> On 22 Jul 2019, at 01:16, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 7/21/2019 4:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 4:39:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>>> I didn't say there was. I said youse-self sees Moscow and Washington. >>>> "Youse-self" is second person plural. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept >>>> frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's >>>> clear and meaningful. >>> >>> But does it have a clear answer? >>> >>> The MWI has it's own problems with probability. It's straightforward if >>> there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we >>> implicitly assume they are equi-probable). But what if there are two >>> possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other? Does the world >>> split into three, two of which are the same? If two worlds are the same, >>> can they really be two. Aren't they just one? And what if there are two >>> possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand >>> chance. Does the world then split into 1001 worlds? And what if the >>> probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds. >>> But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely >>> many times and there is no natural measure of probability. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> >>> Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer. >>> >>> >>> http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/ >>> >>> <http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/> >>> >>> >>> "The potential for multiple worlds is always there in the quantum state, >>> whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do multiple-world >>> superpositions of the form written [above] ever actually come into being? >>> And the answer again is: yes, automatically, without any additional >>> assumptions." >> >> But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and how does >> probability come into it? Do we have to just assign probabilities to >> branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead of deriving it)? And what >> about continuous processes like detecting the decay in Schroedinger's cat >> box? Is a continuum of worlds produced corresponding to the different times >> the decay might occur? >> >> Brent >> >> >> Tegmark could be on the mark by taking the position that infinities of all >> types should be removed from physics. >> >> So there would be no "continuum of worlds". The way I think about it >> (without getting into the formality of computable analysis) is to just think >> of the worlds being generated as in a quantum Monte Carlo program: There >> will be lots of worlds randomly made, but not an actual infinity of them. > > That would just be equivalent to weighting them with the Born Rule. If > you're going to have worlds generated per a MC program with weightings > (probabilities) then why not just have world generated per the Born MC > program.
Only if is deduced from the sigma_1-measure problem, or Mechanism has to be andonned. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> >> (God plays Monte Carlo.) >> >> @philipthrift >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7277434f-bdf0-4423-807a-d46b9b46c1e8%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7277434f-bdf0-4423-807a-d46b9b46c1e8%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e5887b44-cfb8-b332-0f91-cfad73acb776%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e5887b44-cfb8-b332-0f91-cfad73acb776%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/BD5C0E05-415B-499A-891D-58382F005FE5%40ulb.ac.be.
