On Sunday, June 10, 2018 at 3:19:37 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 9 Jun 2018, at 01:10, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Friday, June 8, 2018 at 12:06:33 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 8 Jun 2018, at 03:30, [email protected] wrote: >> >> On Thursday, June 7, 2018 at 9:07:37 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> [snip] >> >> * So consciousness anticipates all quantum experiment that MIGHT >> occur in the future, * >> >> The arithmetical relations do that. Consciousness only select the >> histories >> >> * and creates those worlds in anticipation? Now we're really >> getting deep into woo-woo territory.* >> >> On the contrary, we explain how the quantum physical illusion arise from >> all computations which are already realised in the block-mindspace given by >> very elementary arithmetic, that we never leave. >> >> Here are all my assumptions: classical logic + the axioms of arithmetic >> (“s” is intended to denote the successor function x+1): >> >> * Please describe ambiguous (for me) symbols, AG* >> >> >> OK. >> >> >> >> >> 0 ≠ s(x) OK >> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y OK >> x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y)) ? >> >> >> A natural number is either null, or has a predecessor. Read “Ex” by it >> exists a number x such that ... >> >> >> >> >> x+0 = x OK >> x+s(y) = s(x+y) OK >> x*0=0 ? *Does * mean multiplication? AG* >> >> >> Yes. “x” looks to much like the variable x. >> >> >> >> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x ? >> >> >> x multiplied by the successor of y gives the same as x * y + x. Exemple 6 >> * 4 = (6 * 3) + 6. >> >> >> I use mechanism only to help people that this has to be a theory of >> everything. It explains very well consciousness (I think), and matter (as >> confirmed up to now). >> >> *What is the first step from these postulates, to anything? I mean >> anything. What is mechanism? * >> >> >> Mechanism is the hypothesis that our body is a machine, or a natural >> machine-like entity. (It has been discussed in the antic China, India and >> greek philosopher/theologians. But you need to wait Descartes and Diderot >> to see it coming back, but, notably with Diderot, also its use by >> materialists to hide the mind-body problem. >> >> Digital Mechanism as I use it in this list, is slightly more precise. The >> notion of digital machine is the notion of Emil Post, Alonzo Church, Alan >> Turing, and best explained by Stephen Kleene in his papers and book, >> notably his “Introduction to Metamathematics” (1952). >> Just ask me, and I gave more on this … after the June exams, as my >> scheduling get tighter and tighter those days. >> >> *Why do we need these postulate to fix anything? * >> >> >> My goal was to reformulate the mind-body problem in the frame of the >> Mechanist hypothesis in the cognitive science/philosophy-o-mind/theology. >> Unfortunately I have been asked to solve it, which I did, but that >> requires some familiarity with Mathematical Logic, which is not well taught. >> Also, the solution is disliked by the “religious” materialists, and I >> have underestimate the number of those in some academical circles, and >> their influence (I got a price for my PhD which has disappears without >> explanation, just to give one example …). >> > > *What happened with your Ph’D? * > > > It was rejected by my old bullying-friends in Brussels University,, at the > recievability level (I never mette them) but I defended it without any > problem in France (Lille), where I got the price of the best theses, with 4 > other laureates in the French speaking world, but then the prized > disappeared, and the bullying (always by defamation done in my back) > continued and get somehow international, as it is easy to mock or > disbelieve someone who say we were wrong since a very long time. But all > scientists doing their job have no problem with it, if only because they > understand the question raised, and that there is not once claim of truth. > > > > > *Are you associated with a university? Which one? Just curious. AG * > > > > I have a position at Brussels University where I did create IRIDIA, with > late Philippe Smets and some others. After the events IRIDIA has been > attached to the Faculty of Applied Science. Engineers are more rigorous in > metaphysics than scientist whose often confuse hypotheses and dogma. Not > all scientists of course. I have worked with Englert, Brout, Nardone, Gross > and others at the time Brout and Englert discovered the “Higgs Boson”. I > have a very minor role there, except reassuring François Englert that > quantum mechanics makes sense even in cosmology. He added a footnote in a > paper suggesting the