> On 10 Sep 2019, at 11:37, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > via László E. Szabó [ http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo/publications.html ] > > Intrinsic, extrinsic, and the constitutive a priori > [ https://rdcu.be/bKxdO ] > > Abstract > > On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics*, I > will develop an amended account of the Kantian–Reichenbachian conception of > constitutive a priori. It will be shown that the features (attributes, > qualities, properties) attributed to a real object are not possessed by the > object as a “thing-in-itself”; they require a physical theory by means of > which these features are constituted. It will be seen that the existence of > such a physical theory implies that a physical object can possess a property > onlyif other contingently existing physical objects exist; therefore, the > intrinsic–extrinsic distinction is flawed > > * Mathematical facts in a physicalist ontology > [ > http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo/Preprints/LESzabo-math_in_physical-preprint.pdf ] >
Exercise: show that this approach by Szabo is incompatible with the digital mechanist hypothesis. It might give some hope, in case Digital Mechanism would be refuted, to save a form of physical-digitalism, speculating on the falsity of Church-Turing thesis. Why not. I have not finish the paper but I am not sure how this could be tested, except by being consistent is ever the physics inferred get inconsistent with the physics deduced from arithmetical self-reference. Might say more later. Szabo’s approach is at least rather well presented formally. It assumes an empirical reality though, so his theory is build on the top of the Aristotelian hypothesis. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4770b694-b07e-4d47-a50b-348bc186862f%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4770b694-b07e-4d47-a50b-348bc186862f%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/D36D72BD-2FCA-4F4F-BA37-2340D2439678%40ulb.ac.be.
