> On 7 Sep 2018, at 14:43, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Friday, September 7, 2018 at 3:59:08 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 6 Sep 2018, at 21:48, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:47:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 6 Sep 2018, at 17:04, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 4:23:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>>>>> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT? It seems that it's >>>>>>> essentially a definition of digital computation. So you could offer >>>>>>> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Brent >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>>>>> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Also thought WHAT? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In terms of theory, Joel David Hamkins @JDHamkins >>>>>>> <https://twitter.com/JDHamkins> (the set-theorist now at Oxford) >>>>>>> considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation": >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/ >>>>>>> <http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and ITTMs are >>>>>>> "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs. >>>>>>> >>>>>> I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s thesis >>>>>> (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non computable. >>>>>> Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is >>>>>> reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a >>>>>> priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by >>>>>> showing that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature >>>>>> is not computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with >>>>>> Mechanism in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable >>>>>> things is just a random oracle, but this does not change the class of >>>>>> computable function. It would change the class of polynomial-time >>>>>> computable function, as we suspect nature do, but that confirms >>>>>> mechanism which predicts this. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But what does the presence of ITTMs mean for the CT thesis? Whether >>>>>>> ITTMs are "realizable" remains to be seen. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with >>>>>> functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what the >>>>>> physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence >>>>>> of non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with >>>>>>> non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic >>>>>>> biology, could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not >>>>>>> equivalently replicable in a simulation. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than a >>>>>> classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can read >>>>>> the basic explanation in my paper here if interested. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th >>>>>> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, >>>>>> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004. >>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >>>>>> >>>>>> <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html> >>>>>> (sane04) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the >>>>>> fact that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in >>>>>> arithmetic, and whatever we predict about our first person experience is >>>>>> indeterminate on the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go >>>>>> through our local and actual state of mind (that is: an infinity). >>>>>> Physicalism is refuted with mechanism, and becomes a branch of machine >>>>>> psychology, or better machine theology (the study of the non provable >>>>>> true propositions). >>>>>> >>>>>> I am just know writing a post on why Church’s thesis is a quasi-miracle >>>>>> in mathematics and epistemology. In particular it entails the >>>>>> incompleteness phenomenon, from which we can derive mathematically the >>>>>> physical laws. That makes Mechanism testable, and indeed, we recover >>>>>> already the quantum logical core of the formalism. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> This is very interesting. (I've written about the irreducibility of >>>>>> "matter" to physics, e.g., >>>>>> [ >>>>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/20/materialism-vs-physicalism/ >>>>>> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/20/materialism-vs-physicalism/> >>>>>> ].) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I will take a look, but feel free to explain the basic. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Do you see what role a "multiverse perspective of mathematical truth" >>>>>> could play in your theory? >>>>>> >>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joel_David_Hamkins#Philosophy_of_set_theory >>>>>> >>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joel_David_Hamkins#Philosophy_of_set_theory> >>>>>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223 <https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I am not sure why you say that the the universe of set is well defined. >>>>> To be franc, although I am realist on arithmetic, I am not for set >>>>> theory, nor analysis, second ordre arithmetic. >>>>> >>>>> Most set theories that I know are first order theory, ans thus they have >>>>> infinitely many non-isomorphic models, including enumerable one. A >>>>> problem here is that we call set theory, well set theory or theory of >>>>> sets, when we should say “theory of universes” (in the math sense of >>>>> universes of set), if we use “of” like in theory of groups, or we should >>>>> call “theory of groups” a theory of vectors, or a theory of >>>>> transformation. That