On 8/27/2018 12:43 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Monday, August 27, 2018 at 1:52:41 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Monday, August 27, 2018 at 1:20:53 PM UTC-5, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/27/2018 12:26 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Sunday, August 26, 2018 at 5:51:58 PM UTC-5, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/26/2018 4:54 AM, spinozalens via Free Thinkers
Physics Discussion Group wrote:
uuu
-----Original Message-----
From: Brent Meeker <[email protected]>
To: atvoid-2 <[email protected]>
Sent: Sun, Aug 26, 2018 2:02 am
Subject: Re: Universes from Nothing-What about the “Laws”?
Brent
*
We are talking past each other. It's probably my
fault. I have lost the tread on what we disagree about.*
I don't think I disagree about anything with you. I
disagreed with phil because he wants to banish the
concept of thoughts. The problem is that thoughts, and
especially perceptions, are epistemologically prior to
matter. We have perceptions, which are an incorrigble
and fundamental basis of knowledge. Then based on that
knowledge/observation we arrive at a theory that says
nothing exists but matter and material processes. That
theory may well be true. But without explicating which
material processes produce perceptions and other
thoughts, as compared to processes that don't, the
theory that only matter and material processes exist is
aspirational. If only matter exist, then thoughts and
perceptions must be explained in terms of matter. You
can't just dismiss them as "immaterial" because they are
the basis of knowledge about matter.
*Well I don't agree with Phil. As I have made clear my
viewpoint is neither materialistic or idealistic. There
is no causality between mind and matter, mind and
matter are two available attributes of reality. This is
neutral monism. This position , in my opinion, provides
an answer to the question posed by Vilenkin at the end
of his book " Many Worlds in One" and provides the
missing piece in Lawrence Krauss's book " A Universe
From Nothing" These are not scientific views , though I
hope they are based in our current scientific
understanding.
*
So you reject the pure materialist idea that matter
causes mind by doing certain computations. This would
imply that a computer, made of silicon, copper,...,
cannot produce mind by simply performing the same
computations as a brain does. It might conceivably
produce some different kind of mind.
Bertrand Russell's idea of neutral monism was that there
were something like "atoms of reality" that would be
events like time-stamped propositions. Mind would be one
way of collecting these events into coherent threads
constituting persons and the physical world would be
another way of collecting them into a "reality" shared by
the different minds.
It's the mirror image of the argument I have with Bruno
Marchal who says if computation (and he means the
Platonist version) is all that exists then matter must
be an aspect of computation, e.g. as it might be in a
holodeck simulation. This too might be true, but
without explaining matter it's also aspirational.
*
*
*The implicit mistake here is assuming casualty between
mind and matter in my opinion*
There's just one thing in Bruno's ontology, computation.
Mind and matter are just aspects of computation. Think
of "The Matrix" or Star Trek's holodeck in which the
people are also part of the simulation.
Brent
I know Brent hates seeing the citing of references, but here
is the reference *[pdf, 11 pages]* to Marchal's theory:
MECHANISM AND PERSONAL IDENTITY
Bruno MARCHAL
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/M&PI_15-MAI-91.pdf
<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/M&PI_15-MAI-91.pdf>
[Mechanistic Platonism]
"Note the Platonism I use is the minimal one which permits me
to embed other (i.e. independent of oneself) mind"in an
independent reality. It is the Platonism of a will writer."
And I know Phil thinks "Platonism" is a sufficient epithet to
shut off any discussion. I've read Bruno's paper and I argue
with him regularly over on the "everything" email list.
Brent
It not about that. It's about showing its problems; for example
"The application of Platonic reality to physics is fraught with
problems."
*Materialism Deconstructed?*
By Victor Stenger
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
<https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html>
- pt
I sort of was following the first part of Bruno Marchal's paper.
Mechanistic Platonism sound like a good thing, no?
But it doesn't help to say /Bruno says X /when you don't point to a
reference (a link) *to a document *people can go to read to see for
themselves where he said that. It's not like Bruno is some Yoda that
can be invoked.
Since you referred to his paper, I assumed you knew where to find his
publications:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications.html
His most complete exposition of his theory in English is the SANE 2004
paper:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
But if you want to discourse with him directly, he holds forth on
[email protected]. He is very nice, patient logician who
teaches at Université Libre de Bruxelles and not at all a crank.
Brent
- pt
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