On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 6:15:50 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > > > > On 8/29/2018 4:04 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT? It seems that it's >> essentially a definition of digital computation. So you could offer >> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. >> >> Brent >> >> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang >> >> Also thought WHAT? >> > > > > > In terms of theory, Joel David Hamkins @*JDHamkins* > <https://twitter.com/JDHamkins> (the set-theorist now at Oxford) > considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation": > > > http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/ > > If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and ITTMs are > "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs. > > But what does the presence of ITTMs mean for the CT thesis? Whether ITTMs > are "realizable" remains to be seen. > > > In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with > non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic biology, > could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently > replicable in a simulation. > > > And John Searle thinks only wetware can be conscious. The question is, do > they have evidence for this? After all a simulation can go all the way > down to subatomic level. There's nothing in principle requiring it to stop > at the neuron level, although that's where most AI researchers assume the > information processing happens. > > Brent >
Then in a practical sense it is a race to see who can make the first conscious "robot": a synthetic-bio wetware team, and the alternative teams. And even then we may not be sure. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
