> On 20 Feb 2020, at 01:19, Alan Grayson <agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 2:58:22 AM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 2:31:37 AM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 
> 
> Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 10:18, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <>> a écrit :
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 12:35:28 AM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 
> 
> Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 08:30, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <>> a écrit :
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 12:10:54 AM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 
> 
> Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 08:03, Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com <>> a écrit 
> :
> 
> 
> Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 07:36, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <>> a écrit :
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 11:25:59 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 
> 
> Le mer. 19 févr. 2020 à 01:24, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <>> a écrit :
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 4:13:03 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 
> 
> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 23:36, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <>> a écrit :
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 3:07:07 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 
> 
> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 22:54, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <>> a écrit :
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 2:22:46 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 
> 
> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 22:15, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <>> a écrit :
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 1:17:59 PM UTC-7, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 
> 
> Le mar. 18 févr. 2020 à 16:43, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <>> a écrit :
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, February 18, 2020 at 6:59:11 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 18 Feb 2020, at 07:28, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, February 17, 2020 at 6:21:47 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 16 Feb 2020, at 17:54, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 5:49:38 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 6:19:36 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 4:58:33 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 2:51:53 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, February 16, 2020 at 1:45:50 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Saturday, February 15, 2020 at 4:29:11 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>  
>>> I posted what MWI means. No need to repeat it. It doesn't mean THIS world 
>>> doesn't exist, or somehow disappears in the process of measurement. AG 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> That's nice.
>>> 
>>> @philipthrift 
>>> 
>>> Nice how? Bruce seems to think when a binary measurement is done in this 
>>> world, it splits into two worlds, each with one of the possible 
>>> measurements. I see only one world being created, with this world remaining 
>>> intact, and then comes the second measurement, with its opposite occurring 
>>> in another world, or perhaps in the same world created by the first 
>>> measurement. So for N trials, the number of worlds created is N, or less. 
>>> Isn't this what the MWI means? AG 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> There is one measurement M in world w, with two possible outcomes: O1 and 
>>> O2.
>>> There are not two measurements M1 and M2.
>>> 
>>> Of the two worlds w-O1 and w-O2 post world w, one is not assigned "this" 
>>> and the other assigned "that", They have equal status in MWI reality. One 
>>> is not privileged over the other in any way.
>>> 
>>> @philipthrift
>>> 
>>> This is hopeless. It's like you don't understand what I wrote, which is 
>>> pretty simple. AG
>>> 
>>> 
>>> What you wrote has nothing to do with MWI. You created something different 
>>> from MWI (in the Carroll sense).
>>> But's OK to have your own interpretation. 
>>> 
>>> It's your own "interpretation", not MWI.  Publish it and call it something 
>>> else.
>>> 
>>> @philipthrift 
>>> 
>>> I suppose I'm just following Tegmark; everything that CAN happen, MUST 
>>> happen.  So, when an observer measures UP (or DN) in THIS world, another 
>>> world comes into existence wherein an observer MUST measure DN (or UP). 
>>> From this I get N or less worlds for N trials where the results of 
>>> measurements are binary, such as spin. Maybe not precisely MWI, but 
>>> definitely less stupid -- but still egregiously stupid. How could MWI be 
