On Monday, July 29, 2019 at 2:10:22 PM UTC+2, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jul 29, 2019 at 8:49 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] 
> <javascript:>> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 8:09 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] 
>> <javascript:>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Sat, Jul 27, 2019 at 7:10 AM Jason Resch <[email protected] 
>>> <javascript:>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 12:44 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>>> [email protected] <javascript:>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 2:42 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] 
>>>>> <javascript:>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> For example, you could, over time, change neuron by neuron, until you 
>>>>> looked like and had the mind of Julius Caesar. 
>>>>>
>>>>> I think these thought experiments need to be more carefully 
>>>>> considered.  I don't think it is nomologically possible to give you the 
>>>>> mind of Julius Caesar by transferring on neuron at a time.  That would 
>>>>> entail intermediate stages in which neurons were connected neither as 
>>>>> yours 
>>>>> were nor as Caesar's were, and less obviously the same goes for the 
>>>>> connections of the body cells.  It is too cheap to just say "at the 
>>>>> appropriate substitution level".
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It's a given that the intermediate stages are neither like you nor like 
>>>> Caesar. But if you can remain conscious/alive during the process, then 
>>>> "what happened to you", "did you die in the transformation?", etc.
>>>>
>>>
>>> That's rather a big "if". It seems to me that one important difference 
>>> between your mind and that of Julius Caesar is the connections between 
>>> neurons. Just replacing one neutron at a time is not going to create/change 
>>> the necessary connections. Besides, do you have any evidence that any two 
>>> minds have exactly the same number of neurons? Piecewise replacement of 
>>> neurons will almost certainly destroy consciousness, even life -- the 
>>> intermediate stages will not correspond to any conscious or living person.
>>>
>>
>> The neuron replacement includes creating the appropriate connections (as 
>> well as adding or subtracting neurons if necessary).
>>
>
> That is not a well-defined procedure -- too many ambiguities remain.
>

Indeed. "Appropriate connections" implies perfect knowledge, which we are 
quite far away from, even generously granting the problem's merit. 
Generalizing impossibility of explanation mathematically doesn't cut it for 
consciousness, since even if we lower the bar to "simpler" lifeforms like 
Caenorhabditis 
elegans, then any mathematical ontology has to derive from first principles 
at least the schematics we obtained regarding neuron connectivity in July 
2019:

https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1352-7.epdf?author_access_token=R1W8EDG9GcRJaEqOYGKyAtRgN0jAjWel9jnR3ZoTv0PjQnCZ3Qe7rshb5_UwUqx-Uxw0WKU7XoMgFTBEVcn0qaFz3UHrpGWIPpmnH5iuA_fU1k3aXWUIRpiYdbHt0dzxiKxssbq5jrWt6YfOIFXnZA%3D%3D

Here, we throw consciousness around as a term all the time. But the complex 
engineering neuronal details required for something to appear conscious, 
cast significant doubt upon claims that anybody knows what they're talking 
about beyond opinions and conjecture. 

We have the complete wiring schematics, all connections of this life form, 
and we're still far from understanding the mystery of its existence in so 
many ways. Sitting back in our armchairs and going "well, we can't explain 
consciousness beyond provability constraints, incompleteness etc." is just 
the perfect excuse to extinguish all scientific curiosity and exploration 
and not get out of bed! lol 

When I read such an article I'm motivated to explore more, both in breadth 
and depth. For fun because what IS that? And wow! PGC 

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