> On 3 May 2019, at 19:41, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > I once corresponded with Greg Stone > (https://www.near-death.com/science/articles/dying-brain-theory.html > <https://www.near-death.com/science/articles/dying-brain-theory.html>), who > advanced a similar theory and claimed that he could detach from his body and > be present at places remote from it. I offered to fund a research program > by him (at the time I controlled a pot of Navy R&D money) if you could > remotely observe the titles of books in the shelf above my computer. He > invented a lot of reasons why it wouldn't be useful to do this.
I do not see any relations with what I say (see the quote below). With mechanism we don’t have a body, only relative “Gödel number”, and the physical one are the most probable one, and usually, if only to make the thought experience easier, we assumed a level rather high, in which such “similar theory” (similar to Kastrup?) is not very plausible, although not entirely logically refutable, with assuming very low level digitalism. Bruno > > Brent > > On 5/3/2019 7:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 1 May 2019, at 18:15, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> But does Kastrup's TOE yield any testable predictions? >> >> >> Good question. Or does it at least lead to any retrodictions, based on less >> hypothesis (simpler)? >> >> Bruno >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> On 5/1/2019 12:28 AM, [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>>> Not my view of course, but here is >>>> >>>> Analytic Idealism: A consciousness-only ontology >>>> Bernardo Kastrup >>>> Dissertation, Radboud University Nijmegen (2019) >>>> https://philpapers.org/rec/KASAIA-3 <https://philpapers.org/rec/KASAIA-3> >>>> pdf: https://philpapers.org/archive/KASAIA-3.pdf >>>> <https://philpapers.org/archive/KASAIA-3.pdf> >>>> >>>> Abstract >>>> >>>> This thesis articulates an analytic version of the ontology of idealism, >>>> according to which universal phenomenal consciousness is all there >>>> ultimately is, everything else in nature being reducible to patterns of >>>> excitation of this consciousness. The thesis’ key challenge is to explain >>>> how the seemingly distinct conscious inner lives of different >>>> subjects—such as you and me—can arise within this fundamentally unitary >>>> phenomenal field. Along the way, a variety of other challenges are >>>> addressed, such as: how we can reconcile idealism with the fact that we >>>> all inhabit a common external world; why this world unfolds independently >>>> of our personal volition or imagination; why there are such tight >>>> correlations between measured patterns of brain activity and reports of >>>> experience; etc. The core idea of this thesis can be summarized thus: we, >>>> as well as all other living organisms, are dissociated alters of universal >>>> phenomenal consciousness, analogously to how a person with Dissociative >>>> Identity Disorder (DID) manifests multiple disjoint centers of >>>> subjectivity also called ‘alters.’ We, and all other living organisms, are >>>> surrounded by the transpersonal phenomenal activity of universal >>>> consciousness, which unfolds beyond the dissociative boundary of our >>>> respective alter. The inanimate world we perceive around us is the >>>> extrinsic appearance—i.e. the phenomenal image imprinted from across our >>>> dissociative boundary—of this activity. The living organisms we share the >>>> world with are the extrinsic appearances of other alters. >>>> >>>> Keywords >>>> >>>> idealism panpsychism cosmopsychism dissociation altered states of >>>> consciousness mind-body problem consciousness hard problem of >>>> consciousness subject combination problem >>>> >>>> >>>> The (1hr) thesis defense: >>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcMOape0PY8 >>>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcMOape0PY8> >>>> >>>> >>>> - @philipthrift >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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