On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 22:17, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 9:41 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 21:32, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 6:27 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 12:29, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 12:13 PM Stathis Papaioannou < >>>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> One is the probability that a certain branch exists, the other is the >>>>>> subjective probability that a being with the feeling that he is a unique >>>>>> individual persisting through time will experience a particular branch. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> According to the individual on the branch, the Born probability is the >>>>> probability that that branch will exist -- it is an objective property of >>>>> the branch. It is a subjective probability only to the extent to which the >>>>> individual believes in Lewis's Principal Principle! >>>>> >>>> >>>> The probability that the branch exists under MWI, as you have rightly >>>> pointed out, is 1. The probability that an entity that can randomly land in >>>> any branch lands in one particular branch is given by the Born rule. >>>> >>> >>> In other words, you have a dualist interpretation of personhood. There >>> is an exact copy of 'you' on every branch. 'You' do not randomly land on >>> any branch unless there is a unique 'you' specified in some dualst manner. >>> >> >> Like everyone, I feel that I am a unique individual persisting through >> time, which does not cause conceptual problems if there is only one extant >> version of me at a time, but does if there are multiple versions. I know >> that this feeling I have is just a contingent fact about human psychology. >> If I were a dualist, I would believe that it was some sort of metaphysical >> truth. >> > > It can be a metaphysical truth without there being any dualist > underpinnings. The problem, as you point out, is when there are multiple > copies of you extant at a single time. If you consider yourself to be a > random selection from this reference class, then you have made the dualist > assumption that there is something that picks you out -- something that > distinguishes you from all the other copies. Whereas, in reality, all the > copies are the same and must think the same: they can deduce that they are > not special, and that the probability for the existence of each copy is > exactly one -- the Born probabilities have no bearing on their existence > because they inevitably exist regardless of the magnitude of the > mod-squared quantum amplitude. There is no process that selects just one > individual copy at random from a distribution, whether it be the uniform > distribution over branches, or the probability distribution obtained by > Born weighting each branch. > I know that all the other copies feel as I do, that they are the unique continuation of the original. For an entity that feels this way, the Born probabilities apply. Call it delusional, call it dualist, but it’s the way everyone’s mind works. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWmX-d4N6vBKi6J5amtyb2o8F3sZYwfKJokosDZZ9keiA%40mail.gmail.com.
