> On 30 Aug 2019, at 20:53, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, August 30, 2019 at 10:10:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 30 Aug 2019, at 04:33, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <javascript:>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> If there are infinities in mathematics, but not in physics or in nature, is 
>> that a problem? AG
> 
> Is that an interesting problem? I guess so.
> 
> Some theories in mathematics assume an axiom of infinity, like in set theory, 
> analysis, etc.
> 
> That has often led to paradoxes, but they have been “solved” by diverse 
> means. So most such theories are considered not being problematic. We can 
> also show that, even restricted on the arithmetical truth (which has no axiom 
> of infinite, as all natural numbers are conceived to be finite), adding an 
> axiom of infinity lead to stronger provability abilities. The set theory ZF 
> proves much more than the arithmetic theories PA, even on just the numbers 
> relations. Yet ZF, and actually all effective theories are limited on a small 
> spectrum of the arithmetical reality. The omega-initial segment of ZF mirrors 
> PA faithfully.
> 
> In physics, the universe itself could be infinite, without having any 
> infinite things in it, like the model of Arithmetic (all numbers are finite, 
> and the set of all numbers is just a meta-concept, not representable directly 
> in the theory, but still manageable (you can prove in PA that there is an 
> infinite of prime numbers, by proving
> 
> For x (prime(x) -> It exist y (y bigger than x) and prime(y)).
> 
> Are there actual infinite object in the universe?
> 
> I can prove that if mechanism is false, then there as such object. With 
> Mechanism, the mind is infinite, and physics is somehow the Mind seen from 
> itself internally. That might favours an infinite physical universe. Does our 
> substitution level depend on Planck Constant? Open problem.
> 
> With mechanism, the axiom of the infinite is inconsistent on the ontological 
> level, but is a theorem on the phenomenological level. It shortens the 
> proofs, and provide many tools to to handle mathematically the semantic, the 
> notion of limit, many form of approximation, even to learn just about the 
> natural numbers or the combinators.
> 
> Mechanism provides a testable account of the mind-body relation, an account 
> which does not assume more than elementary arithmetic, and which doesn’t 
> involve any other ontological commitment. So let us see. The quantum 
> structure, and time, admits a “simple" arithmetical interpretation, but 
> space, dimension, energy remains in the shadow.
> 
> Science has not yet decided between Plato's and Aristotle’s conception of 
> reality, and not all people are aware of the hypothetical nature of those 
> options, nor that Digital Mechanism, or even just the Church-Turing thesis, 
> leads us back to Pythagorus and Plato.
> 
> The natural numbers realised the infinities without making them into existing 
> things, or beings.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> Also, some may think that because theoretical physics (field theories) is 
> expressed in a language that includes a mathematically continuous (real 
> number) background R^4 of spacetime and the methods of multidimensional 
> calculus (tensor calculus, etc.), that because mathematically 
> infinite-divisibility is present and infinitary definitions (like "limit") 
> are present, that these  "infinities" of the mathematics are real in the 
> actual world.

I agree. Infinities are useful does not entails that infinities exist in 
“Reality”.

That is why I can be more open to your fictionalism for second order 
arithmetic, analysis, set theory, more than for arithmetic (that would make 
Mechanism and even just computer science into fiction)..

Bruno


> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
>  
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