> On 9 Jun 2018, at 01:10, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Friday, June 8, 2018 at 12:06:33 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 8 Jun 2018, at 03:30, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > On Thursday, June 7, 2018 at 9:07:37 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > [snip] > > So consciousness anticipates all quantum experiment that MIGHT occur > in the future, > > The arithmetical relations do that. Consciousness only select the histories > > and creates those worlds in anticipation? Now we're really getting > deep into woo-woo territory. > > On the contrary, we explain how the quantum physical illusion arise from all > computations which are already realised in the block-mindspace given by very > elementary arithmetic, that we never leave. > > Here are all my assumptions: classical logic + the axioms of arithmetic (“s” > is intended to denote the successor function x+1): > > Please describe ambiguous (for me) symbols, AG > > OK. > > > > > 0 ≠ s(x) OK > s(x) = s(y) -> x = y OK > x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y)) ? > > A natural number is either null, or has a predecessor. Read “Ex” by it exists > a number x such that ... > > > > > x+0 = x OK > x+s(y) = s(x+y) OK > x*0=0 ? Does * mean multiplication? AG > > Yes. “x” looks to much like the variable x. > > > > x*s(y)=(x*y)+x ? > > x multiplied by the successor of y gives the same as x * y + x. Exemple 6 * 4 > = (6 * 3) + 6. >> >> I use mechanism only to help people that this has to be a theory of >> everything. It explains very well consciousness (I think), and matter (as >> confirmed up to now). >> >> What is the first step from these postulates, to anything? I mean anything. >> What is mechanism? > > Mechanism is the hypothesis that our body is a machine, or a natural > machine-like entity. (It has been discussed in the antic China, India and > greek philosopher/theologians. But you need to wait Descartes and Diderot to > see it coming back, but, notably with Diderot, also its use by materialists > to hide the mind-body problem. > > Digital Mechanism as I use it in this list, is slightly more precise. The > notion of digital machine is the notion of Emil Post, Alonzo Church, Alan > Turing, and best explained by Stephen Kleene in his papers and book, notably > his “Introduction to Metamathematics” (1952). > Just ask me, and I gave more on this … after the June exams, as my scheduling > get tighter and tighter those days. >> Why do we need these postulate to fix anything? > > My goal was to reformulate the mind-body problem in the frame of the > Mechanist hypothesis in the cognitive science/philosophy-o-mind/theology. > Unfortunately I have been asked to solve it, which I did, but that requires > some familiarity with Mathematical Logic, which is not well taught. > Also, the solution is disliked by the “religious” materialists, and I have > underestimate the number of those in some academical circles, and their > influence (I got a price for my PhD which has disappears without explanation, > just to give one example …). > > What happened with your Ph’D?
It was rejected by my old bullying-friends in Brussels University,, at the recievability level (I never mette them) but I defended it without any problem in France (Lille), where I got the price of the best theses, with 4 other laureates in the French speaking world, but then the prized disappeared, and the bullying (always by defamation done in my back) continued and get somehow international, as it is easy to mock or disbelieve someone who say we were wrong since a very long time. But all scientists doing their job have no problem with it, if only because they understand the question raised, and that there is not once claim of truth. > Are you associated with a university? Which one? Just curious. AG I have a position at Brussels University where I did create IRIDIA, with late Philippe Smets and some others. After the events IRIDIA has been attached to the Faculty of Applied Science. Engineers are more rigorous in metaphysics than scientist whose often confuse hypotheses and dogma. Not all scientists of course. I have worked with Englert, Brout, Nardone, Gross and others at the time Brout and Englert discovered the “Higgs Boson”. I have a very minor role there, except reassuring François Englert that quantum mechanics makes sense even in cosmology. He added a footnote in a paper suggesting the perplex reader to read Everett for a QM making sense without external observer. > >> What is the problem you're trying to fix? > > The mind-body problem. How a grey brain can create a color perception, for > example. > > Unsolved IMO, Not a trivial problem. AG Glad to hear this. > > But it is more deep than that, as eventually, Mechanism is shown incompatible > with materialism and/or physicalism, which is the actual paradigm in most > metaphysics and theologies. > > What is Materialism? I alway mean “weak Materialism”. It is the belief that there is a universe out there, or a primary universe, a material world. It is the paradigm in theology since the closure of Plato academy in Athene, and there is a variety of strong (anti-agnosyic) atheists who forbid doubt about it (showing that they did not grasp what science is all about). Intellectual jews, christians and muslims are usually cooler than such atheists, except for the radicals. I don’t know the truth, but I explain that with the Church-Turing thesis, many questions becomes amenable to mathematical and observable/testable consequences. > If Mechanism is as you defined above -- that the body is a machine or like a > machine -- why is it incompatible with materialism? AG Because of a fact which I have underestimated the ignorance of. Yet this has been discovered already by Gödel, although implicitly, in 1931. And explicitly later by Church, Turing, Kleene, and others. That was the mathematical discovery of the universal computer. Turing will play some role in its first physical implementation, but Suze, von Neumann, well … today, here and now, we communicate with it, but its “universal” character is a bit hidden, unless you use the log, or Darwin, Linux, etc. (which mix the universal machine with layer of protection, as they are necessarily rather “fragile” (capable of crashing). There are very deep reason for that. The fact is that the elementary arithmetical reality implements, in the original sense of Gödel & Others, all