gives the feeling that set theory admit one clear >>>>> model, but it has many. Arithmetic also has many non-isomorphic models, >>>>> but most people agree on a notion of standard model, which lacks for set. >>>>> Also, there are many set theories, which all have different models, but >>>>> quite different theorems too. In Quine set theory (New Foundations, NF), >>>>> the universes can belong to themselves, which is not the case in >>>>> Zermelo-Fraekel of Von Neuman Bernays Gödel set theories. That is a >>>>> reason why I prefer to put “set theory” in the catalog of the mind of the >>>>> universal machine looking at itself. >>>>> >>>>> Once we postulate Mechanism, the “cardinality” of the mathematical >>>>> "universe" becomes undecidable, and it is simpler to use enumerable >>>>> models. In fact, the standard model of arithmetic is already too much >>>>> big, and we can decide to postulate only the “sigma_1 truth”, or the >>>>> “PI_1 truth”, that is the truth of the proposition having the shape >>>>> ExP(x,y) with P decidable (and their negations). That is, we need only >>>>> the notion of computation (which provably exists in any Sigma_1 complete >>>>> (= Turing universal) theory. We do get a constructive “multiverse” of >>>>> some sort, which I call Universal Dovetailer. It is a program which >>>>> generates all programs, and executes them all, in a dovetailed way, >>>>> pieces by pieces to avoid being stuck in non terminating computations >>>>> (something that I have just explained to be non predictable in advance). >>>>> From this I have extracted the mathematics of a physical multiverse, but >>>>> that structure is phenomenological: it exist only in the mind of the >>>>> machines (naturally implemented in arithmetic). Physics becomes a >>>>> statistics on computations, and the math fit well with some version of >>>>> Quantum Mechanics, until now. >>>>> >>>>> More on this later, very plausibly. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On the reduction of all matter to physics: >>>>> >>>>> I consider "all matter" to include everything studied by natural >>>>> sciences: physics, chemistry, biology, etc. I cite in some of my Notes* >>>>> the concept that there may be "laws" of chemistry (or biology) that >>>>> cannot be "reduced" to "laws" of physics. >>>>> >>>>> * e.g. 87. Backward and Downward! >>>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/07/06/backward-and-downward/ >>>>> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/07/06/backward-and-downward/> >>>>> (the references there to "downward causation") >>>>> >>>>> There is another term: Incommensurability of the sciences >>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incommensurability/ >>>>> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incommensurability/> >>>>> http://depa.fquim.unam.mx/sieq/Documentos/floresgallegosgarritzgarciaincommensurabilityse2007.pdf >>>>> >>>>> <http://depa.fquim.unam.mx/sieq/Documentos/floresgallegosgarritzgarciaincommensurabilityse2007.pdf> >>>>> >>>>> The idea is that the spectrum of matter (from particles to people) has a >>>>> spectrum of laws. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On a (computational) universal dovetailer and its relationship to >>>>> conscious matter: worth finding out more. >>>> >>>> >>>> I can explain that IF we assume that the brain or the body is Turing >>>> emulable, then everything can be reduced to arithmetic. Note that >>>> arithmetic is not a computable thing (the computable part of arithmetic is >>>> a very tiny part of arithmetic). It makes machine theology becoming the >>>> fundamental science. In particular physics and the natural science get >>>> reduced to “machine theology”, and this has been proven constructively: so >>>> that physics is deducible from arithmetical self-reference. That makes >>>> mechanism testable by comparing the physics deducible from theology with >>>> the physics inferred from observation. This works (until now), where >>>> physicalism does not work (as most people grasping the mind)body problem >>>> are more or less aware since long). >>>> >>>> I can agree that there is a spectrum of laws, that is the natural case in >>>> computer science. To understand a brain by studying neurons cannot work. >>>> It would be like trying to understand Big Blue strategy to win Chess game >>>> by studying the electronic gates. That might explain how some strategy is >>>> implemented, but that will not put light on which strategy is used. >>>> >>>> I am skeptical on (primary) matter. That is not used in physics, only in >>>> metaphysics, and its use is more like the use of God in some theologies: >>>> to prevent the search of theories and make people stopping asking >>>> question. >>>> >>>> What is matter? If I may ask? What are your evidence for all is matter? >>>> And are you open to the mechanist theory of mind? (The idea that there is >>>> no magic operating in a brain, or the idea that we could survive with a >>>> digital brain transplant, obtained by copying it at some level of >>>> description). Mechanism is my working hypothesis, and it makes primary >>>> matter very doubtful. We get a simpler explanation of both mind and >>>> matter-appearances without it, as matter, nor a god, can select a >>>> computation in arithmetic. >>>> >>>> The notion of computation is a purely mathematical (arithmetical) notion. >>>> It should not be confused with the notion of physical computation, which >>>> will appear to be a very special case, observable by the average universal >>>> (digital) machine/number from inside arithmetic. