On Sat, 26 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 25, 2020 at 11:29 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> On Fri, 25 Dec 2020 at 22:17, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> It can be a metaphysical truth without there being any dualist >>> underpinnings. The problem, as you point out, is when there are multiple >>> copies of you extant at a single time. If you consider yourself to be a >>> random selection from this reference class, then you have made the dualist >>> assumption that there is something that picks you out -- something that >>> distinguishes you from all the other copies. Whereas, in reality, all the >>> copies are the same and must think the same: they can deduce that they are >>> not special, and that the probability for the existence of each copy is >>> exactly one -- the Born probabilities have no bearing on their existence >>> because they inevitably exist regardless of the magnitude of the >>> mod-squared quantum amplitude. There is no process that selects just one >>> individual copy at random from a distribution, whether it be the uniform >>> distribution over branches, or the probability distribution obtained by >>> Born weighting each branch. >>> >> >> I know that all the other copies feel as I do, that they are the unique >> continuation of the original. For an entity that feels this way, the Born >> probabilities apply. >> > > The Born probabilities apply because a single-world model has been adopted > by default. You cannot prove that there are any intrinsic probabilities in > a deterministic branching world. > People in a deterministic branching world will say “I tossed a coin many times and about half the time it came up heads”. They will then assign a probability of 1/2 to heads coming up on the next toss. I don’t know if you would call this an “intrinsic probability”, but that is what would happen. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypXzYj6tDsjExGhL9r3VXWf1j8Ap8ZsqiJJ%2B2WLU0W%2Bajw%40mail.gmail.com.
