> On 28 Aug 2018, at 00:57, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 8/27/2018 12:43 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> On Monday, August 27, 2018 at 1:52:41 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> On Monday, August 27, 2018 at 1:20:53 PM UTC-5, meekerdb wrote: >> >> >> On 8/27/2018 12:26 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, August 26, 2018 at 5:51:58 PM UTC-5, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 8/26/2018 4:54 AM, spinozalens via Free Thinkers Physics Discussion >>> Group wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> uuu >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: Brent Meeker <[email protected]> <> >>>> To: atvoid-2 <[email protected]> <> >>>> Sent: Sun, Aug 26, 2018 2:02 am >>>> Subject: Re: Universes from Nothing-What about the “Laws”? >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> >>>> We are talking past each other. It's probably my fault. I have lost the >>>> tread on what we disagree about. >>>> >>>> I don't think I disagree about anything with you. I disagreed with phil >>>> because he wants to banish the concept of thoughts. The problem is that >>>> thoughts, and especially perceptions, are epistemologically prior to >>>> matter. We have perceptions, which are an incorrigble and fundamental >>>> basis of knowledge. Then based on that knowledge/observation we arrive at >>>> a theory that says nothing exists but matter and material processes. That >>>> theory may well be true. But without explicating which material processes >>>> produce perceptions and other thoughts, as compared to processes that >>>> don't, the theory that only matter and material processes exist is >>>> aspirational. If only matter exist, then thoughts and perceptions must >>>> be explained in terms of matter. You can't just dismiss them as >>>> "immaterial" because they are the basis of knowledge about matter. >>>> >>>> Well I don't agree with Phil. As I have made clear my viewpoint is neither >>>> materialistic or idealistic. There is no causality between mind and >>>> matter, mind and matter are two available attributes of reality. This is >>>> neutral monism. This position , in my opinion, provides an answer to the >>>> question posed by Vilenkin at the end of his book " Many Worlds in One" >>>> and provides the missing piece in Lawrence Krauss's book " A Universe From >>>> Nothing" These are not scientific views , though I hope they are based in >>>> our current scientific understanding. >>> >>> So you reject the pure materialist idea that matter causes mind by doing >>> certain computations. This would imply that a computer, made of silicon, >>> copper,..., cannot produce mind by simply performing the same computations >>> as a brain does. It might conceivably produce some different kind of mind. >>> >>> Bertrand Russell's idea of neutral monism was that there were something >>> like "atoms of reality" that would be events like time-stamped >>> propositions. Mind would be one way of collecting these events into >>> coherent threads constituting persons and the physical world would be >>> another way of collecting them into a "reality" shared by the different >>> minds. >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> It's the mirror image of the argument I have with Bruno Marchal who says >>>> if computation (and he means the Platonist version) is all that exists >>>> then matter must be an aspect of computation, e.g. as it might be in a >>>> holodeck simulation. This too might be true, but without explaining >>>> matter it's also aspirational. >>>> >>>> >>>> The implicit mistake here is assuming casualty between mind and matter in >>>> my opinion >>> >>> There's just one thing in Bruno's ontology, computation. Mind and matter >>> are just aspects of computation. Think of "The Matrix" or Star Trek's >>> holodeck in which the people are also part of the simulation. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> I know Brent hates seeing the citing of references, but here is the >>> reference [pdf, 11 pages] to Marchal's theory: >>> >>> MECHANISM AND PERSONAL IDENTITY >>> Bruno MARCHAL >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/M&PI_15-MAI-91.pdf >>> <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/M&PI_15-MAI-91.pdf> >>> >>> [Mechanistic Platonism] >>> >>> "Note the Platonism I use is the minimal one which permits me to embed >>> other (i.e. independent of oneself) mind"in an >>> independent reality. It is the Platonism of a will writer." >> >> And I know Phil thinks "Platonism" is a sufficient epithet to shut off any >> discussion. I've read Bruno's paper and I argue with him >> regularly over on the "everything" email list. >> >> Brent >> >> >> >> It not about that. It's about showing its problems; for example "The >> application of Platonic reality to physics is fraught with problems." >> >> Materialism Deconstructed? >> By Victor Stenger >> >> https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html >> >> <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html> >> >> - pt >> >> >> >> I sort of was following the first part of Bruno Marchal's paper. Mechanistic >> Platonism sound like a good thing, no? >> >> But it doesn't help to say Bruno says X when you don't point to a reference >> (a link) to a document people can go to read to see for themselves where he >> said that. It's not like Bruno is some Yoda that can be invoked. > > Since you referred to his paper, I assumed you knew where to find his > publications: > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications.html > <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications.html> > > His most complete exposition of his theory in English is the SANE 2004 paper: > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html > <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html> > > But if you want to discourse with him directly, he holds forth on > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>. > He is very nice, patient logician who teaches at Université Libre de > Bruxelles and not at all a crank.
Well … thanks! :) Bruno > > Brent >> >> - pt >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Free Thinkers Physics Discussion Group" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/atvoid-2/c93c907f-34e0-4a25-b173-a11065accbe6%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/atvoid-2/c93c907f-34e0-4a25-b173-a11065accbe6%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
