On Tuesday, April 2, 2019 at 3:19:36 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 1 Apr 2019, at 20:08, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Monday, April 1, 2019 at 11:46:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 31 Mar 2019, at 19:50, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, March 31, 2019 at 11:58:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 30 Mar 2019, at 07:15, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> https://thenewstack.io/which-programming-languages-use-the-least-electricity/ >>> >>> Which language one uses makes a physical difference. >>> >>> >>> That is correct, interesting for the application, but not directly >>> relevant for the “ontological problem” and the mind-body problem. >>> >>> Physics is not able to make any prediction without assuming something >>> (what exactly) capable of selecting our computation in arithmetic. >>> Theologically, it still invoke an ontology, which cannot be done when doing >>> science. >>> >>> The fact that efficient computation “survives”, and non efficient do >>> not, requires magic if the environnement does not map the finitely many >>> accessible histories at (or below) our substitution level. >>> >>> A quantum computation does not require any energy, note. And both >>> observation, and mechanism seems to force the physical reality into a >>> combinatory algebra without Kestrel (Kxy = x, which eliminates the >>> information in y), nor Starling S (Sxyz = xz(yz)) nor any duplicator (no >>> Mocking Bird like M, Mx = xx). Information cannot be physically created, >>> nor eliminated, nor duplicated. >>> >>> We can still have Turing universality without eliminators. Yet we lost >>> Turing universality when we have no eliminators and no duplicators, but we >>> can regain it with adding “measurement” modal operator (internally defined, >>> or not). That is the combinatory BCI algebra, with a core physics where >>> energy is a constant, and computations use no energy, yet relative >>> subcomputation are allowed to make relative measurement, leading to >>> apparent (indexical) breaking of the core laws, and apparent elimination of >>> “memories”. There are Turing universal group and group have natural mesure >>> theory associated with them, but again, such group must be justified >>> mathematically (and theologically to get the private (first person) parts >>> not eliminated). >>> >>> Thinking of group, I have said that physics is a symphony played by the >>> number 0, 1, e, PI, gamma, and with the number 24 has chief orchestra. To >>> be honest, my motivation comes more from physics and number theory than >>> from Metamathematics (mathematical logic, machine theology), and it makes >>> me nervous that the number theorist stumble on the right physics before the >>> theologian (leading to an arithmeticalism still capable of eliminating the >>> first person for awhile). Here is a nice video where John Baez explains >>> well why he likes 24 too, and its main role in String Theory (the Riemann >>> regularisation). I think about this when mentioning group theory, as 24 is >>> related to the Monster Group and Moonshine (where deep relation occurs >>> between fundamental physics and number theory). >>> >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzjbRhYjELo >>> >>> To be sure, my favorite reason to love 24 is more the one related to >>> Hardy Rademacher and Ramanujan exact formula for the number of partition of >>> a number. That plays also some role in fundamental chemistry and >>> classification of “orbitals” (or quantum stationary waves). >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> Every programming language has physical semantics >> >> >> But a term like physics has not yet understandable semantics. Carnap and >> Popper made some try in that direction, but it leads to many difficulties. >> It is part of the beauty of mechanism that it provides a semantic of the >> physical proposition, without invoking any ontological commitment (beyond >> the terms needed to have the notion of universal machine (in the >> Turing-Post-Church-Kleene sense). >> >> >> >> >> >> -- which depends on its material computing substrate >> >> >> That seems very weird to me. If something is a programming language, it >> can be implemented in a physical realm, but it is also implemented in the >> arithmetical realm, and anything emulated in that programming language >> cannot see any difference if the original emulator is the physical one or >> the arithmetical one. That is logically impossible, even without assuming >> mechanism. >> >> If you want a dependence from the substrate, you need a non >> computaionalist theory of mind, and you need to singularise matter with >> actual infinities, a bit like lowing down the substitution level up to some >> real numbers and oracles with some infinite precision. >> >> >> >> >> -- in addition to (substrate-independent) denotational and operational >> semantics . That includes quantum programming languages, like QASM [ >> https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.03429 ] (for IBM's Q computer). >> >> >> >> Same remark. All quantum computers + oracle are simulated in the partial >> computable part of arithmetic, which (of course?) requires a vaster part of >> arithmetic to be studied and get semantics. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > The example I refer to is the new programming paradigms of matter > programming: programs here are compiled into molecular structures that "go > out into the real world" and do things, like cure diseases. > > > > Which real world? How would a machine distinguish this from an oracle, and > what are the evidence for such oracle? You can always add a god in a > scientific picture, but where are the evidences that this is not Turing > emulable, other than the fact that the first person attached to a machine > is already confronted to the non computable part of the arithmetical > reality. To invoke “God", or “real”, or “truth” is not valid in science, en > especially in metaphysics/theology. > Mechanism is not the doctrine that we act like a this or that machine, but > that at some level of description, we don’t see the difference. No machine > can ever know-for-sure which machine she possibly could be, and this > introduce may non computable attribute to the machines. > If matter programming is really programming, and not analogical rendering, > then it has to be Turing emulable. Quantum computing is certainly a > wonderful way to do programming, but it is entirely emulated in arithmetic > already. You have to show something in nature which is neither > programmable, nor recoverable by the first person indeterminacy of the > machine with respect to the infinitely many computations going through its > “current” indexically defined state of mind. If that exists, then what you > say is that there is a nature’s tautology violating the observable mode of > self-reference (Z1*, or X1*, or S4Grz1), but up to now, we have not found > such departure? Of course, the research here is infinite, but as long as no > departure is found, it remains speculative to mention it in a metaphysical > argument. > My point is not a dense of mechanism, nor a critics of (weak) materialism. > Just that we can test this, and that up to now, the test are negative for > the presence of Matter (with a big M, it means Primary Matter). > > Bruno > > > > "Analogical rendering" is a perfectly good programming paradigm.

*Engineers Develop Analog Computing Compiler * https://www.engineering.com/DesignerEdge/DesignerEdgeArticles/ArticleID/13340/Engineers-Develop-Analog-Computing-Compiler-for-Biological-Simulations-More.aspx "The high-level language of the compiler makes use of differential equations, which are frequently used to describe biological systems." "Researchers from MIT have presented a new compiler designed for analog computers. The compiler, called Arco, takes sets of differential equations as its input and translates them into circuits in programmable analog devices." - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.