> On 14 Sep 2019, at 04:45, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > This should be of interest to the list: > > Refuting Strong AI: Why Consciousness Cannot Be Algorithmic > Andrew Knight > (Submitted on 11 Jun 2019) > While physicalism requires only that a conscious state depends entirely on an > underlying physical state, it is often assumed that consciousness is > algorithmic and that conscious states can be copied, such as by copying or > digitizing the human brain. In an effort to further elucidate the physical > nature of consciousness, I challenge these assumptions and attempt to prove > the Single Stream of Consciousness Theorem (SSCT): that a conscious entity > cannot experience more than one stream of consciousness from a given > conscious state.
This is a direct consequence of Mechanism. And indeed the very fact that consciousness is not algorithmic is a theorem of mechanism. The knower described by ([]p & p) is provably not algorithmic, not even identifiable to anything 3p. Here the author confuse Mechanism and Materialism at the start. > Assuming only that consciousness is a purely physical phenomenon, So he identifies 1p and 1p-plural, or 1p and 3p. > it is shown that both Special Relativity and Multiverse theory independently > imply SSCT and that the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics is > inadequate to counter it. Then, SSCT is shown to be incompatible with Strong > Artificial Intelligence, implying that consciousness cannot be created or > simulated by a computer. Finally, SSCT is shown to imply that a conscious > state cannot be physically reset to an earlier conscious state nor can it be > duplicated by any physical means. The profound but counterintuitive > implications of these conclusions are briefly discussed. OK. That is coherent again, as he claim both (weak) Materialism and negate Mechanism. Bruno > Subjects: History and Philosophy of Physics (physics.hist-ph); Artificial > Intelligence (cs.AI) > Cite as: arXiv:1906.10177 [physics.hist-ph] > (or arXiv:1906.10177v1 [physics.hist-ph] for this version) > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/16698607-b254-554e-958d-b67c04e550b6%40verizon.net. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/DA121EE1-3FCD-447E-B66F-AFF8689345FC%40ulb.ac.be.
