> On 12 Jan 2019, at 03:14, Mason Green <masonlgr...@hotmail.com> wrote: > > Solomonoff’s method of induction seems like a good fit for a mechanist view > of things. For instance, it could be used to assign a relative probability to > the universe being generated by a universal dovetailer: 2^(-K) * m, where K > is the Kolmogorov complexity of the universal dovetailer and m is the measure > the dovetailer assigns to universes like ours. > > This formula implies that a (more complex) non-universal dovetailer might be > preferable _if_ it assigned a much higher measure to universes like ours.
That works for the individual mind, and with some luck for the first person plural physics, but you have to drive them from the universal dovetailing (if not you will reintroduce some identity thesis hardly compatible with computationalism (even with oracles). > Such a dovetailer might, for instance, output only (or mostly) habitable > worlds, instead of outputting mostly uninhabitable worlds as the standard UD > does, and the higher resulting measure would offset the increased Kolmogorov > complexity. That leads to technical difficulties, although a subpart of this might explains the “thermodynamical part of physics”, relying on the laws of big numbers. But to make all this works, I am not sure it possible with taking into account the “mental” abilities of the universal-observers. > > If we live in a highly “atypical” universe, that might also affect how we > should do Solomonoff induction. For instance if we knew that we lived in a > universe with much less suffering than an “average” inhabited universe, ? What do you mean by “suffering” in an inhabited universe? > that could imply we were generated by a dovetailer that doesn’t like > suffering. If the opposite is true and we live in a “mean world”, that means > we might be generated by a sadistic dovetailer, etc. If such a malevolent or benevolent program exists, it has to be explained by the sum on all universal dovetailing, that any single universal dovetailer produces. The initial one does not matter, and I use the sigma_1 arithmetic sentences (equivalent to their own provability at the G* level) to start with (or sometimes the combinators, which are more handy but much less known). Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