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I have mainly followed the perspective of the late Turing scholar S. Barry >>>> Cooper >>>> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S._Barry_Cooper >>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S._Barry_Cooper> ]: >>>> >>>> Incomputability after Alan Turing >>>> [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1304.6363 <https://arxiv.org/abs/1304.6363> ] >>> >>> I appreciate very much Barry Cooper. He invited me at one of the European >>> Meeting on Computability (CiE). >>> It is there that I prenseted my Plotinus paper (accessible on my URL >>> frontage). >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Basically: We don't know the full nature of physical [ that is, material ] >>>> computation. >>> >>> OK. But Feynman and Dutch, like Landauer and Bekenstein did great advances. >>> Of course many great questions remain unsolved. >>> >>> >>> >>>> Corollary: We don't know the full nature of matter. >>> >>> I can explain in all details that “matter” (in its usual occidental sense >>> of primary substance) does not make sense once we postulate (Digital) >>> Mechanism. To put it simply: matter do not exist. There is no physical >>> universe, … or Mechanism is false, but there are no evidence for that. On >>> the contrary, modern physics sides more and more with the immaterialist >>> theology/metaphysics. The more we observe nature, the more we guess the >>> deep mathematical reality at its origin. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Computation without matter, even though we don't know completely what >>>> matter is (like Kant's noumenon) remains a ghostly entity, >>> >>> Here I disagree. Unless you mean that 2+2=4 is a ghostly truth (in which >>> case I invite you to convince my taxe inspector! >>> The (arithmetical) notion of computation is a astonishingly clear >>> mathematical notion thanks to Church thesis. It admit an infinity of >>> apparently very different definitions, yet they can be shown equivalent, >>> and indeed equivalent to very simple definition of them, like I illustrate >>> with the combinators. It is a unique fact in the history of mathematics: an >>> epistemological (computable) notion which get a precise mathematical (even >>> arithmetical) definition. I am as sure about the existence of computations >>> than I am about the existence of prime numbers. I am less sure of >>> Mechanism, but then that is why I proposed an experimental testing >>> procedure, and as I said, physics confirms Mechanism (up to now at least, >>> thanks mainly to quantum-mechanics-without-collapse). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> one where there is no real experientiality (like the pleasure of eating a >>>> candy bar). >>> >>> On the contrary, the logic of self-reference explains both qualia and >>> quanta, and link them without using the brain-mind identity thesis, which >>> has been debunked in the frame of Mechanism. Why would there be no real >>> experience, and how could you know that? Yet, your position might be >>> coherent: if matter exist and play a role in consciousness, then we cannot >>> be digital machine, and there must be actual infinities in nature. But that >>> seems rather speculative, given the absence of evidence for both actual >>> infinite in Nature, and the evidences for mechanism (Darwin theory of >>> evolution uses mechanism quasi explicitly, for example). >>> >>> So, you would not accept a digital brain transplant (in theory, in practice >>> me too!). That seems to me like invoking something more complex that what >>> we want to explain, to avoid searching an explanation. Matter is a >>> speculative hypothesis in metaphysics without evidences, and which hides >>> more the problem than clarifying it, I think. I prefer to assume Mechanism, >>> and see if we are lead to absurdity or to facts contradicted by nature. But >>> the most startling fact predicted by Mechanim, —the fact that physics is a >>> statistic on many computations is somehow confirmed by Quantum Mechanics >>> (without collapse). Then it took me 30 years to confirms this >>> mathematically (using the self-reference logics of Gödel, Löb and Solovay). >>> >>> Bruno. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> My own (hypothetical) course in Philosophy of Mathematics would begin with >>> this slide: >>> >>> "There are no such things as mathematical objects.” >> >> >> With mechanism, we are mathematical object, and the physical reality is a >> mathematical phenomenon, so there is no physical object per se. That does >> not threat the existence of the moon, of galaxies, or bosons and fermions, >> but such existence becomes phenomenological, yet more universal in the sense >> that the core of the physical laws is the same for all universal machine, >> the rest becomes historico-geographical differentiations. Mechanism makes it >> possible to delineate the indexical geography from what are genuinely >> univarsable laws for the universal machine observable. >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> cf. https://twitter.com/philipthrift/status/1029079439190228992 >>> <https://twitter.com/philipthrift/status/1029079439190228992> >>> Mathematical pulp fictionalism [ >>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/08/26/mathematical-pulp-fictionalism/ >>> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/08/26/mathematical-pulp-fictionalism/> >>> ] >>> ref: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ >>> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/> >>> >>> That being the first principle, I would say what does exist are material >>> objects. And then proceed from there. >> >> You will have to say “no” to the doctor proposing you a digital brain >> transplant. If we survive such transplants, we survive in the infinitely >> many continuations that are emulated in arithmetic, and the laws of physics >> are determined