On Tuesday, May 21, 2019 at 2:13:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > I don’t see how, nor why, we could associate experience with matter. Then > with mechanism, we have to explain the appearance of matter from the > universal numbers and their relations. Materialism requires non-mechanism. > I have never found any evidence for (weak) materialism, but there are many > evidence for mechanism, and computer science provides a mathematically > precise theory of 3p self, 1p self, and material selves, in a precise > enough way so that it can be tested. Up to now, QM assesses mechanism, > which is not the case with Laplace or Newton. > > Bruno > > > One could have an an ontology of pure phenomenology, of pure experiences, including first-person experience: "I am."
Or one of pure information, of pure arithmetic/logic, from low-order PA to higher-order modal and even infinitary arithmetics/logics. The first captures the real existence of experience, but misses the grounding that matter provides. The second captures all possible behavioral descriptions, but has the big hole in it of missing experience itself. Only matter supplies what is needed for both. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/76d41c02-48b1-4ae7-b754-e51c0b5fb1af%40googlegroups.com.
