On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 4:42:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > Things are much simpler if we assume mechanism, like Everett. But Everett > stil assumes some universal wave, which, when we assume mechanism, must be > justify by the mechanist first person indeterminacy in arithmetic. > > To apply physics, “shut up and calculate” is all good, but in Metaphysics, > it is pure authoritative argument to prevent finding and testing possible > solutions of the problem. That is doubly true in the Mechanist frame, > probably because the Mechanist solution is troubling for those who are > physicalist, and believe in an ontological physical universe. > > The mechanist solution is empirically testable, so let us test it. Up to > now, Mechanism is the only theory which explains the appearance without > eliminating consciousness and its mechanist explanation (the theology G* > and its variants). > > With Mechanism, physics is not the fundamental science. Physics is reduced > to a sort of arithmetical probability/credibility machine theory. > > Bruno >
This distinction between what is physical and what is mechanistic seems somewhat contrived. I suppose in the philosophical world this is what people do, where now there are people into meta-metaphysics. I am not an enemy of philosophy quite in the way Feynman was or his followers as Weinberg, but I do think science is best with a minimum of metaphysics. LC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8994f00e-474d-4593-92da-a525b7814f3a%40googlegroups.com.
