On Tue, Jun 9, 2020 at 6:03 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 at 03:08, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > >> For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the testable >> implications of computationalism on physical law, and instead focus on the >> following idea: >> >> "How can we know if a robot is conscious?" >> >> Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an exact >> computational emulation, meaning exact functional equivalence. Then let's >> say we can exactly control sensory input and perfectly monitor motor >> control outputs between the two brains. >> >> Given that computationalism implies functional equivalence, then >> identical inputs yield identical internal behavior (nerve activations, >> etc.) and outputs, in terms of muscle movement, facial expressions, and >> speech. >> >> If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain, and ask them >> both to describe the pain, both will speak identical sentences. Both will >> say it hurts when asked, and if asked to write a paragraph describing the >> pain, will provide identical accounts. >> >> Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that any scientific >> objective third-person analysis or test is doomed to fail to find any >> distinction in behaviors, and thus necessarily fails in its ability to >> disprove consciousness in the functionally equivalent robot mind? >> >> Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory of mind before >> it reaches this testing roadblock? >> > > We can’t know if a particular entity is conscious, but we can know that if > it is conscious, then a functional equivalent, as you describe, is also > conscious. This is the subject of David Chalmers’ paper: > > http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html > Chalmers' argument is that if a different brain is not conscious, then somewhere along the way we get either suddenly disappearing or fading qualia, which I agree are philosophically distasteful. But what if someone is fine with philosophical zombies and suddenly disappearing qualia? Is there any impossibility proof for such things? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUjnn2DQwit%2Bj%3DYdXbXZbwHTv_PZa7GRKXwdo31gTAFygg%40mail.gmail.com.
