> On 11 Sep 2018, at 19:45, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > >> On 11 Sep 2018, at 14:44, Philip Thrift <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, September 11, 2018 at 5:54:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 11 Sep 2018, at 04:44, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: >>> >>> Is it not computable because after some value of its argument, its mapped >>> value is greater than anything that can be written by a computer? AG >> >> >> No, even a computer with infinite time and infinite memory is not able to >> compute it. The busy beaver is a well defined total (everywhere defined) >> function which is not computable, even in theory. >> >> I can prove that, but have you understand that the Total-or-Partial >> attribute of an arbitrary programs is a well defined function yet non >> computable? I have proven this in my last post in the Church-Turing thread. >> >> >> Why is the busy beaver not computable. The basic reason is that it gives the >> bound of what you can compute with the machine, and if the BB function was >> computable, you could use it to build a more powerful BB, notably by >> diagonalisation. >> >> More on this later, >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> On the BBP and hypercomputing: >> >> >> A New Godelian Argument for Hypercomputing Minds Based on the Busy Beaver >> Problem >> https://newdualism.org/papers/S.Bringsjord/laihyper11.pdf >> <https://newdualism.org/papers/S.Bringsjord/laihyper11.pdf> >> > > I read his book a long time ago, and was not much impressed, but here his > definition of computationalism is directly inconsistent with the “indexical > computationalism” that I study. He uses a quantifier on the notion of person > and a quantifier on the machine and an indentity thesis between person and > machine, which makes no sense with indexical mechanism, and it makes his > argument into a confusion between the third person and the first person. (The > confusion between []p and [)p & p). The universal (Löbian) machine knows > already defeat such argument. Hofstadter understating of Gödel is better.
Sorry. I meant “Hofstadter understanding”. > I will read more, but his notion of person takes the whole of Aristotle for > granted, where mechanism goes far more in the Plato direction. Like Penrose, > he seems to ignore the fact that a machine does not know which machine she > is, not-r which universal machine support her, and that below its > substitution level, there are an infinity of such universal machine, > structured by the mathematics of self-reference. > > Bruno > > > >> >> - Philip Thrift >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
