> On 11 Jun 2019, at 11:09, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Fri, Jun 7, 2019, at 20:22, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> On Friday, June 7, 2019 at 11:54:42 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 6 Jun 2019, at 19:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> [... stuff on libertarianism] >>> >>> I'm reminded of Bruno's theory that everything is computation… >> >> Just to be exact. My working hypothesis is “Indexical Digital Mechanism”. It >> is “YD + CT” to sum it all. >> >> My contribution is a theorem: which says that if we assume Mechanism, it is >> undecidable if there is more than the additive and multiplicative structure >> of the natural numbers, or Turing equivalent. >> >> But most things are not computation. The mixing of the codes of the total >> computable functions and the strictly partial one IS NOT computable, yet >> “arithmetically real” and this will have a role in the “first person >> indeterminacy” measure problem. >> >> If Mechanism is true, very few things are computable, or even deducible in >> powerful theory. Both consciousness and matter are typically not computable, >> yet absolutely real, for all Lôbian machines, from their phenomenological >> perspective. >> >> Every is numbers, or computations, which means we can limit the arithmetical >> reality to the sigma_1 sentences eventually, but that means only that the >> fundamental ontology is very simple. The interesting things, including god, >> consciousness and matter all get their meaning and laws from the >> phenomenological perspective. >> >> So, to say that with mechanism, that 'everything is computation’ is a bit >> misleading, as the phenomenologically apprehensible things will all be non >> computable, and yet are *real*, as we all know. >> >> For consciousness you need only to agree that it is >> >> True, >> Knowable, >> Indubitable, >> (Immediate), >> >> And >> >> Non-definable, >> Non Rationally believable > > Wait, this last one is new!
I use sometimes “non rationally believable” for non provable. Usually I use “non believable”, but I am usually in a context where I made clear I talk about self-referentially correct machine, which are rational in the sense that their believability is close for the usual first order logical rules, and that they have few simple beliefs, like 2+2=4 or KKK = K, etc. > What do you mean by "non rationally believable"? Isn't this contradictory > with "indubitable”? Not for consciousness. The indubitability is a first person person experience. Believable is modelled by Gödel’s bewesibar (the one modality which obeys to G and G*), but the indubitability is on the first person level: it is modelled by ([]p & p)’s logic, i.e. S4Grz. That one find its self-consistency obvious. OK? Bruno > > Telmo. > >> >> Together with the invariance for some digital transformation at some >> description level. >> >> >> >> >>> and so everything must be explainable in terms of computation. >> >> In terms of addition and multiplication, you can understand where >> consciousness come from, why it differentiates, and the transfinite paths it >> get involved into, and why Reality is beyond the computable, yet partially >> computable, partially and locally manageable, partially observable, >> partially and locally inductively inferable. Etc. >> >> Even just the arithmetical reality is far beyond the computable, but from >> inside, the sigma_1 (ultra-mini-tniy part of that reality) is already bigger >> than we could hope to formalise in ZF or ZF + Large cardinal. >> >> Digital mechanism, well understood (meaning with understand the quasi direct >> link between the Church-Turing thesis and incompleteness, (which I have >> explained many times, but I can do it again), is constructively >> antireductionist theory. The Löb-Gödelian machines, those who obeys to the >> probability/consistency laws of Solovays (cf G and G*) can defeat any >> complete theory anyone could conceive about them. >> >> Only numbers at the ontological level, OK, but the crazily interesting >> things appears at the phenomenological levels, where things are no more very >> computable at all. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> Today is the last day of UCNC 2019. >> >> Program: http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/program.html >> <http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/program.html> >> >> What the conference is about can be summed up as >> >> What is computing >> if the CT thesis [ >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis> ] is false? >> >> >> @philipthrift >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/71fdd53d-c433-4c6d-9c9a-347ee44103da%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/71fdd53d-c433-4c6d-9c9a-347ee44103da%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/82f78bd7-a03a-4560-acec-002ccd5c95af%40www.fastmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/82f78bd7-a03a-4560-acec-002ccd5c95af%40www.fastmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3D81BF3F-B599-40B0-BD35-CC03839BEE8D%40ulb.ac.be.
