On 7/21/2019 9:12 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
<snip>
Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy
is by claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once,
but that will need some telepathy hardly compatible with the
idea that the level of substitution was correctly chosen.
So, do you die or not in the step 3?
I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and
let's find out -- you go first.
Let me rephrase the question:
Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3?
According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original is
cut. The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after a
delay, or in several different places.
The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the original
disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more sophisticated view
of personal identity, depending on a lot more the just memories of
previous states, but depending also on bodily continuity, then the
question of whether the original dies or not depends on the details of
your theory of personal identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest
continuer" theory, if the duplicate has an equivalent body and
environment, then a single continuer is the closest continuer of the
original, and can be considered the same person in some sense. Nozik's
argument is that if there are two or more continuers, and there is a
tie in the relevant sense of "closeness", then each continuer is a new
person, and the original no longer exists (dies).
So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than your
simplistic assumptions allow: it is actually an empirical question as
to whether the "person" continues unaltered or not. So rather than
armchair philosophising, we should wait until the relevant brain scans
are indeed possible and we perform the experiment, before we
pontificate absolutely on what will or will not happen.
Given the limitations on quantum level measurements, it is certain that
the continuer will not be identical. But I'm not identical with Brent
Meeker of yesterday or last year or of 1939. I have a continuous causal
connection with those Brent Meekers and I have some similarities (DNA
for example). So it hardly makes sense to demand a sharp answer to
"What will you experience." in a duplication experiment when we don't
even have a sharp definition of "you". And it doesn't even take
something as scifi as a duplicator to raise the question. I might have
a stroke tonight and lose my ability to recognize names. Will I be the
same person tomorrow? I will have some of the same memories, but not
all. Will I experience being Brent Meeker or not?
Brent
As for assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT), it is not a matter of
assuming this. It is a matter of whether the assumptions that you are
building in make sense or not. And that is an empirical matter. Does
any of it comport with our usual understandings of personal identity
and other matters.
Bruce
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