via László E. Szabó [ http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo/publications.html ]
*Intrinsic, extrinsic, and the constitutive a priori* [ https://rdcu.be/bKxdO ] Abstract On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics*, I will develop an amended account of the Kantian–Reichenbachian conception of constitutive a priori. It will be shown that the features (attributes, qualities, properties) attributed to a real object are not possessed by the object as a “thing-in-itself”; they require a physical theory by means of which these features are constituted. It will be seen that the existence of such a physical theory implies that a physical object can possess a property onlyif other contingently existing physical objects exist; therefore, the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction is flawed ** Mathematical facts in a physicalist ontology* [ http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo/Preprints/LESzabo-math_in_physical-preprint.pdf ] @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4770b694-b07e-4d47-a50b-348bc186862f%40googlegroups.com.
