> On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > Do you have some evidence for doubting CT? It seems that it's > essentially a definition of digital computation. So you could offer > some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. > > Brent > > On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: > > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang > > Also thought WHAT? > > > > > In terms of theory, Joel David Hamkins @JDHamkins > <https://twitter.com/JDHamkins> (the set-theorist now at Oxford) considers > infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation": > > http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/ <http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/> > > If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and ITTMs are > "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs. > I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s thesis (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non computable. Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by showing that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature is not computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with Mechanism in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable things is just a random oracle, but this does not change the class of computable function. It would change the class of polynomial-time computable function, as we suspect nature do, but that confirms mechanism which predicts this.
> > But what does the presence of ITTMs mean for the CT thesis? Whether ITTMs > are "realizable" remains to be seen. > The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what the physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence of non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”. > > In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with non-standard > materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic biology, could have > novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently replicable in a > simulation. > > Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than a classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can read the basic explanation in my paper here if interested. B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html (sane04) The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the fact that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in arithmetic, and whatever we predict about our first person experience is indeterminate on the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go through our local and actual state of mind (that is: an infinity). Physicalism is refuted with mechanism, and becomes a branch of machine psychology, or better machine theology (the study of the non provable true propositions). I am just know writing a post on why Church’s thesis is a quasi-miracle in mathematics and epistemology. In particular it entails the incompleteness phenomenon, from which we can derive mathematically the physical laws. That makes Mechanism testable, and indeed, we recover already the quantum logical core of the formalism. Bruno > > - pt > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
