> On 11 Sep 2018, at 14:44, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, September 11, 2018 at 5:54:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 11 Sep 2018, at 04:44, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: >> >> Is it not computable because after some value of its argument, its mapped >> value is greater than anything that can be written by a computer? AG > > > No, even a computer with infinite time and infinite memory is not able to > compute it. The busy beaver is a well defined total (everywhere defined) > function which is not computable, even in theory. > > I can prove that, but have you understand that the Total-or-Partial attribute > of an arbitrary programs is a well defined function yet non computable? I > have proven this in my last post in the Church-Turing thread. > > > Why is the busy beaver not computable. The basic reason is that it gives the > bound of what you can compute with the machine, and if the BB function was > computable, you could use it to build a more powerful BB, notably by > diagonalisation. > > More on this later, > > Bruno > > > > > On the BBP and hypercomputing: > > > A New Godelian Argument for Hypercomputing Minds Based on the Busy Beaver > Problem > https://newdualism.org/papers/S.Bringsjord/laihyper11.pdf >
I read his book a long time ago, and was not much impressed, but here his definition of computationalism is directly inconsistent with the “indexical computationalism” that I study. He uses a quantifier on the notion of person and a quantifier on the machine and an indentity thesis between person and machine, which makes no sense with indexical mechanism, and it makes his argument into a confusion between the third person and the first person. (The confusion between []p and [)p & p). The universal (Löbian) machine knows already defeat such argument. Hofstadter understating of Gödel is better. I will read more, but his notion of person takes the whole of Aristotle for granted, where mechanism goes far more in the Plato direction. Like Penrose, he seems to ignore the fact that a machine does not know which machine she is, not-r which universal machine support her, and that below its substitution level, there are an infinity of such universal machine, structured by the mathematics of self-reference. Bruno > > - Philip Thrift > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