computations, and no universal machine can distinguish a computation eventually realised in arithmetic than by any universal machine. Then each first person view that Gödel’s incompleteness attaches canonically to such machine (when “rich enough” in some sense; I call them Gödel-Löbian, or Löbian for short) is indeterminate on which computations she is supported by, among an infinity of computations. But the constraints of relative self-referential correctness (using tarski notion of truth, and Theatetus notion of knowledge, or variants) has to provided a measure on alternate computational continuation, and indeed we get formally a sample of quantum logics where expected. Normally, if mechanism is true, this should lead to a “Gleason theorem”, making that measure unique and well defined. Up to now, the quantum logics “in the head of the universal machine” fits with nature. That is not the case with physicalism, which use a 1-1 identity thesis between mind and brain, which makes no sense with Digital Mechanism. To get that 1-1 link, even weakening a lot mechanism does not help. I don’t see any way to build a non computational its theory of mind other than ad-hoc diagonalization, leading to transfinite “surnatural theories”. You need almost like an infinities of magic. But there is no evidence for any in nature. I don’t expect you to grasp this in a second. I can give references. For example: B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >> How can these postulates explain consciousness? TIA, AG > > Eventually by the logics of self-reference discovered by Gödel and Löb in > arithmetic, and axiomatised completely (at the propositional level) by > Solovay. > > If you agree that for a conscious being, consciousness is true, non > doubtable, but also non provable and non definable, then it is long but not > difficult to show that all universal machine (in the sense of Church …) can > introspect itself (in the sense provided by Gödel), and discover some thing > obeying to those axiomatic description of consciousness. 99% of consciousness > is explained, + an explanation why the last 1% has to be felt by the machine > as utterly not explainable. > > Introspection -- the great unsolved problem. I hate to brag, but I would say that it is solved. In fact in my childhood my question was “does an amoeba lives only one day, or is she immortal”. Everyday an amoeba gives to amoeba. Does the amoeba survives the self-duplication. Then I got the molecular biology solution, with the DNA encoding the process of is replication. But then I was lucky enough to find a book on Gödel’s proof, and I realised that self-reproduction is realised, and explained, entirely in arithmetic, which decides me to become a mathematician instead of a biologist. That self-duplication in arithmetic provides only the third person notion of self. It gives you the way to implement a notion of self (called “self” in its object-oriented implementation in SMALLTALK, actually, and can be seen as a control structure. In my paper, I used it to implement “planarians”, that is programs that you can cut in pieces, and each pieces “regenerates” the entire program. It took me to read Plato to get the first person notion of self, and the idea was quite simple, leading directly to the understanding of why (Löbian) machine as so persuaded that they have a soul, (personal consciousness), why they cannot doubt it, yet not proved its existence, and still less define it). The third person self of Peano arithmetic(*) is just the Gödel number of its probability ability, that is Gödel’s bewesibar predicate. PA is Löbian, it can prove its own incompleteness theorem for example. Read “bewesibar” as “provable”. ~beweisbar(“0 = 1”) -> ~beweisbar( ~bewesibar(“0 = 1”)), If I don’t prove the false (= I am consistent) then I don’t prove that I am consistent. But the soul, that is the first person, the one conscious, is the knower, and Theaetetus’ defined it y the conjunction of the (rational) belief with truth. Arithmetical truth cannot be defined in arithmetic, making the soul not definable by the machine. It is not even identifiable to any third person describable object. This using only the notion of Truth given by Tarski. Gödel’s incompleteness makes “provability” into a relative notion of believability (which can be wrong), so the soul’s logic will be given by []p & p: the conjunction of the belief with the (no definable) truth. The observable is provided by a weakening, still imposed by incompleteness: []p & ~[]f, where we add the consistency condition, which indeed is a requirement to have a notion of “by default probabilities”. The (halting) computations are modelled by the sigma_1 sentences in arithmetic, thanks to the normal form there of Kleene. The confirmation (not proof, of course) is given by the fact that the logics of []p & p, []p & <>p, ans []p & <>p & p, gives quantum logic when p is restricted to the sigma_1 sentences. (*) (the Escherichia Coli of the Löbian machine, although the “experts” use a much weaker one, called Delta_0 EXP (they add the exponentiation axiom, and limit the induction axioms on the entirely testable formula (the recursive or total computable formula). > I have difficulty giving you the benefit of the doubt if you believe in a > silly theory such as the MWI. AG If the Schroedinger wave equation is correct, and you believe it (or assume it for the sake of a reasoning) you have to believe/accept the MW. You might add metaphysical assumptions to select one world, like you can add epicyles to make the Earth at the center of the Solar system. Bohm added a hardly covariant potential, and Copenhagen added the collapse of the wave, making something not obeying to the SWE. With mechanism there is no “ontological worlds” at all, but you do have the many-computations (a purely arithmetical notion, (if you accept the Church-Turing thesis, and thus still believe in your table of additions and multiplications. The wave equation should result from the sum on all computations in arithmetic. Mechanism predicts that when looking around below your substitution level, things will get fuzzy, as you will only see the map of the infinitely many possible continuations, which explains the origin of the quantum weirdness. The many worlds, including ours is only in "the head" of all sound universal machine, if mechanism is true. Bruno > > More on this later, perhaps. > > Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
