On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 6:15:50 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > > > > On 8/29/2018 4:04 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT? It seems that it's >> essentially a definition of digital computation. So you could offer >> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. >> >> Brent >> >> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang >> >> Also thought WHAT? >> > > > > > In terms of theory, Joel David Hamkins @*JDHamkins* > <https://twitter.com/JDHamkins> (the set-theorist now at Oxford) > considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation": > > > http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/ > > If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and ITTMs are > "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs. > > But what does the presence of ITTMs mean for the CT thesis? Whether ITTMs > are "realizable" remains to be seen. > > > In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with > non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic biology, > could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently > replicable in a simulation. > > > And John Searle thinks only wetware can be conscious. The question is, do > they have evidence for this? After all a simulation can go all the way > down to subatomic level. There's nothing in principle requiring it to stop > at the neuron level, although that's where most AI researchers assume the > information processing happens. > > Brent >
Then in a practical sense it is a race to see who can make the first conscious "robot": a synthetic-bio wetware team, and the alternative teams. And even then we may not be sure. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
