On Tuesday, June 11, 2019 at 12:42:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 9 Jun 2019, at 22:00, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Sunday, June 9, 2019 at 10:11:37 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 7 Jun 2019, at 20:22, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, June 7, 2019 at 11:54:42 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 6 Jun 2019, at 19:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> [... *stuff on libertarianism*] >>> >>> I'm reminded of Bruno's theory that everything is computation… >>> >>> >>> Just to be exact. My working hypothesis is “Indexical Digital >>> Mechanism”. It is “YD + CT” to sum it all. >>> >>> My contribution is a theorem: which says that if we assume Mechanism, it >>> is undecidable if there is more than the additive and multiplicative >>> structure of the natural numbers, or Turing equivalent. >>> >>> But most things are not computation. The mixing of the codes of the >>> total computable functions and the strictly partial one IS NOT computable, >>> yet “arithmetically real” and this will have a role in the “first person >>> indeterminacy” measure problem. >>> >>> If Mechanism is true, very few things are computable, or even deducible >>> in powerful theory. Both consciousness and matter are typically not >>> computable, yet absolutely real, for all Lôbian machines, from their >>> phenomenological perspective. >>> >>> Every is numbers, or computations, which means we can limit the >>> arithmetical reality to the sigma_1 sentences eventually, but that means >>> only that the fundamental ontology is very simple. The interesting things, >>> including god, consciousness and matter all get their meaning and laws from >>> the phenomenological perspective. >>> >>> So, to say that with mechanism, that 'everything is computation’ is a >>> bit misleading, as the phenomenologically apprehensible things will all be >>> non computable, and yet are *real*, as we all know. >>> >>> For consciousness you need only to agree that it is >>> >>> True, >>> Knowable, >>> Indubitable, >>> (Immediate), >>> >>> And >>> >>> Non-definable, >>> Non Rationally believable >>> >>> Together with the invariance for some digital transformation at some >>> description level. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> and so everything must be explainable in terms of computation. >>> >>> >>> In terms of addition and multiplication, you can understand where >>> consciousness come from, why it differentiates, and the transfinite paths >>> it get involved into, and why Reality is beyond the computable, yet >>> partially computable, partially and locally manageable, partially >>> observable, partially and locally inductively inferable. Etc. >>> >>> Even just the arithmetical reality is far beyond the computable, but >>> from inside, the sigma_1 (ultra-mini-tniy part of that reality) is already >>> bigger than we could hope to formalise in ZF or ZF + Large cardinal. >>> >>> Digital mechanism, well understood (meaning with understand the quasi >>> direct link between the Church-Turing thesis and incompleteness, (which I >>> have explained many times, but I can do it again), is constructively >>> antireductionist theory. The Löb-Gödelian machines, those who obeys to the >>> probability/consistency laws of Solovays (cf G and G*) can defeat any >>> complete theory anyone could conceive about them. >>> >>> Only numbers at the ontological level, OK, but the crazily interesting >>> things appears at the phenomenological levels, where things are no more >>> very computable at all. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> Today is the last day of *UCNC 2019*. >> >> Program: http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/program.html >> >> What the conference is about can be summed up as >> >> *What is computing* >> if the CT thesis [ >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis ] is *false*? >> >> >> >> If CT is false, it means that we miss some human computable operation on >> the natural numbers that a Turing machine, or a combinator, (…) cannot >> imitate. >> >> In that case, two things are possible: >> >> 1) that the new operation is still a mathematical operation, like an >> oracle à-la Turing, in which case we might still have a purely mathematical >> theory of computations, we might get a new notion of universal machine, >> stronger in abilities than any Turing machine, and we would keep the >> “measure problem” formulation of the mind-body (1p/3p, 1pp/3p) problem, but >> enlarged on more rich part of arithmetic/mathematics. Instead of sigma_1 >> completeness, we would be pi_1 complete, or perhaps complete on the >> analytical hierarchy, or perhaps not (many things remains possible, some in >> relation with “older” notion of computability, some totally new. There are >> no evidences for such human ability. >> >> 2) much more speculative would be that the new operation is not amenable >> to mathematics at all. It would be like a way to compute a function from >> N to N, needing consciousness for example. A zombie would be unable to >> imitate the computation. That is highly speculative, and bad scientific >> play: as