On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 10:55:30 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 11:42:13 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 10:22:14 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 11:19:23 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 11:04:31 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 5:05:26 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 5:32:55 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 2:55:48 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 7:14:24 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 3:55:13 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 9:48 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 2:49:44 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 8:45 PM Alan Grayson <
>>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, February 14, 2020 at 2:34:59 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 7:56 PM Alan Grayson <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thursday, February 13, 2020 at 4:33:52 PM UTC-7, Brent
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/13/2020 1:17 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bruce argues that the MWI and Born's rule are incompatible.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't understand his argument, no doubt my failing.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't think they are incompatible; it's just that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Born rule has to stuck in somehow. It's not implicit in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> SWE and can't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be derived from the linear evolution. Somehow a probability
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> introduced. Once there is a probability measure, then it can
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be argued via
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gleason's theorem that the only consistent measure is the Born
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rule.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Brent
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think what Bruce is trying to show, is that using the MWI,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one CANNOT derive Born's rule as claimed by its advocates. But
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whether one
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> affirms MWI or not, the only thing one has to work with is an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ensemble
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> generated by measurements in THIS world. So if you cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> derive Born's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rule using a one-world theory, it would seem impossible to do
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> many-worlds, since in operational terms -- what is observed --
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interpretations are indistinguishable. AG
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's quite an astute observation, Alan. The thing is, we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can move on from there. If Many-worlds is true, all possible
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sets of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> measurements are generated, and most will give different values
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> probabilities. For the observers getting the alternative data,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing to tell them that they are getting the wrong answer. MWI
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bruce
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> But won't the hypothetical observers in OTHER worlds get the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> same ensembles and thus the same distributions? AG
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> No, The point of MWI is that other worlds get different data.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Bruce
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On each individual trial of course, with the exception that some
>>>>>>>>>>> outcomes have the identical probability. But since the ensembles
>>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>> generated by the same wf, I think they're identical. AG
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Think again. If there are N repetitions of the measurement with
>>>>>>>>>> two possible outcomes, there are 2^N different sets of results.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> some sets have the same or similar frequencies, but others have
>>>>>>>>>> very different frequencies. So many different ideas about the
>>>>>>>>>> probabilities
>>>>>>>>>> are obtained in different branches. The wave function does not
>>>>>>>>>> affect this
>>>>>>>>>> result.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Bruce
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If there are only two possible outcomes in this world, won't the
>>>>>>>>> ensemble in the unobserved world, be the complement of the ensemble
>>>>>>>>> in this
>>>>>>>>> world? AG
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> More like clones than complements.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If there is a quantum coin flip (QCF) in world w, then there are
>>>>>>>> two copies (branches) w-0 and w-1 with w-0 and w-1 being clones of w
>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>> the difference being the two possible outcomes. w no longer exists.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This proceeds with N QCFs via branching to 2^N worlds
>>>>>>>> w-x[1]...x[N], x[i] in {0,1}
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So with just 10000 QCFs there are now
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> #python
>>>>>>>> print(2**10000)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 19950631168807583848837421626835850838234968318861924548520089498529438830221946631919961684036194597899331129423209124271556491349413781117593785932096323957855730046793794526765246551266059895520550086918193311542508608460618104685509074866089624888090489894838009253941633257850621568309473902556912388065225096643874441046759871626985453222868538161694315775629640762836880760732228535091641476183956381458969463899410840960536267821064621427333394036525565649530603142680234969400335934316651459297773279665775606172582031407994198179607378245683762280037302885487251900834464581454650557929601414833921615734588139257095379769119277800826957735674444123062018757836325502728323789270710373802866393031428133241401624195671690574061419654342324638801248856147305207431992259611796250130992860241708340807605932320161268492288496255841312844061536738951487114256315111089745514203313820202931640957596464756010405845841566072044962867016515061920631004186422275908670900574606417856951911456055068251250406007519842261898059237118054444788072906395242548339221982707404473162376760846613033778706039803413197133493654622700563169937455508241780972810983291314403571877524768509857276937926433221599399876886660808368837838027643282775172273657572744784112294389733810861607423253291974813120197604178281965697475898164531258434135959862784130128185406283476649088690521047580882615823961985770122407044330583075869039319604603404973156583208672105913300903752823415539745394397715257455290510212310947321610753474825740775273986348298498340756937955646638621874569499279016572103701364433135817214311791398222983845847334440270964182851005072927748364550578634501100852987812389473928699540834346158807043959118985815145779177143619698728131459483783202081474982171858011389071228250905826817436220577475921417653715687725614904582904992461028630081535583308130101987675856234343538955409175623400844887526162643568648833519463720377293240094456246923254350400678027273837755376406726898636241037491410966718557050759098100246789880178271925953381282421954028302759408448955014676668389697996886241636313376393903373455801407636741877711055384225739499110186468219696581651485130494222369947714763069155468217682876200362777257723781365331611196811280792669481887201298643660768551639860534602297871557517947385246369446923087894265948217008051120322365496288169035739121368338393591756418733850510970271613915439590991598154654417336311656936031122249937969999226781732358023111862644575299135758175008199839236284615249881088960232244362173771618086357015468484058622329792853875623486556440536962622018963571028812361567512543338303270029097668650568557157505516727518899194129711337690149916181315171544007728650573189557450920330185304847113818315407324053319038462084036421763703911550639789000742853672196280903477974533320468368795868580237952218629120080742819551317948157624448298518461509704888027274721574688131594750409732115080498190455803416826949787141316063210686391511681774304792596709376
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> worlds.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I interpret MW differently. If an observer gets a Head in this world
>>>>>>> on his first trial, another world is created where his clone get a Tail
>>>>>>> (since all possibilities are realized) On the second trial in this
>>>>>>> world,
>>>>>>> whatever is measured will be reversed in some another world (for the
>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>> reason as just stated), maybe the same world as the one created on the
>>>>>>> first trial; and so forth. AG
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There is no "this world".
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> BS.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> "You" is in a world w (out of the infinity of worlds already
>>>>>> existing), runs the quantum coin flipper -
>>>>>> https://www.nature.com/articles/nphys4342 - and two worlds w-0 and
>>>>>> w-1 of equal reality replace w. And there are now "You"-0 and "You"-1
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> no more "You".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> @philipthrift
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>> You (not me) want a many-worlds reality. That's what you(s) get.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> BS2.
>>
>
>
>
> What's incorrect?
>
> If you are *not* a Many Worlds believer (*Mad-Dog Everettian *to use Sean
> Carroll's term) already, ignore any papers or articles on Many Worlds. They
> are a waste of time (to spend in *this* - the only - world there is).
>
> @philipthrift
>
I was having a discussion about the MWI, lately with Bruce, to clarify some
issues. Doesn't mean I endorse the interpretation. Isn't that totally
OBVIOUS? AG
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