>>> remotely correctly if it alleges THIS world splits when it's never observed?
>> 
>> Everett explains this entirely in his long text. The observer cannot feel 
>> the split, nor observe it directly. But if QM (without collapse) is correct, 
>> it is up to the Uni-World to provide explanation of how “nature” makes some 
>> terms in the superposition disappear.
>> 
>> Also, the MW is also a consequence of Descartes (mechanism) + 
>> Turing-Church-Post-Kleene (i.e. the discovery of the computer … in the 
>> elementary arithmetical reality). 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> But now you say that for Everett there's no such thing as THIS world. All 
>>> this stuff, including Bruno's BS, is so profoundly dumb, I can't believe 
>>> we're even discussing it! Was it Brent on another thread who claimed many 
>>> physicists have become cultists? Whoever made that claim qualifies for 
>>> sanity. AG
>> 
>> 
>> Are you saying that the brain is not Turing emulable? Or what? All what I 
>> say follows from this “intuitively”, but is also recovered by the 
>> Platonician’s definition used in epistemology, when modelling  “rational 
>> belief” by “provability”, which is suggested by incompleteness. I do know 
>> philosophers who are not convinced, by I don’t do philosophy, I prefer to 
>> show a theory and its testability, and indeed I show exactly how to test 
>> experimentally between Mechanism and (Weak) Materialism (physicalism), and I 
>> show that quantum mechanics confirms Mechanism.
>> 
>> I am not the guy who comes with a new theory. I am just showing that the old 
>> and venerable Mechanist theory (in biology, psychology) is experimentally 
>> testable, and that QM without-collapse confirms it, like I show also that 
>> quantum logic confirms it.
>> 
>> What is your take on the WM-duplication? 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> PS if you could avoid the insults, and reason instead, that would be nice. 
>> Leave the insults to those who have no arguments.
>> 
>> As I see it, you have no arguments for MW except hand-waving. Do unicorns 
>> exist because they can exist?
> 
> Exists in which sense? They certainly are fictive object. Unicorn does not 
> exist, because by definition they belong to fairy tales. I am not sure what 
> you try to convey, or perhaps to insinuate. “Hand waning” is a bit of an 
> insult. Please quote the sentences that you disagree with, or that you don’t 
> understand.
> 
> Or are you assimilating the true number relation with fiction? Then stop 
> doing science, because those number relations are assumed in all theories 
> that I know of.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> If there are genetic codes which create unicorns, do they exist, somewhere?
> 
> No. Unicorn does not exist by definition. Some horse have one corn, due to 
> congenital malformation, but we don’t use them to suddenly claim that unicorn 
> exist. It would be playing with word.
> 
> 
> 
>> Well maybe, given enough time. I'll grant you that.
> 
> That seems wiser, I mean to understand that the computation exists, once you 
> agree with simple rules like x + 0 = x, x + s(y) = s(x + y), etc.
> 
> This is where the proverbial rubber hits the road. I can assume a primary 
> physical world where observations yield those arithmetic rules. As a 
> rudimentary result, there is only one world, this world. Also, you speak of 
> computations, but where is the computer doing the computations? MW is like 
> what Nietzsche said of Christianity; Rococo of the Mind. AG 
> 
> So you accept a physical reality emerging from nothing, located nowhere (as 
> if it has any meaning)... but not a computation... strange how one can be 
> blinded by his own prejudice. 
> 
> Speaking of prejudices, tell me where and what is the computer doing the 
> computation?  AG
>  
> The same place and thing that magically support the physical reality.
> 
> You made the claim that computations exist. So please tell me what is doing 
> the computations and where it is located. Hand-waving not acceptable. AG 
> 
> You made the claim that physical reality exists ontologically... Can you back 
> it up ? Hand-waving not acceptable
> 
> I never used the word or concept "ontological".  We observe the world. You 
> claim Many Worlds based on "computations". It's YOUR claim! What is doing the 
> computations and where is it located?
> 
> Why should they be located anywhere or done by anything ? It's your claim 
> they should. Stop hand waving !
> 
> Face it. You have a vacuous claim. It's not located anywhere and doesn't do 
> anything? And you implicitly claim this is an application of the scientific 
> method? AG 
> 
> Face it you have a serious claim, stop dodging and hand waving. Why should an 
> ontological computation be located somewhere and done by something, and not 
> an ontological physical reality ? It's the same thing, so when you'll answer 
