solely >> on internalised first-person interpretations (i.e. theirs and yours). Your >> subsequent description is then an attempt to make this interpretation >> explicit in the third-person mode. But the first-person interpretation is >> the lens through which all this is being viewed (aka the Wittgenstein >> ladder). Since it's that very lens we're trying to explain, you can't >> simply assume it in the explanation. In effect, the account you give above >> eliminates it from the explanans whilst implicitly retaining it in the >> explanandum. >> >> >> >>> But Newton didn't know how gravity reached across empty space. >>> Einstein didn't know why stress-energy appears on the RHS. >>> >> >> True, but if such an account were to be known or knowable it would >> presumably be fully accountable in the third-person mode without loss. >> Indeed isn't that what Einstein achieved with respect to Newton's spooky >> action at a distance? >> >> And Bruno doesn't know why some computations instantiate experience and >>> others don't, and which do which. >>> >> >> He won't ever know *why* because that's subsumed in the assumption of >> CTM. But his aim, at least in a preliminary way, on the basis of that >> assumption, is to suggest *how*, and in so doing also make plausible what >> the logical limits of such an account might consequently be. >> >> The further point is that, if an everythingist approach is to work, both >> the how and the why must in the end 'self-select' from the dual plenitude >> of the ontological and epistemological assumptions. I know you have a >> distaste for this mode of explanation and indeed in the end it might never >> be made to work. But as a conception it has a certain compelling quality; >> at least it does for me. That's because, at least potentially, it addresses >> core questions of origins and creativity without assuming either. >> Everything that is, and everything that can be performed or known, emerge >> in this view as the dumb extensional consequences of an intensionally >> minimal widget, itself a consequence of mere arithmetic. It's a conception >> of an entirely ignorant but supremely productive creative process. To that >> extent it might be said to out-Darwin Darwin. >> >> >>> >>> I have suggested several times to Bruno questions related to >>> fundamental physics which it seems his theory might address, e.g. why is QM >>> based on complex Hilbert space instead of quarteronic or octonic? Is the >>> wave function ontic or epistemic? But then he says his theory is just >>> showing there's a problem - not solving them. >>> >>> >>> Well give the poor guy a break why don't you? Open problems are open to >>> all. Why not give it a try yourself? That said, in response to your >>> question about the wavefunction, this bears on the distinction I've >>> recently been trying to draw between the ontological and epistemological >>> components of a general theory. Inasmuch as the wavefunction is itself an >>> inference from the arithmetical ontology, in terms of my explanatory scheme >>> it is therefore an aspect of epistemology. IOW the implication is that the >>> physical organisation imposed on the computational Babel by subjective >>> filtration 'necessarily' (with the usual caveats here) takes the >>> mathematical form of the wavefunction. >>> >>> >>> That's the implication of a hope. >>> >> >> Indeed. But doesn't all speculation begin that way? >> >> >>> >>> >>> With an incidental historical appropriateness, this is probably the view >>> that Schrodinger himself might well have taken, given his well known >>> philosophical position. >>> >>> Computationalism makes this characteristic of the physical a little less >>> surprising since the superposition of outcomes is a direct consequence of >>> the multiplicity of continuations proceeding from any relative state. >>> >>> >>> No. The multiplicity is use to explain the probabilistic nature of >>> outcomes - or beliefs. But it doesn't explain interference patterns that >>> arise from superpositions. >>> >> >> You're right; my imprecision. What I meant of course is that it would at >> least make the counterfactuality implied by MWI plausible to that extent. >> >> >>> >>> >>> The question of relative measure of course remains open for solution. >>> >>> >>> Of course there is an assumption here that the modes of perception we >>> are attempting to explain depend in some critical way on just that physics >>> whose phenomena we observe and whose mathematical transformations we >>> hypothesise. And further that the measure of such a physics would typically >>> predominate over any other physics that might produce either different >>> modes of perception or a different spectrum of 'probabilities'. These are, >>> to say the least. open problems although as you are aware they have begun >>> to figure even in 'conventional' physical speculation. >>> >>> >>> Yes, very open. It's a version of everything happens, and that explains >>> everything. >>> >>> >>> But this is the Everything List, so if not here where and if not now >>> when? Everythingism, in whatever form, seems in favour at the moment as a >>> general opening up of the possibilities of explanation with a corresponding >>> minimisation of the basic entities and relations to be 'taken for granted'. >>> As such, it will either collapse into the theoretical graveyard as is the >>> fate of most such hypotheses or else emerge into the light as a genuinely >>> novel and fertile direction. >>> >>> I know you're fond of the slogan that a theory that explains everything >>> actually succeeds in explaining nothing. But in fact I think this is a >>> misunderstanding of the original aphorism. Its applicability is appropriate >>> to a theory of epicycles - psychoanalysis for example - in terms of which >>> there can be no counter-examples because new epicycles can always be added >>> to shore up the structure, no matter how rickety it becomes. Bruno's >>> approach isn't like that. It's open to falsification by counter-example or >>> contradiction at any point. So aren't you still curious? Just a little? >>> >>> >>> Sure. That's why I've been on this list a long time. And I've even >>> offered to recommend Bruno for a Templeton - his theological approach would >>> really appeal to them. >>> >> >> Good idea. >> >> David >> >> >>> >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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