On 31 May 2017 18:39, "Bruno Marchal" <[email protected]> wrote:
On 30 May 2017, at 17:00, David Nyman wrote: On 30 May 2017 at 14:48, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 30 May 2017, at 14:10, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > On Tue, May 30, 2017 at 1:35 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> > > > <snip> > >> >> >> Right, I agree with you and Pierz on this. My point was more on what >> you address below. >> >> >> What if the substitution level turns out to be at a higher level than >> quantum? E.g. at the level of the neurons and their connections and >> activations levels? >> > > That would enlarge the uncertainty spectrum on the realities we can access > without losing anything subjective. > A point against, I assume. Not sure. Perhaps. > It would help the doctor to build the artificial brain. A point in favour. Yes. Modulo it helps also the charlatans, the hackers, etc. But that's part of the price. In the long run, 99% of the treatment of information might consist in cryptography. Some amount of first person privacy is needed to get consistent extensions. > It could also make more difficult to justify the smallness of Planck > constant, and to explain why the quantum seems more obviously present in > the micro-states, Against? Problematical for the Mechanist. I would favor the identification of the substitution level with the lower classical physical state up to the "quantum isolation". I think this could be proved. It is the level of the molecules, and their most probable histories. The quantum fuzziness is how our self-description relatively to the more proable histories appears for the average Löbian number. > Decoherence would be easier to fight against, OK > and quantum computing would be more easy to be realized. How, if the substitution is above the quantum boundary? Then physics is deflected from the mechanist self-reference. Put it bluntly: computationalism is refuted or we are in a malevolent Bostromian simulation (or other number conspiracies. May be, if the Riemann hypothesis is false, ... Of course, it can depend to what you consider to need to survive. The level of substitution is defined, not for the survival, but for the perfect survival. Above that level, you will continue to survive, but -either you will be aware of a defect, from a permanent headache to anything you can imagine, or not. - Or there will be a defect (observable by a third person, or not). Exemple: the first classical teleported human, who said after the experience : "it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, ... And continue to say so in an asylum. Did he survived? Above the level, you lost things. Obviously, with a digital *electronical* neural net, you would lost the experience of cannabis, alcohol, salvia, tobacco, until you find the apps on the net, emulating the chemical level information. Neurology is fundamentals, including the swarm neural play, but each neuron is a complex chemical factory, and cells communicates mainly by molecules, even when they get the cable (neurons). > This > > makes me think that the quantum level is boundary of the substitution > level. I don't follow all of the above. Do you mean a boundary above which, or below which, a plausible substitution might be made? By high level, I mean a vulgar approximation of the brain/body could be made, with few mega on the disk. By low level, I mean an ultra-precise description of a big generalized brain, like the brain + a part of the environment described by the quantum superstring with 10^100 decimals. You will need a big disk. Normally the relative substitution level determine the boundaries between the classical boolean mind and the quantum observable. But with QM without collapse, the level is not a question of micro/macro, but of independence between computations, in sense which can be described by using the modal logics. In the math part, the level is in the choice of the box, the beweisbar provability predicate. The theology is invariant for all the sound (mechanical, or weakenings) extensions. But no machines can rationally justifies any substitution level, and it is a bit like a private matter. If the brain exploits the quantum weirdness, it means that we can extracts information from the statistical measure on all computations below our substitution. That possibility is independent of the level, and the whole of the apparent matter exploits this, and should entirely emerge from this ... Here I agree with Bohr, if you define the Macroscopic by the Boolean laws of thought level, where the quantum theory is made. We can see only the border of the mind, and that does not obey to classical logic. The Everett-quantum should be the first person *plural* substitution level, the private quale level might be lower. I am not sure. What makes things nicer and harder is that we get three "physical hypostases". PA told us, admitting Plato's definition, that there are three physics. Three multiverses. Eventually we are the chooser of the box/body but the points of view are logically implied. They all follows from incompleteness. ISTM then that there's a consequence here for the comp theory. The original idea, which the MGA sets out finally to refute or at least render implausible (assuming we haven't already excised it by Occam) is that consciousness supervenes on *physical implementation* of classical computation. Assuming we don't thereby choose to reject comp a la Maudlin, the consequence is the notorious reversal. But on the basis of the above, it would seem that the underlying assumption that consciousness supervenes on classical computation per se might itself be at issue. This would in turn imply that CTM - the theory that consciousness is in principle invariant to an adequate (classical) digital substitution - may ultimately be untenable. So would we then need to think in terms of a quantum-computational substitution? David David http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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