On 6/5/2020 2:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 4 Jun 2020, at 20:35, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:



On 6/4/2020 4:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 3 Jun 2020, at 21:47, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:



On 6/3/2020 3:26 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
On Tuesday, June 2, 2020 at 12:34:37 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



    On 6/2/2020 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
    >> On 1 Jun 2020, at 22:43, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
    <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote:
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >> On 6/1/2020 2:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
    >>> Brent suggest that we might recover completeness by
    restricting N to a finite domain. That is correct, because all
    finite function are computable, but then, we have
    incompleteness directly with respect to the computable
    functions, even limited on finite but arbitrary domain. In
    fact, that moves makes the computer simply vanishing, and it
    makes Mechanism not even definable or expressible.
    >> That's going to come as a big shock to IBM stockholders.
    >
    > Why? On the contrary. IBM bets on universal machine

    No, they bet only on finite machines, and they will be very
    surprised to
    hear that they have vanished.

    Brent


For the most part computers are meant to run various algorithms that solve some restricted set of problems, say business applications. We use them largely as tools.

Mathematics is largely a tool.  My pure mathematics friends over on math-fun seem to have most of their fun on Mathematica.

Of course, this is close to Aristotelian theology. It assumes that there is something which is not mathematical in some reality. A platonism or a pythegaorean think that he physical universe is but a tool, invented by the numbers to figure out what happens, and what is real.

But once you grasp that all computations exists in arithmetic (or more exactly, that they are enabled by the arithmetical true relations), even without Mechanism, the charge are reversed. It is those who claim (in metaphysics, not in physics) that there is a primitive universe who have the task to provide evidence.

You have implicitly asserted that computation=reality. With not proof, or even evidence.

?

The UDA *proves* that the fundamental reality = arithmetic.

All proofs are relative to their premises.  You just assume arithmetic is real.

Brent

And AUDA (arithmetical Dovetailer Argument) makes the proof constructive, and it makes Mechanism testable, and the evidences for mechanism are striking, at a place where we know since 1500 years that Materialism is already refuted. Oh, yes, that is well hidden since 1500 years, by all gnostic (atheist or non atheists).

You are the one who seems to claim the existence of an ontological physical universe, where there is no proof nor any evidence.

When I kick it, it kicks back.

Evidences for a physical reality is not evidences for an ontological or primitive physical reality.

Nobody said it was.  But it is evidence for physical reality.  The thirst for an absolute primitive is a sickness of philosophy.

Brent

The confusion between both of those is know as Aristotle theology. The belief in primary matter or physicalism (mathematicalist or not).




Bruno





Brent

I have given the way to test this, and, thanks to QM, we can say that there are not yet any evidence found for a primitive physical universe. On the contrary, nature seems to obey exactly to what is needed for mechanism to be true.

Then, if we assume furthermore Mechanism, there is no more choice in this matter. Physics cannot be the fundamental science, it reduces to arithmetic (or any model of any Turing equivalent machinery) “seen-from inside”.

Bruno




Brent

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