> On 18 Oct 2020, at 19:08, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Fri, Oct 16, 2020 at 6:44 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >> On 15 Oct 2020, at 04:38, Jason Resch <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> I just finished an article on all the science behind fine-tuning, and how >> the evidence suggests an infinite, and possibly complete reality. I thought >> others on this list might appreciate it: >> https://alwaysasking.com/was-the-universe-made-for-life/ >> <https://alwaysasking.com/was-the-universe-made-for-life/> >> >> I welcome any discussion, feedback, or corrections. > > > Fine-tuning + physical realism implies the many-things (many-worlds or > many-histories, or many indexical relative-state). > > But fine tuning is a bit like superdeterminisme, it is a not much a theory, > than something in need to be explained. > > I agree, fine-tuning is something that calls for explanation, an apparent > mystery, > > > Fine-tuning + some hypothesis like existence and unicity of a “universe” > might be seen as an evidence for a designer, but it make it only consistent > or possible, which is far less than necessary. God or Universe ontological > commitment are, like super-determinisms more like tool to abandon the > research instead of digging on a problem, and discover perhaps something new. > Fine tuning is close to being tautological, and cannot be used in an > explanation, even if true. > > I consider the appearance of fine-tuning as evidence for a reality that is > much greater than the universe we can see.
I agree with you on this. Now, with the Digital Mechanist hypothesis (in cognitive science), we know that we can limit that reality to any model of any elementary theory of arithmetic, which is so big that it is not even definable in any first order theory, not even in ZF, and higher order theory are not really theories at all, unless made effective, but then they are representable in first order theories. The arithmetical reality is 3P big, but very small compared to a model of ZF. But the internal view by universal machine in arithmetic is bigger than a model of ZF. It is unconceivably bigger than ourselves. > > > With Digital Mechanism, there I no matter of choice, adding anything > ontological to any universal machinery brings a contradiction, and the > “many-worlds” is reduced to the many-computations, which we know to be > emulated in the arithmetical reality (indeed the common part of arithmetic > already assumed by all scientists, consciously or not). Now, with digital > mechanism, the fine tuning is organised by the modes of self-reference, and > all universal machine have the same modes, and their fist person perspective > can be seen as self-fine tuner. (Even more so for []p & <>t and even still > more so the same with the “& p”). > > What do you mean by “infinite complete reality”? > > By complete I mean that anything that is possible to exist does. I see your > point though that "possible" depends on the model one assumes, which I did > leave open. OK. > > Realities or models are complete by definition. Also, “reality” is always > ambiguous, as we don’t know if this refers to an arithmetical reality or a > physical realty, or a psychological reality, etc. > > > That's a good point, and it does need clarification. I will be sure to make > the assumed model clear when I write on the subject of "why does anything > exist", for which arithmetic appears to be the simplest model compatible with > our current observations. It is not that simple, as the arithmetical reality, in its entirety, is not axiomatizable. That realm is essentially undecidable, and things get “worst” when viewed from inside. That is why it is the simplest *conceptually* choice. They can not be any another (except for those Turing equivalent) because if you add something, it would need to be non Turing emulable, nor first person recoverable to not being part of the arithmetical machine phenomenology, which would rise a serious doubt before saying yes to a mechanist doctor. Bruno > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhQO2mF7zTDmA3mxXgcC_9DvP5HRvj225uyG-TMCC5UDA%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhQO2mF7zTDmA3mxXgcC_9DvP5HRvj225uyG-TMCC5UDA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/91A30B02-D87F-4F9B-B999-92257312D322%40ulb.ac.be.