by what is provable in all such continuations, which is then >> mathematically recovered by nuances on provability logic imposed by >> incompleteness. It works actually, until now, formally, and intuitively if >> you agree with QM-without collapse. >> >> I avoid as much as possible to use any hypothesis in philosophy of >> mathematics, as the Mechanist Hypothesis in ogive science is so strong as to >> reset what we can sought on this. Contrary to what many people think, >> Mechanism is incompatible with Materialism. It explains the observable >> without any ontological commitment other than what is needed to define the >> notion of computation (and this requires nothing more than what is required >> in elementary arithmetic, or combinator theory, or anything equivalent with >> respect to computability). >> >> It uses only arithmetical realism, and recently I have discovered that it >> works even with some form of ultrafinitism. My “theory” seems to be the >> common base of all possible theories. A non arithmetical realist is someone >> who disbelieve that it is false that a digital machine stops or not. >> >> I doubt less 2+2=4 than F=ma or the SWE, or the existence of the moon, or my >> body, which are among what I try to explain from simple things, like "x+2 = >> 9 has a solution”. >> >> When you say “there is no mathematical object?” What do you mean. Please >> make your point here, and refers only for more detailed and lengthy >> treatment. To me, even without Mechanism, it seems that the notion of >> physical object is far less clear than mathematical object. I am not sure >> modern physics can define what is a physical object: you need a “theory of >> everything physical” for that, but gravitation and the quantum makes the big >> picture still not accessible. Mechanism does not (yet) seem to imply that >> the physical reality is, or not, immune to diagonalisation, so some >> universal number can still play some role in the physical reality, but we >> are far to know that, and the theory would still be a description of number >> relations. With mechanism, we can associate minds only to infinities of >> computations. Assuming physical object gives them a magical ability to >> deflect your consciousness in arithmetic, in a way which is not explainable >> when we assume Mechanism. >> >> Just to say that at some point you will need some non mechanist theory of >> mind, if you really want to have physicalist primary objects. Of course, I >> will also ask you some theory about those objects. >> >> Assuming Matter is a bit like assuming God. I can accept that things like >> that exists phenomenologically, and perhaps ontologically. But even in that >> case, invoking them does not help to explain them. I prefer to start from >> what I am the closest to certainty, like 2+2=4, or SKKK = K. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> By "There are no such things as mathematical objects” (quoted from the SEP >> article "Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics") I mean that in the >> language(s) of mathematics (including arithmetic), the objects referred to >> are fictional and do not exist; as in vampire stories, the vampire is a >> fictional object that does not exist. So the 2 in "2+2=4" is a fictional >> object: it does not exist. > > I accept classical first order logic. If 2+2=4, I can deduce Ex(x+2=4). It is > neutral if 2 is an object or an idea (which is also an object of some sort). > I am not sure I can understand 2+2=4 if 2 does not exist in a way or another. > This means that you are not using classical logic. What logic are you using? > > Frankly, I tend to believe in 2, and not in vampire (when these words are > used with their usual meaning. Of course I believe in bats!). > > I can explain that mechanism leads to physical fictionalism. Numbers (and > combinators, Turing machine, …) belongs to what I doubt the less. All humans > agree on all their properties. > Again, if you think that Mechanism is false, then there is some place for a > possible ontological matter, but we loss the computationalist explanation of > matter appearance and mind, provided by any introspecting universal machine > (well, the Löbian one, i.e. they know that thy are universal, like Peano > Arithmetic, or the humans). > > Bruno > > > > > > I don't use or start with logic in its traditional sense. I begin with type > theory & lambda calculus as presented in programming language theory (PLT). > > Arithmetic is defined in terms of a programing language: e.g. lambda > calculus. (It could be SKI combinatory calculus.) > > Seft-"aware" programs are achieved by monadic reflection - or other > reflection approaches as defined in PLT. (Whether this theory is useful for > defining the programs of consciousness remains to be seen.) > > This is why I refer to the codical-material universe and not the > mathematical-material universe. Math is defined by code. > > All code requires a material medium to transmit, e,g. the program "3" := > λf.λx.f (f (f x)) [ from > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lambda_calculus ]. Here the medium is > electronic dots on a screen you are looking at right now.
I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. I disagree strongly with “all codes requires a material medium to transmit if “material" refers to something primitively material. I am OK, if by “material" you mean “observable by a universal machine or number”. In that case physics becomes a branch of machine’s theology/psychology. The observable is a mode of machine’s self-reference. I have proven (40 years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible. We can’t have both. Bruno > > - Philip Thrift > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
