Hi Jason, I discover your post just now, sorry.
> On 31 Mar 2021, at 17:58, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > I was thinking about what aspects of conscious experience are communicable > and which are not, and I realized all communication relies on some > pre-existing shared framework. OK. It presupposes that we (the communicating entities) share some Reality, which is not rationally justifiable (by using both Gödel completeness theorem and Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem). Consistency (~[]f, <>t) is equivalent with “existence of a reality/model” by the completeness theorem, and in no provable by arithmetically sound machine by the second incompleteness theorem). That corroborates the idea that consciousness is an (instinctive) belief in *some* reality. > > It's not only things like "red" that are meaningless to someone whose never > seen it, but likewise things like spatial extent and dimensionslity would > likewise be incommunicable to someone who had no experience with moving in, > or through, space. > > Even communicating quantities requires a pre-existing and common system of > units and measures. Only for the quantities that we assume to be correlated to some empirical reality. In mathematics there is no units, so if we can agree on some mathematical axiomatic, we can communicate/justify-rationally many things. It is the link with some assumed Reality which is not communicable here. > > So all communication (inputs/outputs) consist of meaningless but strings. It > is only when a bit string is combined with some processing that meaning can > be shared. Yes. You communicate the number x, and the universal machine will interpret it as phi_x. The universal machine is the interpreter. It works, apparently, as you have succeeded to make a machine understanding that she has to send me your mail. > The reason we can't communicate "red" to someone whose never seen it is we > would need to transmit a description of the processing done by our brains in > order to share what red means to oneself. But that would not be enough, as this presupposes that you could know-for-sure, your mechanist substitution level, which is impossible. So again, the communication of a qualia is impossible. We can communicate a theory. We can agree on the axioms, and communicate consequences, but the semantic is not communicated and we can only hope the others have enough similar interpretations, although that is not part of what can ever be communicated (in the strong sense of “rationally justified”). > > So in summary, I wonder if anything is communicabke, not just qualia, but > anything at all, when there's not already common processing systems between > the sender and receiver, of the information. We need to share a common axiomatics (implicit in our brain, or explicit by agreeing on some theory). If you agree that for all x and y we have that Kxy = x, I will be able to communicate that KAB = A. I you agree with Robinson’s axioms for arithmetic, we will agree on all sigma_1 sentences, which includes the universal dovetailing… If we agree on Mechanism, the whole of physics becomes communicable, despite it being a first person (plural) notions. Then, in case we do share some physical reality, we can communicate units in the ostensive way (like defining a meter to be the length of some metallic piece in a French museum, or defining it by some natural phenomena described in some theory on which we already agree). In the machine’s metaphysics/theology/psychology we have the 5 modes, which separated into 8 modes, and what is on the right is what is not communicable (in the strong sense above): 1) p 2) []p []p 3) []p & p 4) []p & <>t []p & <>t 5) []p & <>t & p []p & <>t & p The qualia (and the quanta, actually, which are special case of qualia, with mechanism) appears on the right (so they belong to G* \ G) at line “4)" and “5)", although a case can be made they appears also at line “3)”. Basically, everything provable in G is communicable, and everything in G* minus G is not. (Technically I should use G1 and G1*, that is G + (p->[]p), but I don’t want to dig on technics here). We can communicate what is rational, but incompleteness impose a surrational corona in between the rational and the irrational (falsity). If we assume mechanism, it is provable that already the intended semantic of arithmetical theories are not communicable, even if we have the intimate feeling of not having any problem to conceive the standard model of arithmetic. Yet, we can communicate 0, s0, ss0, …, and we can communicate codes of universal machines, making the whole sigma_1 truth communicable, although not as such, without accepting larger non communicable intuition, like Mechanism itself (which is non rationally justifiable but still extrapolable from personal life and public theories, like Darwin, biology, …). I do think that there is no problem below sigma_1. Above sigma_1, there is already matter of debate…, and things get different if we accept or reject the Mechanist Hypothesis. Bruno > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhC%3Dq%3D1t6mQzo%2BLLZCOrpXFK9etNojhQ-hgb%2BZaE2wr0A%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhC%3Dq%3D1t6mQzo%2BLLZCOrpXFK9etNojhQ-hgb%2BZaE2wr0A%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/92EA8BBA-21AC-4F7B-998A-2A238E5C0566%40ulb.ac.be.
