On 6/9/2020 10:08 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the testable
implications of computationalism on physical law, and instead focus on
the following idea:
"How can we know if a robot is conscious?"
Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an exact
computational emulation, meaning exact functional equivalence. Then
let's say we can exactly control sensory input and perfectly monitor
motor control outputs between the two brains.
Given that computationalism implies functional equivalence, then
identical inputs yield identical internal behavior (nerve activations,
etc.) and outputs, in terms of muscle movement, facial expressions,
and speech.
If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain, and ask
them both to describe the pain, both will speak identical sentences.
Both will say it hurts when asked, and if asked to write a paragraph
describing the pain, will provide identical accounts.
Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that any scientific
objective third-person analysis or test is doomed to fail to find any
distinction in behaviors, and thus necessarily fails in its ability to
disprove consciousness in the functionally equivalent robot mind?
Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory of mind
before it reaches this testing roadblock?
If it acts conscious, then it is conscious.
But I think science/technology can go a lot further. I can look at the
information flow, where is memory and how is it formed and how is it
accessed and does this matter or not in the action of the entity. It
can look at the decision processes. Are there separate competing
modules (as Dennett hypothesizes) or is there a global workspace...and
again does it make a difference. What does it take to make the entity
act happy, sad, thoughtful, bored, etc.
Brent
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