On Friday, September 20, 2019 at 7:39:14 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 20, 2019 at 6:31:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 17 Sep 2019, at 16:04, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>
>> From a pragmatic perspective, I do not see any Everettian MW (theory, 
>> math, ideas, formulations, interpretations or whatever they want to call 
>> it) in computational quantum mechanics:
>>
>>
>> https://www.simonsfoundation.org/flatiron/center-for-computational-quantum-physics/software
>>
>> If MW were important, it would be there.
>>
>>
>>
>> All computational theory (quantum or not) implies the "Many 
>> Computations”. 
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>


I guess. But I was looking at the actual libraries of computational QM 
programming repositories, and there is a lot of Monte Carlo for example but 
nothing explicitly Many Worlds. 

In Sean Carroll's advocacy of Many Worlds:

https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2015/02/19/the-wrong-objections-to-the-many-worlds-interpretation-of-quantum-mechanics/

The people who object to MWI because of all those unobservable worlds 
<http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2012/06/04/does-this-ontological-commitment-make-me-look-fat/>
 aren’t *really* objecting to MWI at all; they just don’t like and/or 
understand quantum mechanics. Hilbert space is big, regardless of one’s 
personal feelings on the matter.

So in Sean's presentation, if you object to Many Worlds then you don't 
like/understand quantum mechanics.

[ But one could start instead with a (quantum) measure space: 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1002.0589 ]

*When scientists proceed from the mathematics of any theory to an ontology 
of nature, they are being more of a religious guru than a scientific one.*

@philipthrift



 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6ed0ec8e-13fe-493a-8d73-490059c3d45e%40googlegroups.com.

Reply via email to