perplex reader to read Everett for a QM making sense > without external observer. > > > > > > *What is the problem you're trying to fix? * >> >> >> The mind-body problem. How a grey brain can create a color perception, >> for example. >> > > > *Unsolved IMO, Not a trivial problem. AG* > > > > Glad to hear this. > > > > > >> But it is more deep than that, as eventually, Mechanism is shown >> incompatible with materialism and/or physicalism, which is the actual >> paradigm in most metaphysics and theologies. >> > > *What is Materialism? * > > > I alway mean “weak Materialism”. It is the belief that there is a universe > out there, or a primary universe, a material world. It is the paradigm in > theology since the closure of Plato academy in Athene, and there is a > variety of strong (anti-agnosyic) atheists who forbid doubt about it > (showing that they did not grasp what science is all about). Intellectual > jews, christians and muslims are usually cooler than such atheists, except > for the radicals. > I don’t know the truth, but I explain that with the Church-Turing thesis, > many questions becomes amenable to mathematical and observable/testable > consequences. > > > > > *If Mechanism is as you defined above -- that the body is a machine or > like a machine -- why is it incompatible with materialism? AG* > > > > Because of a fact which I have underestimated the ignorance of. Yet this > has been discovered already by Gödel, although implicitly, in 1931. And > explicitly later by Church, Turing, Kleene, and others. That was the > mathematical discovery of the universal computer. Turing will play some > role in its first physical implementation, but Suze, von Neumann, well … > today, here and now, we communicate with it, but its “universal” character > is a bit hidden, unless you use the log, or Darwin, Linux, etc. (which mix > the universal machine with layer of protection, as they are necessarily > rather “fragile” (capable of crashing). There are very deep reason for that. > > The fact is that the elementary arithmetical reality implements, in the > original sense of Gödel & Others, all computations, and no universal > machine can distinguish a computation eventually realised in arithmetic > than by any universal machine. Then each first person view that Gödel’s > incompleteness attaches canonically to such machine (when “rich enough” in > some sense; I call them Gödel-Löbian, or Löbian for short) is indeterminate > on which computations she is supported by, among an infinity of > computations. > > But the constraints of relative self-referential correctness (using tarski > notion of truth, and Theatetus notion of knowledge, or variants) has to > provided a measure on alternate computational continuation, and indeed we > get formally a sample of quantum logics where expected. Normally, if > mechanism is true, this should lead to a “Gleason theorem”, making that > measure unique and well defined. Up to now, the quantum logics “in the head > of the universal machine” fits with nature. That is not the case with > physicalism, which use a 1-1 identity thesis between mind and brain, which > makes no sense with Digital Mechanism. To get that 1-1 link, even weakening > a lot mechanism does not help. I don’t see any way to build a non > computational its theory of mind other than ad-hoc diagonalization, leading > to transfinite “surnatural theories”. You need almost like an infinities of > magic. But there is no evidence for any in nature. > > I don’t expect you to grasp this in a second. I can give references. > For example: > B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th > International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, > SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004. > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html > > > > > > > > *How can these postulates explain consciousness? TIA, AG* >> >> >> Eventually by the logics of self-reference discovered by Gödel and Löb in >> arithmetic, and axiomatised completely (at the propositional level) by >> Solovay. >> >> If you agree that for a conscious being, consciousness is true, non >> doubtable, but also non provable and non definable, then it is long but not >> difficult to show that all universal machine (in the sense of Church …) can >> introspect itself (in the sense provided by Gödel), and discover some thing >> obeying to those axiomatic description of consciousness. 