> On 27 Jul 2019, at 14:27, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 5:21 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] 
> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>> >>>>> You keep confusing stuff that can *do* things from stuff that can not
>>  
>> >>>> You keep assuming that such things exists.
>> 
>> >>>You keep assuming existence exists.
> >I have no interpretation for “existence exists”. I don’t see what this could 
> >mean.
> 
> It means about the same thing as your accusation that I assume that some 
> things can *do* things and some things can't. In other words nothing.
> 
> > Mechanism assumes [...]
> 
> Things don't care about assumptions and they don't care about mechanism 
> either, they either *do* stuff (such as make calculations) or they don't. 
>  
> > In the Aristotelian theology [...]
> 
> My cue to jump to the next paragraph.
>  
> > Physics does not address the issues of metaphysics at all. 
> 
> Because Physics is not junk science and makes use of inductive reasoning and 
> not just deductive.
>  
> >> So you agree that a Turing Machine can do something that Turing 
> >> quintuplets or Lambda Calculus can not.
> 
> > Physical machine can do thing that a mathematical machine cannot do.
> 
> YES!! And a mathematical "machine" can NOT do anything a physical machine 
> can’t,

A mathematical machine cannot emulate a physical machine, but the appearance of 
a physical machine can still emerge from a purely mathematical reality; Most of 
mathematics is not Turing emulable.
So...

> so the physical machine is a more profound notion.

… this does not follow.



> A Physical Turing Machine may or may not be at the level of ultimate reality 
> but it is certainly closer to it than Turing quintuplets or anything else 
> pure mathematics can come up with. 

That is what has been shown inconsistent when we assume Digital Mechanism in 
the cognitive science. How could something physical, interfere with the 
arithmetical computations? 



>  
> >> Regardless of if I'm made of "primitive stuff" or not it remains true that 
> >> a Turing Machine can do something that Turing quintuplets or Lambda  
> >> Calculus can not.
>  
> > Yes, but that does not make them primitively real.
> 
> Primitively real or not a Physical Turing Machine is certainly one hell of a 
> lot closer to it than Turing quintuplets or Lambda Calculus.

“Certainly”? 

I don’t see why. And that would contradict Digital Mechanism. That would made a 
physical being able to interfere with the arithmetical reality. Either that 
interference is Turing emulable, and then it happens already in arithmetic, and 
cannot be used to claim some physical existence, or it is not Turing emulable, 
and then we can’t accept any more the digital brain operation.

Bruno




> 
> John K Clark
> 
>  
> 
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