> On 10 Mar 2021, at 22:49, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/10/2021 7:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 9 Mar 2021, at 20:06, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> <[email protected] 
>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 3/9/2021 5:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> On 6 Feb 2021, at 20:27, John Clark <[email protected] 
>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> Parallel Worlds Probably Exist. Here’s Why 
>>>>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kTXTPe3wahc&t=7s>
>>>>> 
>>>>> John K Clark
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> My comment there:
>>>> 
>>>> <<
>>>> Why to assume even one universe? We know since the 1930s that all models 
>>>> of elementary arithmetic execute all computations, and that no universal 
>>>> machine can know which computations  support it, and indeed that if the 
>>>> machine looks below at itself (and environment) its Mechanist Substitution 
>>>> level, she has to see the statistical impact of the "parallel 
>>>> computation". The only problem is that the wave itself must be explained 
>>>> by the logics of machine self-reference mathematics, and that is what I 
>>>> did (already in the 1970s, but I took it as an argument against Mechanism, 
>>>> as I was not aware that the physicists were already there. The advantage 
>>>> is a simpler "theory of everything" (elementary arithmetic or Turing 
>>>> equivalent), but also that we get very naturally the qualia/quanta 
>>>> distinctions. This if unfortunately not well known, and of course 
>>>> physicalist or materialist philosophers hate this, as physics become 
>>>> reducible to pure arithmetic/computer science.
>>>> >>
>>>> 
>>>> We do have evidence for a physical reality, but we don’t have any evidence 
>>>> that the physical reality if the fundamental reality, and I can argue that 
>>>> we have a lot of evidence that the fundamental reality is not physical, 
>>>> but arithmetical. We have even a proof once we assume the (indexical and 
>>>> digital) Mechanist hypothesis in the cognitive science (not in the 
>>>> physical science).
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> Whatever explains every possibility, fails to explain anything at all.
>> 
>> That is how Deustch refuted Schmidhuber, perhaps, but it does not refute 
>> mechanism and its consequences, and indeed, the theory explains what we 
>> observe, and discard what we don’t observe, and this not just for the 
>> observable but also the sensible, the justifiable, etc.
>> 
>> You might critique all theories of everything, as they explain everything, 
>> but that is interesting only if we can make prediction, both positive and 
>> negative, like physical laws. But with mechanism we have an explanation of 
>> where the physical laws come from, and why they give rise to sharable 
>> quanta, and non sharable qualia.
> 
> A good example.  You have an explanation of where physical laws come from 
> because you have theory that explains every possible physical law (according 
> to you).

?

It explains the actual physical laws, which are “necessary” with Mechanism (not 
“possible”). 

It is not my theory. It is the same (Digital) Mechanism that we need for 
attributing an explanative power to Darwin’s theory of Evolution, confirmed by 
the existence of a genetic code, which makes us digital as far as our 
biological current theory are approximately correct. 

The whole point is that it makes the appearance of a physical reality as a 
*necessary* consequence of incompleteness, and this in a constructive way so 
that if we find the slightest discrepancy between this Turing machine 
introspective physics and the actual observations, we would refute Mechanism 
(or bet on some conspiration, but that is a trivial non interesting move). That 
did not yet happen. 

It makes the laws of physics unique. Indeed, the whole physicalness is an 
invariant for *all* digital machines. Physics emerge from *all* computation. A 
Turing machine already proves that “If heaven exists, it too obeys quantum 
mechanics". Mechanism makes physics much more solid than the usual Aristotelian 
extrapolation from observation can let us hope.

With Mechanism physics is literally reduced to arithmetic, and this through the 
appearances that the arithmetical reality got when viewed by inside by Löbian 
machine.

This will not kill the physical science, because such a physics is useless as a 
prediction tool, but it is useful to remain modest, and especially to avoid the 
elimination of the (first) person, and consciousness, that the (weak) 
materialist are obliged to do if they want to keep up mechanism. But this 
contradicts the only data we can really be sure about: personal consciousness. 

Digital Mechanism just enforces us to extend Darwin’s evolution idea to the 
origin of the physical realm, a branch of the bio-psycho-theology of (relative) 
numbers.

The theory exists, it works up to now.



> 
>> 
>> Physics fails. Not only it has not yet any unique theory of the universe, 
>> but two contradicting theories, but it does not address at all the question 
>> of consciousness, for good reason: it fails on this. It uses an identity 
>> thesis incompatible with Mechanism, used already in Darwin and in Molecular 
>> Biology. That is why strict materialist believer
> 
> There's a big difference between being a believer and a scientist.   I'm 
> content to regard problems as unsolved until someone finds a solution.

I agree. A scientist should avoid any ontological commitment different that the 
implicit model of the terms he is using, but even that model can only be 
implicit (by incompleteness).

The problem here is that there are still many scientists (or pseudo-scientists 
perhaps) who believe in a primary physical universe, like if that was a 
scientific fact. That is not a problem for using physics, but it is a problem 
when doing metaphysics, as we are, in that case, not allowed to decide the 
nature of Reality: it is simply part of the inquiry. 
Now, we cannot start from the empty theory, so we have at least to agree on 
something, and with mechanism, we can start from elementary arithmetical truth, 
like x + 0 = x. We don’t need 0 + x = x, and indeed that is not provable in Q.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>> come up with the idea that consciousness is an illusion (but that is 
>> non-sensical), or just eliminate persons and consciousness altogether, which 
>> is not really satisfying…
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
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