> without hand waving, I'll do the same.
> 
> What is doing the computation? Why is it necessary. You can't explain its 
> necessity or remotely identify it. Dream on, and go FY. AG 
> 
> Why should *something* be doing an ontological computation and an ontological 
> physical reality wouldn't have the same requirement ?  You can't explain its 
> necessity or remotely identify it. Dream on, and go.
> 
> It's asking where is the ontological physical reality substrate of the 
> ontological computations which are the base of the reality, don't you see the 
> absurdity of the question when the hypotheses is that the physical reality is 
> not ontologically real but an appearance from an ontological mathematical 
> reality ? The mathematical reality is located nowhere ex hypothesi, it's the 
> base of the real, computation are process existing statically in the 
> mathematical reality ex hypothesi.
> 
> Your hypothesis is that there must exist mathematical computations to sustain 
> the universe. Unless and until you can justify this hypothesis, it's nothing 
> more than hot air.  But even if I accepted your hypothesis, I'd like to know 
> what is being computed. Here too, you fail to offer anything at all, let 
> alone plausible. AG
> 
> What is being computed is our consciousness. Physical reality is an 
> appearance inside our consciousness. The ontologically real physical reality 
> is also no more than an hypothesis, nothing more than hot air... but contrary 
> to you I do not attach myself to any hypothesis, I entertain them and see 
> where it could lead... I'm not an advocate of this or that contrary to you, 
> I'm not here to defend anything except the right to discuss it. Stop being a 
> old rat by adding violence to every post you make on this list... be an adult 
> and try to discuss instead of fighting like your live depends on it.
> 
> Quentin
> 
> You surely have a claim which you defend with gusto.
> 
> No I don't defend anything, you do. You defend an ontologically real physical 
> universe, and you don't back your claim. I entertain all idea.
>  
> All I have done is ask for the basis of your claim -- such as that our 
> consciousness is being computed -- but I haven't seen it.
> 
> It's an hypothesis not a claim, it has the same base as an ontologically real 
> physical universe, it's ex hipothesi, both are not compatible hypothesisn so 
> you can't frame one into the other, and that's precisely what you're asking.
>  
> I am not necessarily saying your wrong. I am just asking why you seem so 
> certain you are right.
> 
> I don't know where and when you've seen me asserting I'm certain of anything, 
> I'm just discussing hypothesis and see where that lead
>  
> I'm not even clear what it means to compute consciousness. AG 
> 
> Well if we create one day a full AGI, then that's what it will mean... it 
> will be a consciousness and computed... And for any computation, there are an 
> infinity of possible implementations, we are then in the idea of Bruno. But 
> that only work if computations have an ontological status (meaning they're 
> all *existing* timelessly)... 
> 
> But instead of insulting, you should read, we're in a discussion group after 
> all, and if you're not interrested in some hypothesis, don't read them... You 
> can have all the beliefs you want, here we're discussing, not asserting one's 
> belief is better and the other stupid...
> 
> At least being able to create a full AGI would give credence to the 
> computational hypothesis, but much more would need to be done, I'm not even 
> sure that can be settled, because it can easily lead to everything is 
> geography.
> 
> Quentin
> 
> AGI = artificial general intelligence? I see a world. It seems real. Your 
> hypothesis is that it's an illusion generated by computations, which are 
> somehow "real". Why should anyone entertain that hypothesis? How could 
> consciousness be generated by computations, and what is doing the 
> computations? A person's brain, or some super brain existing in hyperspace, 
> or beyond the space-time continuum? I get annoyed because I don't see 
> anything to hang my hat on, so to speak. It seems like fantasy talk. AG 
> 
> IMO, a world created by arithmetic computations is Platonism run amok.

That expression is super-ambiguous, but as far I can make sense, I agree, and 
the universal machine lardy agree too.

The physical reality is never created or constructed, it is only dreamed, and 
the physical reality emerges from the dreams, in a non computable way.

The dreams are all emulated with a big redundancy in arithmetic, and physics is 
determined by the mathematics of that redundancy, and that mathematics does not 
depend on the choice of the universal dreamer, nor of the basic ontology (which 
can be any Turing complete theory or system).

Bruno


> I see no reason to entertain this hypothesis. What is your plausibility 
> argument? AG
> 
> 
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