On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 8:42:58 PM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote: > > On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote: >> >> Bruno, >> >> I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds >> account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have >> produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding >> irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights. >> >> So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many >> people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, >> but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be >> able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would >> have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously. >> >> As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the >> real existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the >> Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave >> function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how >> the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of >> probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the >> objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate >> (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real >> existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can >> safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure. >> >> It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a >> substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it >> always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. >> There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical >> nonsense. >> >> Bruce >> > > I started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including > reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I > will try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of > PR box argument. > > MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence > to QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the > problem into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if > any interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a > "it feels good" sort of argument. > > I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently: > > No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is > still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI > the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding > to a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is > this idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, > the world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer > who is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on > that measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to > discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic > jump. > > If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I > may work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states > encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's > theorem. The implication is there is no decidable way to determine whether > QM is ψ-epistemic, say in the sense of Bohr and Copenhagen Interpretation > and Fuch's QuBism, or if it is ψ-ontic in the sense of MWI and GRW and ... . > > All of these have problems. Bohr and CI posit as fundamental quantum and > classical domains. However as pointed out by Heisenberg early on there is > an ambiguous boundary between these two domains. MWI proposes a splitting > of worlds, but there is no definitive meaning to a spatial surface or set > of them according to probabilities. Bohm's idea really only has sense in > nonrelativistic domain, but that could hold for physics on a holographic > screen, so while this has serious weaknesses I will not throw it completely > under the bus. There are I read at last count over 50 interpretations. > Collapses are not the result of unitary evolution and so appear > inconsistent with the evolution of quantum states. I think this is some > sort of incompleteness in the axioms or postulate of QM. It might be > compared to the fifth axiom of Euclid in geometry. I think in the end, or > if I am right, then this is simply a state of affairs that exists, there is > no causal process behind it and we are best to just accept this and press > on. Maybe this is Mermin's *Shut up and calculate* and this search for > interpretations is a waste of time. > > LC >
I think it is also true of *Many Worlds *(BTW, Sean Carroll is launching a nationwide tour, as he reports on Twitter, evangelizing the Many Worlds interpretation), but any papers/videos advocating any *epistemic* or *Bayesian* quantum interpretations can be ignored, and nothing is missed, and time saved for better things. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5ea62f83-0bac-4b09-9325-32e2e02c55b5%40googlegroups.com.
