On Saturday, September 8, 2018 at 4:00:41 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 7 Sep 2018, at 14:43, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Friday, September 7, 2018 at 3:59:08 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 6 Sep 2018, at 21:48, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 11:47:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 6 Sep 2018, at 17:04, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, September 6, 2018 at 4:23:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 18:58, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 9:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 5 Sep 2018, at 11:54, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wednesday, September 5, 2018 at 2:28:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 2 Sep 2018, at 21:32, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sunday, September 2, 2018 at 8:15:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 30 Aug 2018, at 01:04, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wednesday, August 29, 2018 at 4:55:12 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Do you have some evidence for doubting CT? It seems that it's >>>>>>>> essentially a definition of digital computation. So you could >>>>>>>> offer >>>>>>>> some other definition, but it would need to be realisable. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Brent >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 8/29/2018 12:12 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>>>>>> > also thought by some in what I call the UCNC gang >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Also thought WHAT? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In terms of theory, Joel David Hamkins @*JDHamkins* >>>>>>> <https://twitter.com/JDHamkins> (the set-theorist now at Oxford) >>>>>>> considers infinite-time TMs to be a part of "computation": >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/ittms/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If computation is the fundamental "substrate" of nature, and ITTMs >>>>>>> are "natural" extensions of TMs, there is no reason to exclude ITTMs. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I have explained in this list, and in my papers, that Church’s >>>>>>> thesis (with Mechanism) entails that matter and nature are non >>>>>>> computable. >>>>>>> Elementary arithmetic realise/emulate all computations, and physics is >>>>>>> reduced into a statistic on all computations, which is not something a >>>>>>> priori computable. If mechanism is refuted some day, it will be by >>>>>>> showing >>>>>>> that nature is “too much computable”, not by showing that nature is not >>>>>>> computable. Mechanism in cognitive science is incompatible with >>>>>>> Mechanism >>>>>>> in physics. Now, it could be that the only not computable things is >>>>>>> just a >>>>>>> random oracle, but this does not change the class of computable >>>>>>> function. >>>>>>> It would change the class of polynomial-time computable function, as we >>>>>>> suspect nature do, but that confirms mechanism which predicts this. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But what does the presence of ITTMs mean for the CT thesis? Whether >>>>>>> ITTMs are "realizable" remains to be seen. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The CT thesis identifies human intuitively computable functions with >>>>>>> functions programmable on a computer. It is a priori neutral on what >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> physical reality can compute. With mechanism, CT entails the existence >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> non emulable phenomena by computer “in real time”. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In terms of practice, UCNC people think that computers made with >>>>>>> non-standard materials, e.g. "live" bioware produced by synthetic >>>>>>> biology, >>>>>>> could have novel computational (behavioural) abilities not equivalently >>>>>>> replicable in a simulation. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Quantum computer can emulate some piece of matter more quickly than >>>>>>> a classical computer. But that was a prediction of mechanism. You can >>>>>>> read >>>>>>> the basic explanation in my paper here if interested. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th >>>>>>> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, >>>>>>> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (sane04) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The key notion if the “first person indeterminacy” which is just the >>>>>>> fact that if we are machine, we are duplicable, and duplicated in >>>>>>> arithmetic, and whatever we predict about our first person experience >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> indeterminate on the set of all computations (in arithmetic) which go >>>>>>> through our local and actual state of mind (that is: an infinity). >>>>>>> Physicalism is refuted with mechanism, and becomes a branch of machine >>>>>>> psychology, or better machine theology (the study of the non provable >>>>>>> true >>>>>>> propositions). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I am just know writing a post on why Church’s thesis is a >>>>>>> quasi-miracle in mathematics and epistemology. In particular it entails >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> incompleteness phenomenon, from which we can derive mathematically the >>>>>>> physical laws. That makes Mechanism testable, and indeed, we recover >>>>>>> already the quantum logical core of the formalism. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> This is very interesting. (I've written about the irreducibility of >>>>>> "matter" to physics, e.g., >>>>>> [ >>>>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/20/materialism-vs-physicalism/ >>>>>> ].) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I will take a look, but feel free to explain the basic. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Do you see what role a "multiverse perspective of mathematical truth" >>>>>> could play in your theory? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joel_David_Hamkins#Philosophy_of_set_theory >>>>>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I am not sure why you say that the the universe of set is well >>>>>> defined. To be franc, although I am realist on arithmetic, I am not for >>>>>> set >>>>>> theory, nor analysis, second ordre arithmetic. >>>>>> >>>>>> Most set theories that I know are first order theory, ans thus they >>>>>> have infinitely many non-isomorphic models, including enumerable one. A >>>>>> problem here is that we call set theory, well set theory or theory of >>>>>> sets, >>>>>> when we should say “theory of universes” (in the math sense of universes >>>>>> of >>>>>> set), if we use “of” like in theory of groups, or we should call “theory >>>>>> of >>>>>> groups” a theory of vectors, or a theory of transformation. That gives >>>>>> the >>>>>> feeling that set theory admit one clear model, but it has many. >>>>>> Arithmetic >>>>>> also has many non-isomorphic models, but most people agree on a notion >>>>>> of >>>>>> standard model, which lacks for set. Also, there are many set theories, >>>>>> which all have different models, but quite different theorems too. In >>>>>> Quine >>>>>> set theory (New Foundations, NF), the universes can belong to >>>>>> themselves, >>>>>> which is not the case in Zermelo-Fraekel of Von Neuman Bernays Gödel set >>>>>> theories. That is a reason why I prefer to put “set theory” in the >>>>>> catalog >>>>>> of the mind of the universal machine looking at itself. >>>>>> >>>>>> Once we postulate Mechanism, the “cardinality” of the mathematical >>>>>> "universe" becomes undecidable, and it is simpler to use enumerable >>>>>> models. >>>>>> In fact, the standard model of arithmetic is already too much big, and >>>>>> we >>>>>> can decide to postulate only the “sigma_1 truth”, or the “PI_1 truth”, >>>>>> that >>>>>> is the truth of the proposition having the shape ExP(x,y) with P >>>>>> decidable >>>>>> (and their negations). That is, we need only the notion of computation >>>>>> (which provably exists in any Sigma_1 complete (= Turing universal) >>>>>> theory. >>>>>> We do get a constructive “multiverse” of some sort, which I call >>>>>> Universal >>>>>> Dovetailer. It is a program which generates all programs, and executes >>>>>> them >>>>>> all, in a dovetailed way, pieces by pieces to avoid being stuck in non >>>>>> terminating computations (something that I have just explained to be non >>>>>> predictable in advance). From this I have extracted the mathematics of a >>>>>> physical multiverse, but that structure is phenomenological: it exist >>>>>> only >>>>>> in the mind of the machines (naturally implemented in arithmetic). >>>>>> Physics >>>>>> becomes a statistics on computations, and the math fit well with some >>>>>> version of Quantum Mechanics, until now. >>>>>> >>>>>> More on this later, very plausibly. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> On the reduction of all matter to physics: >>>>> >>>>> I consider "all matter" to include everything studied by natural >>>>> sciences: physics, chemistry, biology, etc. I cite in some of my Notes* >>>>> the >>>>> concept that there may be "laws" of chemistry (or biology) that cannot be >>>>> "reduced" to "laws" of physics. >>>>> >>>>> * e.g. 87. Backward and Downward! >>>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/07/06/backward-and-downward/ >>>>> (the references there to "downward causation") >>>>> >>>>> There is another term: Incommensurability of the sciences >>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incommensurability/ >>>>> >>>>> http://depa.fquim.unam.mx/sieq/Documentos/floresgallegosgarritzgarciaincommensurabilityse2007.pdf >>>>> >>>>> The idea is that the spectrum of matter (from particles to people) has >>>>> a spectrum of laws. