> On 8 Mar 2020, at 08:50, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sun, Mar 8, 2020 at 5:32 PM Russell Standish <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Fri, Mar 06, 2020 at 10:44:37AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > That is, in fact, false. It does not generate the same strings as flipping a > > coin in single world. Sure, each of the strings in Everett could have been > > obtained from coin flips -- but then the probability of a sequence of 10,000 > > heads is very low, whereas in many-worlds you are guaranteed that one > > observer > > will obtain this sequence. There is a profound difference between the two > > cases. > > You have made this statement multiple times, and it appears to be at > the heart of our disagreement. I don't see what the profound > difference is. > > If I select a subset from the set of all strings of length N, for example all > strings with exactly N/3 1s, then I get a quite specific value for the > proportion of the whole that match it: > > / N \ > | | 2^{-N} = p. > \N/3/ > > Now this number p will also equal the probability of seeing exactly > N/3 coins land head up when N coins are tossed. > > What is the profound difference? > > > Take a more extreme case. The probability of getting 1000 heads on 1000 coin > tosses is 1/2^1000. > If you measure the spin components of an ensemble of identical spin-half > particles, there will certainly be one observer who sees 1000 spin-up > results. That is the difference -- the difference between probability of > 1/2^1000 and a probability of one.
That is the 3-1p probability. You forget that the uncertainty is on the experience. You did accept that there is an 1p-uncertainty. > > In fact in a recent podcast by Sean Carroll (that has been discussed on the > list previously), he makes the statement that this rare event (with > probability p = 1/2^1000) certainly occurs. In other words, he is claiming > that the probability is both 1/2^1000 and one. That this is a flat > contradiction appears to escape him. The difference in probabilities between > coin tosses and Everettian measurements couldn't be more stark. The probability that someone get the sequence of only head is one, does not entaill that the probability that I am that one is 1. The flat contradiction disappear when you keep in mind that the uncertainty, that we wish to quantify in a manner or another, concerns the particular 1p accessible experience. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQC%3DCTYjUbZ4BHE78YuUrMTWkOHEV_%3DW6LB4Q4_pJ-SyA%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQC%3DCTYjUbZ4BHE78YuUrMTWkOHEV_%3DW6LB4Q4_pJ-SyA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2B41B3C9-228A-423B-B6C3-29135EFC84F1%40ulb.ac.be.
