On Sun, 15 Sep 2019 at 05:24, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:

>
>
> I really couldn't follow this paper - many worlds (of QM) vs. multiverse
> (of cosmology) seemed all mixed up.
>

The author essentially disagrees with the idea that a person can be copied,
whatever the mechanism.

On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 9:45:10 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>> This should be of interest to the list:
>>
>> Refuting Strong AI: Why Consciousness Cannot Be Algorithmic
>> Andrew Knight
>> (Submitted on 11 Jun 2019)
>> While physicalism requires only that a conscious state depends entirely
>> on an underlying physical state, it is often assumed that consciousness
>> is algorithmic and that conscious states can be copied, such as by
>> copying or digitizing the human brain. In an effort to further elucidate
>> the physical nature of consciousness, I challenge these assumptions and
>> attempt to prove the Single Stream of Consciousness Theorem (SSCT): that
>> a conscious entity cannot experience more than one stream of
>> consciousness from a given conscious state. Assuming only that
>> consciousness is a purely physical phenomenon, it is shown that both
>> Special Relativity and Multiverse theory independently imply SSCT and
>> that the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics is inadequate
>> to counter it. Then, SSCT is shown to be incompatible with Strong
>> Artificial Intelligence, implying that consciousness cannot be created
>> or simulated by a computer. Finally, SSCT is shown to imply that a
>> conscious state cannot be physically reset to an earlier conscious state
>> nor can it be duplicated by any physical means. The profound but
>> counterintuitive implications of these conclusions are briefly discussed.
>> Subjects:    History and Philosophy of Physics (physics.hist-ph);
>> Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
>> Cite as:    arXiv:1906.10177 [physics.hist-ph]
>>       (or arXiv:1906.10177v1 [physics.hist-ph] for this version)
>>
>> Brent
>>
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Stathis Papaioannou

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