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On a (computational) universal dovetailer and its relationship to >>>>> conscious matter: worth finding out more. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I can explain that IF we assume that the brain or the body is Turing >>>>> emulable, then everything can be reduced to arithmetic. Note that >>>>> arithmetic is not a computable thing (the computable part of arithmetic >>>>> is >>>>> a very tiny part of arithmetic). It makes machine theology becoming the >>>>> fundamental science. In particular physics and the natural science get >>>>> reduced to “machine theology”, and this has been proven constructively: >>>>> so >>>>> that physics is deducible from arithmetical self-reference. That makes >>>>> mechanism testable by comparing the physics deducible from theology with >>>>> the physics inferred from observation. This works (until now), where >>>>> physicalism does not work (as most people grasping the mind)body problem >>>>> are more or less aware since long). >>>>> >>>>> I can agree that there is a spectrum of laws, that is the natural case >>>>> in computer science. To understand a brain by studying neurons cannot >>>>> work. >>>>> It would be like trying to understand Big Blue strategy to win Chess game >>>>> by studying the electronic gates. That might explain how some strategy is >>>>> implemented, but that will not put light on which strategy is used. >>>>> >>>>> I am skeptical on (primary) matter. That is not used in physics, only >>>>> in metaphysics, and its use is more like the use of God in some >>>>> theologies: >>>>> to prevent the search of theories and make people stopping asking >>>>> question. >>>>> >>>>> What is matter? If I may ask? What are your evidence for all is >>>>> matter? And are you open to the mechanist theory of mind? (The idea that >>>>> there is no magic operating in a brain, or the idea that we could survive >>>>> with a digital brain transplant, obtained by copying it at some level of >>>>> description). Mechanism is my working hypothesis, and it makes primary >>>>> matter very doubtful. We get a simpler explanation of both mind and >>>>> matter-appearances without it, as matter, nor a god, can select a >>>>> computation in arithmetic. >>>>> >>>>> The notion of computation is a purely mathematical (arithmetical) >>>>> notion. It should not be confused with the notion of physical >>>>> computation, >>>>> which will appear to be a very special case, observable by the average >>>>> universal (digital) machine/number from inside arithmetic. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I have mainly followed the perspective of the late Turing scholar S. >>>> Barry Cooper >>>> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S._Barry_Cooper ]: >>>> >>>> *Incomputability after Alan Turing* >>>> [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1304.6363 ] >>>> >>>> >>>> I appreciate very much Barry Cooper. He invited me at one of the >>>> European Meeting on Computability (CiE). >>>> It is there that I prenseted my Plotinus paper (accessible on my URL >>>> frontage). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Basically: We don't know the full nature of physical [ that is, >>>> material ] computation. >>>> >>>> >>>> OK. But Feynman and Dutch, like Landauer and Bekenstein did great >>>> advances. Of course many great questions remain unsolved. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Corollary: We don't know the full nature of matter. >>>> >>>> >>>> I can explain in all details that “matter” (in its usual occidental >>>> sense of primary substance) does not make sense once we postulate >>>> (Digital) >>>> Mechanism. To put it simply: matter do not exist. There is no physical >>>> universe, … or Mechanism is false, but there are no evidence for that. On >>>> the contrary, modern physics sides more and more with the immaterialist >>>> theology/metaphysics. The more we observe nature, the more we guess the >>>> deep mathematical reality at its origin. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Computation without matter, even though we don't know completely what >>>> matter is (like Kant's noumenon) remains a ghostly entity, >>>> >>>> >>>> Here I disagree. Unless you mean that 2+2=4 is a ghostly truth (in >>>> which case I invite you to convince my taxe inspector! >>>> The (arithmetical) notion of computation is a astonishingly clear >>>> mathematical notion thanks to Church thesis. It admit an infinity of >>>> apparently very different definitions, yet they can be shown equivalent, >>>> and indeed equivalent to very simple definition of them, like I illustrate >>>> with the combinators. It is a unique fact in the history of mathematics: >>>> an >>>> epistemological (computable) notion which get a precise mathematical (even >>>> arithmetical) definition. I am as sure about the existence of computations >>>> than I am about the existence of prime numbers. I am less sure of >>>> Mechanism, but then that is why I proposed an experimental testing >>>> procedure, and as I said, physics confirms Mechanism (up to now at least, >>>> thanks mainly to quantum-mechanics-without-collapse). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> one where there is no real experientiality (like the pleasure of eating >>>> a candy bar). >>>> >>>> >>>> On the contrary, the logic of self-reference explains both qualia and >>>> quanta, and link them without using the brain-mind identity thesis, which >>>> has been debunked in the frame of Mechanism. Why would there be no real >>>> experience, and how could you know that? Yet, your position might be >>>> coherent: if matter exist and play a role in consciousness, then we cannot >>>> be digital machine, and there must be actual infinities in nature. But >>>> that >>>> seems rather speculative, given the absence of evidence for both actual >>>> infinite in Nature, and the evidences for mechanism (Darwin theory of >>>> evolution uses mechanism quasi explicitly, for example). >>>> >>>> So, you would not accept a digital brain transplant (in theory, in >>>> practice me too!). That seems to me like invoking something more complex >>>> that what we want to explain, to avoid searching an explanation. Matter is >>>> a speculative hypothesis in metaphysics without evidences, and which hides >>>> more the problem than clarifying it, I think. I prefer to assume >>>> Mechanism, >>>> and see if we are lead to absurdity or to facts contradicted by nature. >>>> But >>>> the most startling fact predicted by Mechanim, —the fact that physics is a >>>> statistic on many computations is somehow confirmed by Quantum Mechanics >>>> (without collapse). Then it took me 30 years to confirms this >>>> mathematically (using the self-reference logics of Gödel, Löb and Solovay). >>>> >>>> Bruno. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> My own (hypothetical) course in Philosophy of Mathematics would begin >>> with this slide: >>> >>> *"There are no such things as mathematical objects.”* >>> >>> >>> >>> With mechanism, we are mathematical object, and the physical reality is >>> a mathematical phenomenon, so there is no physical object per se. That does >>> not threat the existence of the moon, of galaxies, or bosons and fermions, >>> but such existence becomes phenomenological, yet more universal in the >>> sense that the core of the physical laws is the same for all universal >>> machine, the rest becomes historico-geographical differentiations. >>> Mechanism makes it possible to delineate the indexical geography from what >>> are genuinely univarsable laws for the universal machine observable. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> cf. https://twitter.com/philipthrift/status/1029079439190228992 >>> *Mathematical pulp fictionalism* [ >>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/08/26/mathematical-pulp-fictionalism/ >>> ] >>> ref: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ >>> >>> That being the first principle, I would say what does exist are material >>> objects. And then proceed from there. >>> >>> >>> You will have to say “no” to the doctor proposing you a digital brain >>> transplant. If we survive such transplants, we survive in the infinitely >>> many continuations that are emulated in arithmetic, and the laws of physics >>> are determined by what is provable in all such continuations, which is >>> then mathematically recovered by nuances on provability logic imposed by >>> incompleteness. It works actually, until now, formally, and intuitively if >>> you agree with QM-without collapse. >>> >>> I avoid as much as possible to use any hypothesis in philosophy of >>> mathematics, as the Mechanist Hypothesis in ogive science is so strong as >>> to reset what we can sought on this. Contrary to what many people think, >>> Mechanism is incompatible with Materialism. It explains the observable >>> without any ontological commitment other than what is needed to define the >>> notion of computation (and this requires nothing more than what is required >>> in elementary arithmetic, or combinator theory, or anything equivalent with >>> respect to computability). >>> >>> It uses only arithmetical realism, and recently I have discovered that >>> it works even with some form of ultrafinitism. My “theory” seems to be the >>> common base of all possible theories. A non arithmetical realist is someone >>> who disbelieve that it is false that a digital machine stops or not. >>> >>> I doubt less 2+2=4 than F=ma or the SWE, or the existence of the moon, >>> or my body, which are among what I try to explain from simple things, like >>> "x+2 = 9 has