it assumes the complicated in absence of evidences. Note that the >> first person experience is of that kind, by the indeterminacy on its >> histories, but that does not lead to computable function (the first person >> indeterminacy on the histories below the substitution level is not >> computable, albeit it could obeys precise statistical laws). >> >> The evidence for CT is strong, and, Imo, it should be provable that CT is >> equivalent with the belief that second order arithmetic make sense, or just >> that the notion of standard natural numbers is well understood, or that the >> notion of “finite” is well understood. >> >> The main evidences for CT are that all attempts to define the computable >> functions from N to N leads to the same class of total and partial >> computable functions (from N to N), and then the “Miracle of Gödel”, that >> is, the fact that the set of partial computable functions is closed for >> Cantor “transcendental” diagonalisation technique, which brings down the >> willing of universality on most epistemic-like predicate, like provability, >> definability, etc. >> >> Such closure property remains correct for the relativized theory, with >> oracles, and the “machine’s theology” is valid for large class of >> relativised notion of computability.It is what makes possible to apply the >> general theory to the machines embedded in their “cones” of computations >> (there infinitely many “past” and “futures” steps in the universal >> dovetailing on all computations. >> >> The finite and the infinite have deep relations, related to the relation >> between the computable and the non computable. Universal machines exploit >> their creativity on the frontiers between the computable and the non >> computable. The flux of consciousness is not solely related to the >> computations, but to where the person survives, all the modes of the self >> structured the space of accessible and relatively stable histories.. >> >> >> Bruno >> >> PS I have given more than three mathematical definition of computation >> and computable, the last one was by using the combinators. I might give >> another one soon and explains a relation between combinators, arithmetic, >> and computer science. >> > > > > Close to 2) above is what is called "intrinsic computing": > > *A layered architecture based on **intrinsic computing** of physical > systems avoids objections to a computationalism in the form of symbol > manipulation.* > > > The Architecture of Mind as a Network of Networks of Natural Computational > Processes > <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/48ed/85597914902cd5a7270f56fbfff9ff83e60a.pdf> > Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic > <https://www.chalmers.se/en/staff/Pages/gordana-dodig-crnkovic.aspx> > > > I know her, and appreciate her work, but it is not even close to violate > CT, Imo. > > > > It wouldn't be fair to say it's (completely) non-mathematical. It's a > different mathematics perhaps that is more morphological and topological in > nature. The key is that *intrinsic computing* is not reducible to Turing > computing (but it has nothing to do with oracles in the hyperarithmetical > sense). It is phenomenological computing (the hole in science left by > Galileo - *Galileo's Error*: > Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness, Philip Goff). > > Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic (above) and Robert Prentner* are two *intrinsic > computing* people. > > * Consciousness and Topologically Structured Phenomenal Spaces > Robert Prentner > https://psyarxiv.com/at53n/ > > > This makes sense for many applications, but using this in metaphysics > would beg the question of mechanism. The phenomenal space brought by the > first person modes ([]p & p, []p & <>t & p) have topological semantics > justifying some statements in such papers. They are right > phenomenologically, but like often, people have a tendencies to wish the > phenomenology being directly instantiated in *some* primitive matter, but > that is like vitalism when you grasp that arithmetic imposes non > computational phenomenologies. > > Bruno > > >
*it is not even close to violate CT, Imo* *It is argued that, on the lower levels of information processing in the brain,finite automata or Turing machines may still be adequate models, while, on the higher levels of whole-brain information processing, natural computing models are necessary.* https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/48ed/85597914902cd5a7270f56fbfff9ff83e60a.pdf Now that "Turing machines may still be adequate models" at lower-level processing, but "natural computing models" are necessary" for higher-level processing seems to violate CT to me. Unless you are saying that there's a class of non-Turing-machine (non-TM) models that are included in CT. *arithmetic imposes non computational phenomenologies* That may be (at least approximately) true (where "non-computational" I take means "non-TM-computational", and "imposes"I takes means "denotes". So is arithmetic non-CT? Doesn't that mean that arithmetic violates CT? @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/140c2342-e90c-4737-a354-7ad70c9fb44d%40googlegroups.com.