99% of >> consciousness is explained, + an explanation why the last 1% has to be felt >> by the machine as utterly not explainable. >> > > *Introspection -- the great unsolved problem. * > > > I hate to brag, but I would say that it is solved. In fact in my childhood > my question was “does an amoeba lives only one day, or is she immortal”. > Everyday an amoeba gives to amoeba. Does the amoeba survives the > self-duplication. Then I got the molecular biology solution, with the DNA > encoding the process of is replication. But then I was lucky enough to find > a book on Gödel’s proof, and I realised that self-reproduction is realised, > and explained, entirely in arithmetic, which decides me to become a > mathematician instead of a biologist. > > That self-duplication in arithmetic provides only the third person notion > of self. It gives you the way to implement a notion of self (called “self” > in its object-oriented implementation in SMALLTALK, actually, and can be > seen as a control structure. In my paper, I used it to implement > “planarians”, that is programs that you can cut in pieces, and each pieces > “regenerates” the entire program. > > It took me to read Plato to get the first person notion of self, and the > idea was quite simple, leading directly to the understanding of why > (Löbian) machine as so persuaded that they have a soul, (personal > consciousness), why they cannot doubt it, yet not proved its existence, and > still less define it). > > The third person self of Peano arithmetic(*) is just the Gödel number of > its probability ability, that is Gödel’s bewesibar predicate. PA is Löbian, > it can prove its own incompleteness theorem for example. Read “bewesibar” > as “provable”. > > ~beweisbar(“0 = 1”) -> ~beweisbar( ~bewesibar(“0 = 1”)), > > If I don’t prove the false (= I am consistent) then I don’t prove that I > am consistent. > > But the soul, that is the first person, the one conscious, is the knower, > and Theaetetus’ defined it y the conjunction of the (rational) belief with > truth. Arithmetical truth cannot be defined in arithmetic, making the soul > not definable by the machine. It is not even identifiable to any third > person describable object. This using only the notion of Truth given by > Tarski. > > Gödel’s incompleteness makes “provability” into a relative notion of > believability (which can be wrong), so the soul’s logic will be given by > []p & p: the conjunction of the belief with the (no definable) truth. > > The observable is provided by a weakening, still imposed by > incompleteness: []p & ~[]f, where we add the consistency condition, which > indeed is a requirement to have a notion of “by default probabilities”. > > The (halting) computations are modelled by the sigma_1 sentences in > arithmetic, thanks to the normal form there of Kleene. The confirmation > (not proof, of course) is given by the fact that the logics of []p & p, []p > & <>p, ans []p & <>p & p, gives quantum logic when p is restricted to the > sigma_1 sentences. > > > (*) (the Escherichia Coli of the Löbian machine, although the “experts” > use a much weaker one, called Delta_0 EXP (they add the exponentiation > axiom, and limit the induction axioms on the entirely testable formula (the > recursive or total computable formula). > > > > > > > *I have difficulty giving you the benefit of the doubt if you believe in a > silly theory such as the MWI. AG * > > > If the Schroedinger wave equation is correct, and you believe it (or > assume it for the sake of a reasoning) you have to believe/accept the MW. > > You might add metaphysical assumptions to select one world, like you can > add epicyles to make the Earth at the center of the Solar system. Bohm > added a hardly covariant potential, and Copenhagen added the collapse of > the wave, making something not obeying to the SWE. > > With mechanism there is no “ontological worlds” at all, but you do have > the many-computations (a purely arithmetical notion, (if you accept the > Church-Turing thesis, and thus still believe in your table of additions and > multiplications. The wave equation should result from the sum on all > computations in arithmetic. > > Mechanism predicts that when looking around below your substitution level, > things will get fuzzy, as you will only see the map of the infinitely many > possible continuations, which explains the origin of the quantum weirdness. > > The many worlds, including ours is only in "the head" of all sound > universal machine, if mechanism is true. > > Bruno >
*Thanks for the data dump. It's way above my head, so not so far above that I can't see the virtue of using arithmetic logic as a starting point for a new take on reality. I might buy the Kindle version of your book, translated by Russell. You might be wrong, but I give you credit for tackling the arguably most intractable problem; the mind-body problem. Keep in truckin'! AG* > > > > > > >> More on this later, perhaps. >> >> Bruno >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <javascript:>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