a solution”. >>> >>> When you say “there is no mathematical object?” What do you mean. Please >>> make your point here, and refers only for more detailed and lengthy >>> treatment. To me, even without Mechanism, it seems that the notion of >>> physical object is far less clear than mathematical object. I am not sure >>> modern physics can define what is a physical object: you need a “theory of >>> everything physical” for that, but gravitation and the quantum makes the >>> big picture still not accessible. Mechanism does not (yet) seem to imply >>> that the physical reality is, or not, immune to diagonalisation, so some >>> universal number can still play some role in the physical reality, but we >>> are far to know that, and the theory would still be a description of number >>> relations. With mechanism, we can associate minds only to infinities of >>> computations. Assuming physical object gives them a magical ability to >>> deflect your consciousness in arithmetic, in a way which is not explainable >>> when we assume Mechanism. >>> >>> Just to say that at some point you will need some non mechanist theory >>> of mind, if you really want to have physicalist primary objects. Of course, >>> I will also ask you some theory about those objects. >>> >>> Assuming Matter is a bit like assuming God. I can accept that things >>> like that exists phenomenologically, and perhaps ontologically. But even in >>> that case, invoking them does not help to explain them. I prefer to start >>> from what I am the closest to certainty, like 2+2=4, or SKKK = K. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> >> By *"There are no such things as mathematical objects”* (quoted from >> the SEP article "Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics") I mean >> that in the language(s) of mathematics (including arithmetic), the objects >> referred to are fictional and do not exist; as in vampire stories, the >> vampire is a fictional object that does not exist. So the 2 in "2+2=4" is a >> fictional object: it does not exist. >> >> >> I accept classical first order logic. If 2+2=4, I can deduce Ex(x+2=4). >> It is neutral if 2 is an object or an idea (which is also an object of some >> sort). I am not sure I can understand 2+2=4 if 2 does not exist in a way or >> another. >> This means that you are not using classical logic. What logic are you >> using? >> >> Frankly, I tend to believe in 2, and not in vampire (when these words are >> used with their usual meaning. Of course I believe in bats!). >> >> I can explain that mechanism leads to physical fictionalism. Numbers (and >> combinators, Turing machine, …) belongs to what I doubt the less. All >> humans agree on all their properties. >> Again, if you think that Mechanism is false, then there is some place for >> a possible ontological matter, but we loss the computationalist explanation >> of matter appearance and mind, provided by any introspecting universal >> machine (well, the Löbian one, i.e. they know that thy are universal, like >> Peano Arithmetic, or the humans). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > > I don't use or start with logic in its traditional sense. I begin with > type theory & lambda calculus as presented in programming language theory > (PLT). > > Arithmetic is defined in terms of a programing language: e.g. lambda > calculus. (It could be SKI combinatory calculus.) > > Seft-"aware" programs are achieved by *monadic reflection* - or other > reflection approaches as defined in PLT. (Whether this theory is useful for > defining the programs of consciousness remains to be seen.) > > This is why I refer to the codical-material universe and not the > mathematical-material universe. Math is defined by code. > > All code requires a material medium to transmit, e,g. the program "3" := > λ*f*.λ*x*.*f* (*f* (*f* *x*)) [ from > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lambda_calculus ]. Here the medium is > electronic dots on a screen you are looking at right now. > > > I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by > matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. > > I disagree strongly with “all codes requires a material medium to transmit > if “material" refers to something primitively material. I am OK, if by > “material" you mean “observable by a universal machine or number”. In that > case physics becomes a branch of machine’s theology/psychology. The > observable is a mode of machine’s self-reference. > > I have proven (40 years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary > matter, or physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible. We can’t have both. > > Bruno >
A working definition of matter: That which stores, transmits, or executes code. (Like the computer on the desk in front of me at this moment, executing the code of Google Groups.) - Philip Thrift > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
