> On 10 Mar 2021, at 23:38, Tomas Pales <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, March 10, 2021 at 4:12:21 PM UTC+1 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> On 10 Mar 2021, at 00:03, Tomas Pales <[email protected] >> <applewebdata://E7C26EC6-C2BB-4B67-99A4-E039F230E093>> wrote: >> >> The law of identity determines what can possibly exist, namely that which is >> identical to itself. But what is the difference between a possibly existing >> object and a "really" existing object? I see no difference, and hence all >> possible objects exist, necessarily. > > But what is an object? > > Good question. Whatever an object is, it seems it must necessarily have these > two kinds of relations to other objects: > > 1) composition relation (the relation between a part and a whole, or between > an object and a collection (combination, set) of objects that includes this > object) > 2) instantiation relation (the relation between an object and its property) > > Having a composition relation means being a part or having a part (all > objects are parts of a greater object, and some objects also have parts). > Having an instantiation relation means having a property or being a property > (all objects have a property, and some objects are also properties). Wouldn't > you agree that every possible object must have these two kinds of relations?
I translate this by “an object is an element of a set together with some structure or laws. OK? So vectors, numbers, maps, can all be seen as (mathematical) object. (And with mechanism, we can then deduce that there is no physical object, although the mind can easily approximate them by some “object” (build by the mind). > > The composition relation generates all possible collections (combinations, > sets), down to empty collections (non-composite objects) and maybe even > without bottom as long as there is no contradiction. And the instantiation > relation generates all possible properties and objects that have these > properties, down to collections (which are not properties of anything else) > and maybe even without bottom as long as there is no contradiction. OK. In math we use often set theory, intuitively (or formally) to define, or better to represent, the different object we want to talk about. It is known that arithmetic (the natural numbers) can be used too, for most of the usual mathematics (including a lot of constructive real objects, and more, but not all real numbers) With mechanism, we can (and must, up to a Turing-equivalence) take as only “metaphysically, or ontologically real” object the natural numbers (0, s0, ss0, …). > > So, there are two kinds of objects: collections and properties (roughly > synonymous with concrete and abstract objects, respectively). “Concrete” is a tricky term which does not survive Mechanism, which reverse not just physics and psychology-theology, but also abstract and concrete. Just 0, s0, … are concrete, but a physical object like a table becomes abstract. It looks concrete phenomenologically, but that is because we have millions of neurons making us feel that way. > Actually, we might count relations as a third kind of object because, after > all, they are something too. Abstract relations are also properties of > concrete relations (for example the abstract/general composition relation is > a property of any concrete composition relation). In logic, the basic object are the intended meaning of the term of the theory, then we can build higher order logics. > > I agree that Unicorn can exist, in the mind of some people, or in a dream, > but most would say that Unicorn do no exist, because being fictional is part > of their definition. > > Minds are parts of reality, We cannot really invoke “reality” as its very nature is part of the inquiry. > so parts of minds (like unicorns) are parts of reality too. Like every > object, unicorns exist in the way in which they are defined, in this case as > parts of minds. And maybe in some other world also outside of minds, as long > as there is no contradiction. > > Or take a square circle, or a dog which is also a cat… > > These are not possible objects because their definition violates the law of > identity. What is a circle that is not a circle? Nothing. > > Why? A red can which is blue can be identical with itself. All odd natural > number solution to 2x = x + 1 are equal to itself, despite not existing. Your > self-identity criteria is too weak for being a criteria of existence. > > A red car that is blue is a red car that is not red. Violation of law of > identity, therefore nothing. Fair enough, at least with a content relative to the metaphysics, or basic ontology we assume at the start. Bruno > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/cd4c87ad-ebdf-488a-9d0e-66e4f9d7e0f3n%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/cd4c87ad-ebdf-488a-9d0e-66e4f9d7e0f3n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/C34F36E7-B97D-4E63-B0A9-6917FA454791%40ulb.ac.be.
