> On 10 Mar 2021, at 10:18, Tomas Pales <litewav...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, March 10, 2021 at 6:40:51 AM UTC+1 Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/9/2021 3:52 PM, Tomas Pales wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, March 10, 2021 at 12:29:07 AM UTC+1 Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 3/9/2021 3:03 PM, Tomas Pales wrote:
>>> The law of identity determines what can possibly exist, namely that which 
>>> is identical to itself. But what is the difference between a possibly 
>>> existing object and a "really" existing object? I see no difference, and 
>>> hence all possible objects exist, necessarily.
>> 
>> So everything that does not exist is something that cannot possibly exist.  
>> But does that mean in the future or just now.  If it means just now then 
>> it's a trivial tautology, equivalent to "It is what it is." and has no 
>> useful content.  But if it means now and the future, even confined to the 
>> near future, it's false.
>> 
>> 
>> When you talk about something you must define it. The temporal position of 
>> an object is part of its definition (identity). So when object X can exist 
>> at time t, then it must exist at time t. It's trivial, just an example of 
>> the law of identity. 
>> 
>>> 
>>> To which someone might say something like: "But there is a red car parked 
>>> in front of my house. Isn't it possible that, at this moment, a blue car 
>>> would be parked there instead? Then the blue car would be a possible object 
>>> that obviously doesn't exist." Um, no. A red car can't be blue; that would 
>>> be a contradiction, a violation of the law of identity, and hence 
>>> impossible. A blue car might be parked in front of my house in a different 
>>> possible world but then we are talking about a different world, and not 
>>> really about my house either but rather about a copy of my house in that 
>>> other world - and the fact that you can't see that other world is not a 
>>> proof that it doesn't exist.
>> 
>> c.f. Russell's teapot.
>> 
>> c.f. Granny's glasses - when she can't find them, they don't exist
>> 
>> The question is what is the difference between a possibly existing object 
>> and a "really" existing object? The fact that you don't see something 
>> doesn't mean that it doesn't exist.
> 
> That you can put it's name in a sentence doesn't mean it does exist either. 
> Or even that it's (nomologically) possible.
> 
> I am not saying that something exists. I am not even saying that something is 
> possible (identical to itself). I am just saying that if something is 
> possible then it exists, because I don't see a difference between possible 
> and "real" existence.


That is close how logicians relativise existence, in some theory, to existence 
in a model of that theory. 

Now, by using both Gödel completeness (a theory has a model iff the theory is 
consistent) and incompleteness theorem (no theory can prove all arithmetical 
truth), we get that no machine can prove the existence of a model satisfying 
its theorem, and that is why all machine get mystical, as they do experience a 
reality without being able to justify its existence.

Bruno,



> 
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