On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 21:51, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 9:31 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 20:29, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 7:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 19:35, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 6:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>>>> [email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 18:12, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 5:50 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>>>>>> [email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tue, 21 Dec 2021 at 15:55, Brent Meeker <[email protected]>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 12/20/2021 6:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The probabilities come from the fact that observers consider
>>>>>>>>> themselves unique individuals persisting through time.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But that doesn't imply any kind of probability unless they regard
>>>>>>>>> themselves as the one member of an ensemble that is unique, e.g. the 
>>>>>>>>> one
>>>>>>>>> that really exists or the one that's really me.  Otherwise they are 
>>>>>>>>> just
>>>>>>>>> like the duplicate Captain Kirks.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Each copy does indeed feel as if they are the one true continuation
>>>>>>>> of the original even though they know that they are not, because that 
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>> the nature of first person experience.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You still need to introduce an independent notion of probability
>>>>>>> because each member must consider himself to be a random selection from 
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> ensemble. The notion of a random selection cannot be defined without
>>>>>>> reference to some prior notion of probability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes, but you don't need any specific theory about how your identity
>>>>>> moves from one body into the next.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You just need some credible evidence that such a notion even begins to
>>>>> make sense.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It makes sense that I feel myself to be a unique individual persisting
>>>> through time, because everyone understands what it means. Some people try
>>>> to come up with theories based on this feeling, such as the existence of an
>>>> immaterial soul, but that doesn’t follow. My feeling that I am a unique
>>>> individual persisting through time stands independently of whatever entity
>>>> or gives rise to this feeling.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't know where you think you are going with this. Continuation of
>>>  personal identity through time was not what we were talking about.
>>> Persistence through time does not involve self-locating uncertainty from an
>>> ensemble at a point in time.
>>>
>>
>> If one version of me will see the atom decay and the other version of me
>> will not see the atom decay, there is a 1/2 chance that I will see the atom
>> decay, because of the symmetry of the situation and because I feel myself
>> to be a unique individual persisting through time, even though I might know
>> the objective details of what is occurring.
>>
>
> I don't see how persistence through time has any bearing on the
> probability. If there is a split, then the probability that you will see
> one or the other result depends on the magnitudes of the wave function for
> the branches. That is the Born rule, and it is an independent assumption,
> as is the fact that there is a probability interpretation at all.
> Self-locating uncertainty only gives you a measure of the probability if
> the number of branches with each outcome matches the Born probabilities.
>

Under MWI every outcome happens, so the probability of each outcome is 1.
How do you justify calculating probabilities for outcomes that are less
than 1?

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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